Norwegian and Danish defence policy: a comparative study of the Post-Cold War era by Saxi, Håkon Lunde

Defence and Security Studies
is a peer-reviewed monograph series published 
by the Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies 
in Oslo.
It provides in-depth studies of topics which 
include all aspects of defence policy, security 
relations in Northern Europe and the Trans-
atlantic and Eurasian area, military and civilian 
crisis operations, as well as relations within and 
between security actors such as NATO, the EU 
and the UN. 
The series welcomes contributions from histori-
ans, political scientists, scholars of international 
relations and war/security studies, as well as 
scholars from other disciplines or practitioners 
in the above mentioned fields.
It aims to reach an audience of academic re-
searchers, defence and foreign affairs analysts, 
politicians, diplomats, journalists, as well as 
others with a special interest in this field of 
research.
Editor: Anna Therese Klingstedt  
(e-mail: therese.klingstedt@ifs.mil.no)
Editorial Board
Dr Kristina Spohr-Readman, London School of 
Economics 
Dr Maria Strömvik, University of Lund 
Dr Henning-André Frantzen, The Norwegian 
Army 
Prof. Rolf Hobson, Norwegian Institute for De-
fence Studies.
Advisory board
Prof. Wilhelm Agrell, University of Lund 
Prof. Mats Berdal, King’s College London 
Prof. Beatrice Heuser, University of Reading 
Dr Johnny Laursen, University of Aarhus 
Dr Joseph Maiolo, King’s College London 
Prof. Helge Pharo, University of Oslo 
Prof. Kimmo Rentola, University of Turku 
Dr Tomas Ries, Director, Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs 
Prof. Patrick Salmon, Chief Historian, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, London 
Prof. Emeritus Krister Wahlbäck, University of 
Umeå and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stock-
holm 
Prof. Øyvind Østerud, University of Oslo.
Manuscripts
Guidelines for contributors appear on page three 
of the cover.
Subscription
Defence and Security Studies is published 4 
times a year. Subscribers to the series automati-
cally also receive the Oslo Files on Defence and 
Security series of studies aimed more towards the 
general public. Oslo Files on Defence and Security 
publishes articles in Scandinavian languages or 
English 6–8 times a year.
Subscription rates
Institutions: NOK 600
Individuals: NOK 300
Single issues can be obtained subject to avail-
ability. Prices are subject to change without 
notice and are available upon request. 
To subscribe or order single issues, please contact
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
Skippergata 17c
P.O. Box 890 Sentrum 
N-0104 OSLO, Norway 
Phone +47 23 09 77 00  
Fax + 47 23 09 77 49  
e-mail: info@ifs.mil.no
The Norwegian Institute for  
Defence Studies
The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
is an independent institute administratively 
attached to the Norwegian Defence University 
College. The Institute conducts independent 
research on Norwegian security and defence 
policy, military concepts and theory, 
international conflicts and cooperation and 
transatlantic relations. The Consultative 
Board for Defence Studies assists the Institute 
in developing and conducting research 
programmes. The Board is composed of 
representatives from the defence establishment 
and the University of Oslo.  
Director: Professor Rolf Tamnes.
ISSN: 1504-6532
ISBN: 978-82-91571-12-6
Contents
page
Norwegian and Danish 
defence policy
A comparative study of the post-Cold War era
Introduction	 5
Explaining	the	difference	 9
Sources	 13
International	military	operations	 14
The	long	lines	 17
Defence	policy	1720–1949	 17
The	Cold	War	 22
The	armed	forces	during	the	Cold	War	 25
After	the	Cold	War	 29
Armed	forces	reform	1990–94	 29
Gulf	War	I	and	the	Balkan	Wars	 34
The	Baltic	states	 39
Defence	reforms	after	the	Bosnian	War	 40
In	the	aftermath	of	9/11	 47
Afghanistan	and	Iraq	 47
Defence	reforms	2002–08		 52
Understanding	the	1990−2008	difference	 58
The	impact	of	geopolitics	 61
The	security	environment	of	the	1990s	 62
Reforms	in	the	21st	century	 67
Weapon	procurement	 71
The	impact	of	geopolitics	 73
The	impact	of	leadership	 75
Decision-making	structures	 76
Denmark:	the	“dynamic	duo”	 76
page
Norway	in	the	1990s:	continuity	 80
Norway	after	2000:	change	 84
The	importance	of	leadership		 88
The	impact	of	strategic	culture	 91
Denmark:	reinventing	itself	 92
Norway:	a	humanitarian	superpower	 94
War,	risk	perception	and	sovereignty	 97
Lingering	strategic	tasks	 98
The	significance	of	strategic	culture	 100
The	impact	of	military	culture	 103
Different	experiences	in	the	1990s	 104
Personnel	policies	 108
Different	responses	to	internationalisation	 112
The	effect	of	military	culture	 117
Conclusion	 119
Geopolitics,	leadership,	strategic	and	military	culture	 120
The	present	and	the	future	 123
Final	remarks	 125
Bibliography	 127
a
b
st
ra
ct
ISSN 1504-6532  •  ISBN  978-82-91571-12-6  © Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
info@ifs.mil.no – www.ifs.mil.no
Norwegian Intitute 
for Defence Studies
Norwegian and Danish 
defence policy
A comparative study of the post-Cold War era
This study argues that in the field of defence policy, Norway and 
Denmark pursued markedly different paths in the post-Cold War era. 
Investigating the period 1990–2008, the study demonstrates Norwe-
gian reluctance to get involved in the growing number of international 
military operations after the Cold War, initially doing so only with low-
risk support units. Denmark, however, welcomed the new international 
paradigm whereby the armed forces were employed actively in the ser-
vice of the country’s foreign policy. Embracing expeditionary deploy-
ment at an early stage, Danish units were frequently among the few 
Western forces to take part in actual combat operations abroad. 
 The study identifies four key reasons for this difference. Firstly, Den-
mark’s geopolitical situation allowed it to focus on distant threats, 
while Norway’s remained tied to threats closer to home. Secondly, Nor-
wegian leaders were generally satisfied with the Cold War defence pol-
icy, while the Danish leadership actively sought a break with the past. 
Thirdly, Danish strategic culture brought with it a reappraisal of the util-
ity and morality of utilizing force, while Norway remained committed 
to the traditional Nordic view. Finally, while Danish military culture was 
easily adapted and receptive to the new post-Cold War expeditionary 
mission, the Norwegian Armed Forces remained more comfortable 
with their historically defined territorial defence tasks.
Key Words: Norwegian defence, Danish defence, international military opera-
tions, geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture, military culture
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CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DIB Danish International Brigade
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NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace 
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PSO Peace Support Operations
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United Nations Operations
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
Introduction
Norway and Denmark are two countries with a great many similari-
ties. The two states share a common Scandinavian language and cul-
ture, very similar democratic political systems, a generous welfare 
state, and even membership in the same military alliance. For many 
non-Scandinavians the two states may appear almost politically and 
socially indistinguishable. However, even very similar countries can 
sometimes develop marked differences in particular sectors of society. 
This study will argue that defence policy is one such sector. After the 
Cold War Norway was reluctant to get involved in international mili-
tary operations, and initially did so only with low-risk support units. 
Denmark, however, wholeheartedly embraced expeditionary deploy-
ment of its Armed Forces, and Danish units were frequently among 
the few Western forces to take part in actual combat. In the two dec-
ades that have passed since the end of the Cold War, Norwegian and 
Danish defence policies have therefore differed significantly.
Images can provide a powerful insight into similarities and differ-
ences. Two snapshots of Norwegian and Danish post-Cold War military 
operations may serve in this case to illustrate some of the differences. 
The first is from the Bosnia and Herzegovinan city of Tuzla, April 
1994, just a few years after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Danish 
Leopard 1 main battle tanks are engaged in a regular battle with 
Bosnian Serb forces, possibly killing as many as 150 Bosnian Serbs.1 If 
the Danes need medical aid, Norwegians medics stand ready to assist; 
if they need medical evacuation Norwegian helicopters are available 
to fly them out; if they need logistical support the Norwegians can 
provide it.2 The Norwegians provided support, but unlike the Danes 
1 Lars R. Møller, Operation Bøllebank: Soldater i kamp (Copenhagen: Høst & Søns Forlag, 
2001), 276–299.
2 For background on the Norwegian contributions to the international military engage-
ment in the Balkans in the 1990s, see Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tam-
nes, Allianseforsvar i endring: 1970–2000, vol. 5, Norsk forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide 
Forlag, 2004), 208–216.
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they did not fight. The Danes did battle; the Norwegians were “in the 
rear, with the gear”.
The second is from Afghanistan, August 2006, separated in other 
words by only a few years from the present day. Danish soldiers in 
lightly armoured vehicles drive to the tiny village of Musa Qala in 
southern Afghanistan to relieve a platoon of British paratroopers. Over 
the next 36 days the Danish soldiers endured over 70 Taliban attacks, 
and killed at least 25 enemy combatants before they were relieved in 
turn by British troops. The encampment they held was nicknamed the 
Alamo, due to its being totally isolated and surrounded on all sides 
by hostile fighters.3 The Norwegians were also in Afghanistan, this 
time with combat troops. The Norwegian units in Afghanistan were 
trained, organised and equipped to fight, having brought heavily 
armed and well-armoured CV9030N infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). 
Seemingly, the Norwegians were now ready to fight alongside the 
Danes. But they did not engage in battle. The reason was simple: the 
regular Norwegian soldiers were not stationed at Musa Quala, but at 
Maymana and Mazar-e Sharif. Both are in the north, far from where the 
Danes were battling the Taliban insurgents.4
These two simple images, snapped twelve years apart, illustrate 
a basic difference between Danish and Norwegian defence policy in 
the post-Cold War era. While the Danes have been ready and able to 
fight alongside (mostly) British and American troops in places far from 
Denmark, Norwegian troops have been more reluctant both to go 
and especially to fight. Why is this? Only a fairly limited number of 
English-language publications offer a comparative view of Norwegian 
and Danish defence policies in the post-Cold War era. One of the most 
exceptional is the work of the Danish International Relations schol-
ar Peter Viggo Jakobsen, who published a comparative study of the 
Nordic states’ approach to peace operation in the post-Cold War era.5 
While an excellent study, Jakobsen does not explore the pronounced 
differences he finds between the two NATO countries Norway and 
Denmark more widely.
3 Jens Ringsmose, “Heltene fra Musa Qala”, Nyhedsavisen, 6 June 2007. For a detailed 
first-hand account, see Lars Ulslev Johannesen, De danske tigre: Med livet som indsats i 
Afghanistan (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008).
4 For a description of the Norwegian contribution to ISAF, see The Permanent Norwe-
gian Delegation to NATO. “Operations: Afghanistan”, 29 Oct 2009 <online >.
5 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
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Unlike Jakobsen, most English-language studies on Danish or 
Norwegian defence policy tend to compare the chosen policy with 
those of non-Nordic countries, as Henning-A. Frantzen and Henning 
Sørensen have done.6 The few dedicated English-language studies of 
Norwegian or Danish post-Cold War defence policy focus exclusively 
on the one or the other, see the studies by Torunn Laugen Haaland 
and Tormod Heier.7 Most publications dealing with Norwegian and 
Danish defence policy in the period after the Cold War are written in 
Norwegian and Danish, and most do not adopt a comparative perspec-
tive. There is therefore a need for an in-depth comparative study of the 
subject that will make this research available to an English-speaking 
audience. This study aims to do both.
But what sort of explanation does the available literature offer 
for the differences between Norway and Denmark? The Norwegian 
political scientist Ståle Ulriksen has a cultural explanation for the 
Norwegian aversion to deployment abroad. Its reluctance is due to 
the Norwegian defence tradition, which understood the role of the 
Armed Forces as the defence of the territory and nation of Norway. The 
Armed Forces were therefore less thought of as a foreign policy tool, 
and when Norwegian soldiers did go abroad, they were less willing to 
sacrifice life and limb for what at best were secondary objectives, at 
worst costly distractions from their “real” task.8 Not until 2001 was 
Norway willing to make operations outside Norwegian territory one 
of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, realising what Ulriksen terms 
a “paradigmatic shift” in Norwegian defence policy.9
Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børresen has a geopolitical rather than 
cultural explanation for Norway’s greater reluctance to participate in 
distant military undertakings. The end of the Cold War, he argues, 
6 Henning-A. Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and 
Doctrines (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Henning Sørensen, “Denmark: 
From Obligation to Option”, in The Postmodern Military, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John 
Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000).
7 Torunn Laugen Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach: Role perceptions 
in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War” (PhD thesis, University of 
Oslo, 2008); Tormod Heier, “Influence and Marginalisation: Norway’s Adaption to 
US Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004” (PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 
2006).
8 Ståle Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? (Oslo: Pax 
Forlag, 2002); Iver B. Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen, “Gjenreis forsvarsdebatten!”, 
Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 16, no. 12 (1997); –––,“Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspoli-
tikk”, in Norges Utenrikspolitikk, ed. Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Gunnar Sørbø, and Svein 
Gjerdåker (Bergen: Chr Michelsens Institutt/Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 1997).
9 Ståle Ulriksen, “Brydningstid – paradigmeskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001–2005)”, 
in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenha-
gen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007).
	 8	 Defence	and	Security	Studies	1-2010
did little to change Norway’s main geopolitical challenge: the shared 
border with Russia. The main role of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
has therefore remained relatively constant since the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union: to demonstrate Norway’s willingness and capacity 
to defend its territory and resources by maintaining a certain military 
presence in the High North. Whereas Ulriksen argues that the Armed 
Forces were insufficiently oriented towards international operations in 
the 1990s, for Børresen too much attention was given early in the mil-
lennium to deploying military forces to far-flung places.10
Both the cultural and the geopolitical explanation have their 
counterparts in the Danish academic debate. The Danish international 
relations scholar Bertel Heurlin sees geopolitics as being decisive for 
Denmark’s path to expeditionary defence. Because Denmark no longer 
faced any direct threat after the Cold War, but, on the contrary, was 
surrounded by friends and allies on all sides, it became necessary for 
Denmark to use its Armed Forces actively as a foreign policy tool. 
Doing so enabled Denmark to retain influence with its allies and espe-
cially with the sole remaining superpower. “Activism” became a way 
to avoid marginalisation in a unipolar world. In order to generate max-
imum political benefit from its military contributions, Denmark re-
structured its Armed Forces to enable a rapid response capacity, global 
projection, and ability to fight alongside high-tech American troops 
(first-in, first-out capacity).11
The cultural explanation for Norwegian reluctance to participate in 
international military operations also has its counterpart in Denmark, 
fronted by the Danish political scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. 
He sees Denmark as having experienced a shift from a deterministic 
“what’s the use of it?” attitude towards the Armed Forces during the 
Cold War, to one of increasing militarisation of its foreign policy un-
der the term “activism” in the post-Cold War era. Unlike Heurlin, 
Rasmussen sees nothing inherently necessary about Denmark’s deci-
sion, following the disappearance of the threat from the east, to make 
use of its newfound strategic opportunity to project military force 
10 Jacob Børresen, Forsvar uten trussel: Det norske Forsvarets rolle og funksjon etter den kalde 
krigen (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS, 2005); –––, “Forsvar uten trussel?”, Norsk Militært 
Tidsskrift 160, no. 4 (1990): 27–35; –––, “Forsvaret og trusselen”, Norsk Militært Tids-
skrift 160, no. 10 (1990): 11–12; –––, Kystmakt: Skisse av en maritim strategi for Norge 
(Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag a.s/Europa-programmet, 1993).
11 Bertel Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret: Dansk forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik under for-
svarskommissionerne af 1988 og af 1997 (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2004). See 
also his contributions to “Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag”, ed. 
Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007).
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abroad. Rather, Danish politicians, civil servants, officers and academ-
ics found a new consensus, about what could be accomplished by using 
the Danish military. This was the decisive factor.12 This new consensus 
was so radically different from the old, and so unquestioned across the 
political spectrum, that one can talk about the emergence of a new 
strategic culture in Denmark. This set Denmark apart from Norway, 
whose strategic culture changed considerably less in the post-Cold 
War era.
The questions one is left with after summarising the above views 
then relate to how and why Norway’s and Denmark’s defence policies dif-
fered so widely after the Cold War. The time period covered by this study 
stretches from 1990 to 2008, the starting date being a compromise 
since the exact end of the Cold War is disputed,13 and the end date 
being as close to the present day as can reasonably be studied in con-
temporary history. Because the full implications of close-to-present-
day events are harder to gauge, I will put more emphasis on the earlier 
part of the period.
Explaining the difference
While the Scandinavian academic debates seem to fall into one of two 
categories, depending on whether participants favour a cultural or geo-
political explanation of the differences, there are two main problems 
with restricting oneself to either the one or the other. First, culture 
operates at many different levels in society. Organisations can exhibit a 
particular culture, affecting which tasks are considered important, ap-
propriate and natural within the individual organisations, somewhat 
independently of the grander societal norms in which the culture is 
embedded.14 To account for this, I shall divide culture into a grander 
strategic culture and a narrower, organisation-focused military culture.
12 This argument is put forward in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “‘What’s the Use of It?’: 
Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force”, Cooperation and Conflict: 
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 1 (2005).
13 The dates usually suggested for the end of the Cold War are 1989 and 1991. See 
Vladislav M. Zubok, “Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of ‘The 
Turn’”, in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne 
Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 344–348.
14 Edgar H. Schein has studied culture at the level of organisations, and argues convinc-
ingly that culture plays a great role at this level of analysis. Edgar H. Schein, Organi-
zational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).
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The second is that they are inherently structural accounts, and pay 
therefore insufficient mind to human agency.15 This represents an on-
tological problem, because, as Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski note, 
“[a]ll collectivities are ultimately reducible to individuals”.16 In order 
to incorporate agency, I will therefore introduce the concept of leaders-
hip. All of these four factors, geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture and 
military culture, will be outlined below.
It is important to note, however, that these categories must ulti-
mately be seen as an analytical device, not as a true reflection of reality. 
They are all by necessity interrelated and thus not truly independent 
variables in the logical-positivistic sense of the word. Nevertheless, as 
analytical tools they provide useful counterpoints, bringing forth the 
bigger picture from the tyranny of details.17
What exactly, then, is meant by the term geopolitics? According to 
one definition geopolitics is commonly thought to be “about world 
politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geo-
graphical dimensions of power”.18 Three different levels of geopolitics can 
be identified: local, regional and global, each with its own “code” which 
may or may not conflict with the other levels.19 A central point in the 
literature on Denmark and Norway is that notwithstanding the enor-
mous impact on the global and regional distribution of power by the end 
of the Cold War, for Norway, local power dynamics were much less af-
fected. Due to its proximity to Russia and the potential for conflict over 
Norway’s rich maritime resources, Norway remained wary of engaging 
in post-Cold War euphoria. I will argue that this dissimilar security 
environment is necessary to any sound explanation of the great differ-
ences between Norway and Denmark, but in and of itself insufficient.
Next, leadership seeks to incorporate agency into the story. Theo 
Farrell argues that a process of radical norm transplantation can be 
driven by individual, elite “norm entrepreneurs” in the centre of the 
15 For a theoretical account of the agent-structure debate in IR, see Alexander E. Wendt, 
“The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, International Orga-
nization 41, no. 3 (Summer, 1987).
16 Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski, “Culture, International Relations Theory, and Cold 
War History”, in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd 
Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 150.
17 In International Relations (IR) terminology the culture vs. strategic behaviour debate 
can be seen as a constructivist/post-structuralist position on the one hand, debating 
with a classical-realist/neo-realist on the other.
18 My italics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “General Introduction: Thinking Critically about 
Geopolitics”, in The Geopolitics reader, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul 
Routledge (London: Routledge, 2006), 1.
19 Colin Flint and Peter James Taylor, Political geography: world-economy, nation-state, and 
locality (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2007), 45–46.
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decision-making apparatus, who by their actions are able to “commu-
nicate and push through new ideas”.20 Similarly, at the organisational 
level, Edgar H. Schein argues that leaders can bring in new beliefs, 
values, and assumptions that they can sometimes successfully impose 
as shared experiences if their ideas succeed in solving the group’s prob-
lems.21 On this note, Peter Viggo Jakobsen has been making the case 
for re-instating agency, in the form of “heroic leadership”, when it 
comes to understanding Denmark’s post-Cold War military activism.22 
Jakobsen draws inspiration from those who seek to “rescue men and 
women as individuals from the oblivion to which political scientists 
have consigned them”.23As I will demonstrate, drawing on Farrell’s, 
Schein’s, and Jakobsen’s arguments, introducing individual agency as 
an explanatory factor can help tremendously in understanding why 
two so seemingly similar states as Denmark and Norway developed 
such profound sectoral differences after the Cold War.
While geopolitics and leadership as terms are not unambiguous, cul-
ture is, perhaps, a more contentious term. I will use Peter Wilson’s 
relatively short and clear definition, identifying culture as “the values, 
norms, and assumptions that guide human action”.24 When culture is 
employed in relation to a nation’s foreign, security, and defence policy, 
one often speaks of that nation’s strategic culture.25 Jack Snyder offers 
the most authoritative definition, identifying it as:
[T]he sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national stra-
tegic community have acquired through instruction or imita-
tion and share with each other with regard to […] strategy.26
20 Theo Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ire-
land’s Professional Army”, European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 
83. See also Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change”, in The 
Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7–10.
21 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 225.
22 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence 
Transformation after the Cold War”, in Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Mili-
tary Roles, ed. Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Malešicˇ (Amsterdam and Washington, 
D.C.: IOS Press, 2005), 41–42.
23 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing 
the Statesman Back In”, International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 109.
24 Peter H. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture”, Journal of Military History 72, no. 1 
(January 2008): 14.
25 For an overview of the field, see Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 123–130.
26 Jack Snyder quoted in Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic 
Culture”, Comparative Strategy 26, no. 1 (January 2007): 6.
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Studying strategic culture allows one to say something about a soci-
ety’s “perception of risk, goals, and the relative willingness to use force”.27 
I will focus in particular on the latter point, in arguing that there 
has been a significant difference in the willingness of Denmark and 
Norway respectively to use force as part of their foreign policy, and 
that this is a key reason why their defence policies came to differ so 
substantially in the post-Cold War era.
Finally, because this study deals with a particular sector of society, 
it makes sense to ask whether cultural traits peculiar to the armed forc-
es of Norway and Denmark respectively influenced the defence poli-
cies.28 I will call this more narrowly defined category military culture. 
Like culture generally, military cultures cannot be changed overnight. 
Change will rather involve the merging of new and old practices, and 
the redefinition of old in a new context.29 Consequently, a culture more 
adapted to the new challenges of the post-Cold War world, such as the 
requirements of expeditionary operations, will facilitate the transition 
to these new tasks. I will argue that Danish and Norwegian military 
cultures differed in their adaptability to tackle the new type of inter-
national military operation in the post-Cold War era. I shall therefore 
single out different military cultures as source of explanation.
I will demonstrate that each of these factors played a vital, if not 
equally important, part in defining the different paths Denmark and 
Norway chose for their defence policies over the last two decades. 
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that Norwegian military reform 
and deployment of combat forces in joint military operations abroad 
have later been seen as too little, too late, even by the Norwegian 
Government itself.30 Meanwhile, Danish reforms and force deploy-
ment have often been ahead of their time, coming before the new secu-
rity situation in the post-Cold War era had fully materialised.
Geopolitics has prescribed the available options, defining the physi-
cal and material limits within which the states operated. Denmark’s 
options were much wider than Norway’s after the Cold War, due to the 
unparalleled freedom created by the disappearance of all conventional 
27 My italics. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture”, 14.
28 For a discussion of the military as an occupational culture, see Joseph L. Soeters, Don-
na J. Winslow, and Alise Wibull, “Military Culture”, in Handbook of the sociology of the 
military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2003).
29 Donna J. Winslow and Jeffrey Schwerzel, “(Un-) Changing Military Culture?”, in 
Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Profes-
sional and Conscript Forces, ed. Kristina Spohr Readman (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004).
30 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, Propo-
sition to the Storting, no. 45 (2000–2001), 6–10.
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threats to Danish territory. However, while determining which op-
tions were available, geopolitics did not determine what actions were 
actually taken. Leadership, on the other hand, has determined the pace 
at which change has taken place. Denmark enjoyed considerable geo-
political freedom of action, and ambitious reformers moved to make 
maximum use of it. In Norway, however, leaders needed longer to ad-
just defence policy notwithstanding the country’s much less radically 
altered security environment. The advent of decisive leadership was a 
catalyst of cultural change in both countries, but change in Denmark 
happened at a much more rapid pace and was more intensive than in 
Norway.
The reason for Denmark’s rapid rejection of Cold War era pacifism 
was therefore that Denmark’s leaders engineered a change in Danish 
strategic culture which made the use of military power abroad seem nat-
ural and appropriate. This did not happen in Norway, where leaders 
preferred to present Norwegian military operations abroad as a con-
tinuation of the past, rather than as a break with it as in Denmark. 
The actions undertaken by the Danish leadership also rapidly trans-
formed Danish military culture, aided by the great receptiveness for 
these changes in the Danish Armed Forces. However, the more tradi-
tional use of the Norwegian Armed Forces abroad during much of the 
1990s meant that similar changes were more modest in the Norwegian 
military. The culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces was also less re-
ceptive to the post-Cold War era military tasks and mode of organisa-
tion, and therefore offered greater resistance to those leaders trying to 
engineer change than in Denmark.
The above does not necessarily represent any universal causality 
or explanation of general change in defence policy, but it is rather my 
reading after comparing Norwegian and Danish defence policy of the 
last two decades, and how they can best be understood. While there 
may be implications for other states and time periods, the aim of this 
study seeks only to explain developments in the two countries between 
1990 and 2008.
Sources
In Norway, the most important policy documents pertaining to de-
fence are the Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces, enacted every four to 
five years. In the period dealt with in this study, six such plans were 
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issued (1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2002, 2002–2005, 2005–
2008, 2009–2012). When larger revisions of defence policy have been 
envisaged, a defence commission or defence policy committee has been 
convened. The findings and recommendations of these committees are 
used by governments as the basis of future long-term plans. One such 
defence commission presented its findings in 1992, and two defence 
policy committees did so in 2000 and 2007 respectively. All were pre-
ceded by a defence study providing the military advice of the Chief of 
Defence.
In Denmark, the key documents in defence policy have not been 
parliamentary documents per se, but extra-parliamentary Defence 
Agreements reached between most of the Danish political parties. Five 
such defence agreements were signed in the relevant timeframe (1989–
1991/2, 1993–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009). As in 
Norway, Denmark also periodically appoints defence commissions to 
report in advance of far-reaching revisions of defence policy. Two such 
commissions delivered their findings in 1989 and 1998 respectively, 
and a smaller defence policy working group in 2003.
Besides government documents, newspapers, biographies, mem-
oirs, and interviews with certain key figures are the bulk of my source 
material for this study. This wealth of material made it relatively easy 
to pin down the specifics of what happened, when, where and how. The 
difficult part, as always in historical accounts, was answering “why?”. 
Explaining the events was the core task of this study
International military operations
A brief mention is necessary of the different types of military opera-
tions in which the Norwegian and Danish armed forces have been tak-
ing part in since the end of the Cold War. Apart from preparing for 
wartime territorial defence tasks and undertaking peacetime duties 
such as sovereignty and surveillance missions, international military 
operations have been the main activity of the armed forces. These fall 
broadly into four categories.
Firstly, there are the so-called traditional peacekeeping operations of 
the type undertaken regularly during the Cold War. Here one seeks to 
monitor compliance with ceasefires, and in some cases physically insert 
the peacekeepers between the former belligerents. This is based on a 
“holy trinity” of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. 
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Secondly, there are the so-called managing transition operations. Unlike 
traditional peacekeeping, these take place after a conflict has ended, 
and seek to implement a peace accord freely entered into by the parties 
involved. Both traditional peacekeeping and managed transitions fall 
under Chapter VI of the UN charter. Thirdly, so-called robust peace-
keeping is conducted internally in states to promote peace and stability, 
often under circumstances where consent is at least periodically with-
drawn by the warring parties. These operations therefore require forces 
that more combat-capable and equipped, and willing to use force at 
the tactical level to protect themselves and complete their missions. 
Fourthly, peace enforcement or Chapter VII missions involve using force 
against one or more of the warring parties to impose a settlement and 
restore peace and security. Since this by its very nature can involve 
high-intensity warfare, it requires the highest level of combat capa-
bilities from the participating forces.31 Note that while the military 
requirements of the different missions are here framed in UN Charter 
terms, they need not be led or even sanctioned by any global or re-
gional organisation. So-called coalitions of the willing or even individual 
countries can also perform them without any legal authorisation from 
the UN, NATO or regional bodies.32
In Scandinavia the preferred term for all of the above tasks is ei-
ther peacekeeping operations or international military operations, terms that 
have a benign ring in Scandinavian. The term expeditionary operations, 
often favoured in the UK and US, has not been common until very re-
cently. However, since most international military operations in which 
Denmark and Norway have participated have taken place in remote 
theatres, calling them expeditionary operations is not inappropri-
ate. Finally, NATO employs a third term, Peace Support Operations 
(PSO), encapsulating all of the above categories.33 In this study I use 
the terms PSO, expeditionary and international military operations 
more or less interchangeably.
31 These categories draw on the work of Anthony Forster as well as Alex J. Bellamy, 
Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, and finally the United Nations’ own “Capstone 
Doctrine” for peacekeeping. Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 198–203; Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and 
Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 93–165; 
UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Prin-
ciples and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 13–44.
32 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization 
and Contemporary Peace Operations”, International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 
169–170.
33 NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Eng-
lish and French) (Brussels: NATO, 2008), 2-P-3.
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The first three chapters of this study approach the topic in his-
torical narrative form. Chapter 1 gives a brief historical introduction 
to Norwegian and Danish security and defence policy between the 
Napoleonic wars and end of the Cold War (1807–1989). The object is 
to provide a point of departure, to contextualise the ensuing chapters 
and draw the reader’s attention to important similarities and differ-
ences. Chapters 2 and 3 outline Norwegian and Danish defence re-
forms since the end of the Cold War, as well as military operations and 
engagements abroad. These chapters seek to demonstrate how Norway 
and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War, both in defence 
posture and in military engagements abroad.
In the next four chapters, the substantial difference between 
Norway and Denmark is explained using the four categories outlined 
above: geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture and military culture. Each 
factor is dealt with in a separate Chapter (4–7). The chapters demon-
strate the importance of each factor individually, but also how they in-
teract with one another, and collectively strive to explain why Norway 
and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War. Finally, the con-
clusion provides an overview of how it all fits together.
Chapter	1
The long lines
Norway and Denmark have both historically been neutral states, that 
is until the German occupation of World War II demonstrated the fal-
lacy of this policy. They were therefore founding members of NATO 
in 1949, and, as front-line members of the Atlantic Alliance, their 
defence strategies and structures became very similar. Both developed 
balanced conscripted, mobilisation-based forces designed to contain 
a territorial invasion until allied reinforcements could arrive. They 
shared limited exposure to warfighting during this “long peace”,34 the 
most common deployments of their armed forces abroad being classi-
cal peacekeeping missions.
This chapter will chart the long historical lines of Danish and 
Norwegian defence policies, demonstrating how their historical expe-
riences brought them together in the same alliance, and made them 
embrace very similar modes of military organisation. It will, however, 
also highlight important differences between them, differences which, 
during the Cold War, made Norway a more committed member of 
the Atlantic Alliance than Denmark, but which in the post-Cold War 
world would help turn Denmark into a more avant-garde NATO coun-
try than Norway.
Defence policy 1720–1949
Between the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720 and creation of 
NATO in 1949, Danish foreign policy was designed to avoid em-
broilment in conflicts between Europe’s great powers. Denmark’s in-
voluntary involvement in the Napoleonic wars 1807–14 constituted 
34 The term is employed by John Lewis Gadis to describe the lack of violent confronta-
tion during the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History 
of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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the first disastrous failure of this policy.35 The second was the second 
Schleswig War (1864), in which the multi-lingual Oldenburg state 
was reduced to a homogenous image of modern Denmark. The third 
was the Second World War, in which Denmark experienced the trauma 
of being de facto occupied by Germany 1940–43 and de jure 1943–45.
Perhaps the most influential event for Danish defence policy was 
the debacle of 1864. The defeat left the country in deep sense of de-
spair, similar to that of fifty years previously, when Napoleon’s de-
feat forced Denmark to hand over Norway to Sweden.36 Symptomatic 
of this attitude was a statement by a Liberal member of Parliament, 
Viggo Hørup, in March 1883, in which he questioned the govern-
ment’s defence policy with the words “what’s the use of it?”.37 As 
the Danish historian Knud J.V. Jespersen sees it, the Danish defeat 
in 1864 “gave birth to the peculiarly Danish image of Denmark as 
Lilliput, with a small and insignificant role to play, and which could 
do best by turning its back on the world.”38
This small-state mentality was to prove particularly influential in 
defence policy. While the Danish state was initially eager to reclaim 
lost territories, the defeat of France in 1871 and the unification of 
Germany made this goal unattainable, leaving Denmark a linguisti-
cally and culturally homogeneous entity. It is in this sense the Danish 
historian Uffe Østergård argues that 1864 created modern Denmark.39 
A referendum in 1920, stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, returned 
northern Schleswig to Denmark and gave Denmark probably the most 
accurate border it could hope for with Germany in terms of the lan-
guage and disposition of the population.40
Following its defeat in 1864, Denmark managed its defence 
policy increasingly in light of a persistent fear of antagonising its 
g iant neighbour in the south. In the interwar period, there was a 
political consensus that Denmark would be unable to defend itself 
against a German attack, but divisions over whether Denmark should 
35 On Denmark’s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, see Kurt Villads Jensen, Knud 
J. V. Jespersen, and Gunner Lind, Danmarks krigshistorie 1: 700–1814 (Copenhagen: 
Gads Forlag, 2008), 370–457.
36 Carsten Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State (Ox-
ford: Claredon Press, 1991), 32–41.
37 Quoted in Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814–
1914, vol. 3 Dansk Udenrigspolitks Historie (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 
404. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
38 Knud J.V. Jespersen, A History of Denmark (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2004), 25.
39 Uffe Østergård. “1864 og det moderne Danmark”, 2 Nov 2008 <online>.
40 Bo Lidegaard, Overleveren, 1914–1945, vol. 4 Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie (Copenha-
gen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 133–141; Jespersen, A History of Denmark, 24–25.
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nevertheless attempt some kind of organised resistance. The Social 
Democratic Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning was clearly against, 
declaring in his New Year’s speech in January 1940, “our country is 
prepared to guard our neutrality, but warfare in any real sense is not an 
option”.41 Stauning effectively ruled out Danish resistance to a foreign 
invasion. When the Germans invaded Denmark on 9 April 1940 (at 
04:15 hours) the Danish Government had decided by 06:00 the same 
day to order the cessation of resistance. The Danish government would 
cooperate with Germany, and continued to function as an independent 
government in Denmark despite the German presence until 28–29 
August 1943. When the German Wehrmacht moved to neutralise the 
Danish Armed Forces on 29 August 1943, the death of 23 Danish 
soldiers marked this day as an even bloodier one for Denmark than 9 
April 1940.42
Unlike Denmark, Norway celebrated 1814 as a triumph for liber-
alism and nationalism. The subsequent dissolution of the union with 
Sweden in 1905 was viewed as a similar success, involving few em-
barrassing concessions apart from the demolition of a few fortresses 
along the Swedish border. While estimates of the relative strength of 
Norwegian Armed Forces in 1905 vary, there is a persistent myth ac-
cording to which “a strong defence” proved decisive for the peaceful 
dissolution of the union.43
When Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905, it, like 
Denmark, sought to avoid international entanglements. The new state 
wanted to focus attention on consolidating independence. Perhaps due 
to the absence of other threats, an eventual conflict with Sweden in-
formed the Norwegian defence effort in the years following the dissolu-
tion of the union.44 While Norway remained publicly neutral between 
1905 and 1940, there was tacit understanding in Norway of Great 
Britain’s interests in ensuring that no other power gained control over 
Norwegian territory. Though seldom articulated, it was assumed in 
Norway that Great Britain would ultimately come to Norway’s aid 
should a threat materialise.45 Until 1940 Norwegian politicians were 
41 Quoted in Lidegaard, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie, 359–360.
42 Ibid., 531–532.
43 Roald Berg, Profesjon – union – nasjon: 1814–1905, vol. 2, Norsk forsvarshistorie (Bergen: 
Eide forlag, 2001), 298.
44 Roald Berg, Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920, vol. 2, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1995), 54, 65–66.
45 Odd-Bjørn Fure, Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940, vol. 3, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 243–254.
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therefore in a position to “have their cake and eat it”,46 enjoying the 
protection of a great power, while indulging in a neutralist stance and 
a moralistic criticism of great power politics.
In contrast to Denmark, Norwegians put up two months of or-
ganised resistance to the German invasion of April 1940, though 
British naval power was trumped by German airpower and resistance 
ultimately proved futile.47 The Norwegian Government and Armed 
Forces continued the war from exile, as did the resistance movement 
in occupied Norway. When the Government and military returned in 
May 1945, it was with their honour intact.
The campaign in Norway in April–June 1940 demonstrated the 
defensibility of the country as long as military assistance was prepared 
in advance rather than improvised at the last minute.48 Norway hence 
emerged from the period 1905–45 with a positive view of what the 
country’s defence forces could achieve if provided with the necessary 
resources and allied assistance. This positive legacy of 1905 and 1940 
formed the basis of the continuation of what Ståle Ulriksen defines as 
the “Norwegian defence tradition”.49 This was the belief in the valid-
ity of having large conscripted armed forces with close (often local) ties 
to territory and nation, but little emphasis on the military as a means 
of furthering the foreign policy the state.
Denmark did not share Norway’s optimistic evaluation of what 
could be achieved with military means. Due to its exposed geographi-
cal location, but also to Denmark’s recent history, Danish defence prep-
arations during the Cold War were very symbolic in character.50 The 
lesson of 1864 and 1940 suggested there was little Denmark could do 
to resist a continental invader, and spending scarce funds on the mili-
tary was therefore a waste of money better spent elsewhere.51 There was 
a sense that “Denmark’s fate would be decided by others irrespective of 
what she did”,52 which can be described as an “unspoken assumption” 
among Danish politicians.53 It was more important for Denmark that 
46 Helge Ø. Pharo, “Scandinavia”, in The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, ed. David 
Reynolds (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), 199.
47 Jakob Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken 1940–1949, vol. 4 Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 15–64. See also Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, 
Total krig, nøytralitet og politisk splittelse 1905–1940, vol. 3, Norsk forsvarshistorie (Ber-
gen: Eide forlag, 2001), 263–318.
48 Kjetil Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred 1940–1970, vol. 4, Norsk forsvarshistorie (Bergen: 
Eide forlag, 2004), 226.
49 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen.
50 Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret, 221–228.
51 Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred, 226.
52 Pharo, “Scandinavia”, 203.
53 Ibid.
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its defence forces were considered credible by its own allies, since they 
would ultimately have to protect it from a foreign invader, than by the 
expected enemy.54 “[Danish] defence efforts tended to be symbolic”, 
argues the Danish historian Nikolaj Petersen, “enough to qualify for 
the NATO guarantee, but not to put up a meaningful deterrent.”55
Despite their different military histories, Norway and Denmark ar-
rived at somewhat similar conclusions about their security and defence 
policy after the Second World War. Both countries negotiated with 
Sweden for a possible Scandinavian defence union, before dropping 
the idea. It would not provide the security guaranties and preferential 
arms deliveries they needed. Norway therefore pursued membership 
of the Atlantic Alliance, followed shortly afterwards by Denmark, and 
both were original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.56 After 
the failure of neutralism to avert the German attack of April 1940, 
both put their trust in a combination of national defence and outside 
assistance from the western great powers. In this their paths diverged 
markedly from their Nordic neighbours, Finland and Sweden.57
Joining an alliance represented a sharp break with neutrality for 
both Norway and Denmark. There was nevertheless a stronger sense 
of continuity in foreign policy in Norway after World War II than 
in Denmark. For Denmark, abandoning neutrality and pragmatically 
accommodating Germany changed the conditions of Danish security 
policy completely.58 More so than Norway, Danish NATO member-
ship was therefore “half-hearted” from the start,59 and Denmark was 
sometimes described, perhaps somewhat unfairly, as the “weakest link” 
in the NATO chain.60
As for Norway, the Norwegian historian Olav Riste sees NATO 
membership in 1949 not so much as a vital turning point for Norway, 
but rather a codification of a pre-existing national security strategy 
54 Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret, 224.
55 Nikolaj Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliance: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO”, in 
A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years (Volume 3), ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 281.
56 Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken 1940–1949, 326–327.
57 Olav Riste, War and Peace in the Political Culture of Scandinavia in the 20th Century, IFS 
Info, no. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2003), 10–11.
58 Christian Thune and Nikolaj Peterson, “Denmark”, in Nordic Defense: Comparative De-
cision Making, ed. William J. Taylor Jr and Paul M. Cole (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books 1985), 1.
59 Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliance”, 277.
60 Jonathan Søborg Agger and Trine Engholm Michelsen, “How strong was the ‘weakest 
link’? Danish security policy reconsidered”, in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: 
Threat perceptions in the East and West, ed. Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger 
Vojtech Mastny (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
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which was “to ‘nail the Anglo-Saxon powers’ to their presumed respon-
sibility for the security of the area”.61 There was therefore a stronger 
feeling of continuity in Norwegian security and defence policy than in 
Denmark’s after 1945, a factor that may explain the greater enthusi-
asm for NATO membership in Norway.
The Cold War
Both Norway and Denmark occupied geopolitical positions of great 
importance in the emerging Cold War. Norway’s long Atlantic coast 
was of strategic importance to the Western powers, as was Denmark’s 
location at the entry to the Baltic Sea, and its possession of Greenland.62 
Throughout the Cold War both countries sought a balance between 
two parameters: of integration and screening in the Western Alliance, 
e.g. by refusing allied bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in 
peacetime.63 In this way Norway and Denmark were said to be playing 
their part in maintaining a particular “Nordic balance”, which ensured 
the Nordic countries remained an area of relatively low tension dur-
ing much of the Cold War.64 By regulating the access of their Alliance 
partners to their territory, and especially the United States, Denmark 
and Norway were also able to influence their much larger allies.65
During the Cold War both countries were part of NATO’s Northern 
European Command, which also included Schleswig-Holstein in 
northern Germany. An isolated Warsaw Pact attack on Norway or 
Denmark was considered unlikely, at least since the late 1960s, but 
in the event of a general conflict with NATO, there were several rea-
sons why the Warsaw Pact might want to take control of Danish and 
Norwegian territory. Control of Denmark, as well as southern Norway, 
would give the Soviet Baltic Fleet an exit from the Baltic Sea, allowing 
joint operations with the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would give Soviet 
61 Olav Riste, “Was 1949 a Turning Point? Norway and the Western Powers 1947–
1950”, in Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947–
1953, ed. Olav Riste (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), 147.
62 Jack W. Jense and Søren H. Pedersen, Dansk udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1949 
(Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1978), 55–57. 
63 Rolf Tamnes, “Norway’s Struggle for the Northern Flank 1950–1952”, in Western Se-
curity: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953, ed. Olav Riste 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), 234–240.
64 Arne Olav Brundtland, “The Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, Cooperation and Con-
flict 1(1965): 30–63.
65 Christian Tuschhoff, “Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO”, in Imperfect 
Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keo-
hane, and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 143–144.
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naval forces in the North Sea access to bases and repair facilities in the 
Baltic. Denmark would also be an important flank against NATO’s 
central region, and possibly provide airbases for attacks on NATO na-
val forces and targets in the British Isles. The Warsaw Pact possessed 
large contingents trained in amphibious operations in the Baltic, and 
the Soviet Baltic Fleet appeared designed to achieve control of the 
Baltic and passage to the North Sea. Some of the Warsaw Pact forces 
in the German Democratic Republic could also have been used against 
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland.66
Northern Norway was strategically important due to its location 
between the US and the Soviet Union, and to the proximity of Soviet 
naval bases in the Kola Peninsula. There was considerable advantage 
for the Soviet Union in gaining control over northern Norway. It 
would provide better protection of its Kola bases, resupply points for 
its Northern Fleet operating in the Atlantic and airbases to support 
its fleet further west with land-based aircraft. The Soviet Union had 
considerable forces in the Leningrad Military District, as well as suffi-
cient forces in the Kola Peninsula to carry out a surprise attack against 
parts of Norwegian territory.67 In the event of war, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces would mostly have operated on their home territory, 
whereas Danish forces, as part of the German-led multinational corps 
LANDJUT, would also have been employed in defence of Schleswig-
Holstein.68 Even Norway’s contribution to NATO’s Standing Naval 
Force Atlantic would have broken away from the force and returned to 
national waters in case of a crisis or war at home.69
From the late 1960s both countries experienced a discrepancy 
between the ambitions of the politicians regarding defence structure 
and the budgets they subsequently approved. The defence budget was 
insufficient to modernise the force structure, most of it being tied to 
personnel expenditure. This was a legacy of the early Cold War, when 
much of the infrastructure and weapons acquisitions had been financed 
by the US and NATO. Norway only had to meet 60 per cent of its 
66 Norwegian Atlantic Committee, The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1986–1987 
(Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1987), 2–12.
67 Norwegian Atlantic Committee, The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1987–1988 
(Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1988), 4–16.
68 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 85; S.C. Volden, Danske hærordninger efter 2. 
Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv (Karup: Hærens Operative Kommando, 
2007), 65–67.
69 Jacob Børresen et al., Fregatter i storm og stille: Marinens “langskip” 1960–2007 (Bergen: 
Eide forlag, 2007), 165–166.
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defence spending between 1950 and 1965.70 Neither country was able 
to resolve this problem during the Cold War.
Norway and Denmark also had very similar experience of out 
of country military operations during the Cold War. Both countries 
maintained a combat brigade in Germany in the early Cold War pe-
riod, first as part of the occupying forces and later as contributions to 
allied defence efforts. The Norwegian brigade remained in Germany 
from 1947 to 1953, whereas the Danish brigade was stationed in 
Germany from 1947 to 1958.
But although they contributed to allied defence in Germany, nei-
ther Denmark nor Norway supported efforts to take NATO out of its 
core area, nor give the organisation new tasks. For the duration of the 
Cold War, Norway and Denmark wanted to limit NATO expansion 
beyond its collective defence mission in the Euro-Atlantic area, and 
both opposed wider membership of the Atlantic Alliance.71 Rather 
than going “out of area” with NATO, Norway and Denmark, togeth-
er with non-aligned Sweden and Finland, pioneered UN peacekeep-
ing operations during the Cold War, introducing what Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen calls “the Nordic Model of peacekeeping”. The Nordic states 
provided about 25 per cent of the personnel serving as peacekeepers 
during the Cold War, about 125,000 troops in total.72 These missions 
can almost all be classified as classic peacekeeping missions, involving 
only the use of force in self-defence. The one notable exception to this 
rule was Norwegian and Danish participation in the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo in 1960-64.73
Both Norway and Denmark took on a number of long-running 
peacekeeping missions. Jointly they provided a battalion (DANOR) 
for the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza 1957–67. Separately 
Norway provided an infantry battalion (NORBATT), as well as, ini-
tially, a medical and a maintenance company plus a helicopter detach-
ment, for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978-98, 
70 Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–
1965, vol. 5, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 74.
71 Frode Liland and Helge Ø. Pharo, “Norge og striden om NATOs geografiske virke-
område”, in NATO 50 år: Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, ed. Chris 
Prebens and Nils Skarland (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomité, 1999).
72 See especially Peter Viggo Jakobsen: “The old Nordic Model: Nordic peacekeeping 
during the Cold War (1947–87)” in Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches
73 Jørgen Lyng et al., Ved forenede kræfter: Forsvarets øverste militære ledelse, Forsvarschefsem-
bedet og forsvarets udvikling 1950–2000 (Vedbæk: Forsvarskommandoen, 2000), 111; 
Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred, 234–236.
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and Denmark provided an infantry battalion for the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964-94.
The armed forces during the Cold War
If we compare the state of the two countries’ armed forces at the very end 
of the Cold War, we find them to be very similar but with a few inter-
esting differences. Both had peacetime structures designed as training 
establishments, producing soldiers who, after the end of their service, 
joined the reserve formations making up the bulk of the armed forces. 
By 1973 Denmark was supplementing the conscripted units with for-
mations composed of contracted enlisted soldiers.74 In the peacetime 
establishment Norway and Denmark had about the same number 
of active troops. Conscripts made up about two-thirds of the active 
Norwegian forces but only one-third of the active Danish troops.75
Table 1: Conscripts from a youth cohort of 18 in 1970/71 – 1998
1970/71 1979 1989 1998
Norway 
conscripts
27,850 
(90 %)
28,250 
(88 %)
21,800 
(64 %)
22,700 
(84 %)
From cohort 34,000 32,000 34,000 27,000
Denmark 
conscripts
24,400 
(57 %)
10,550 
(27 %)
9,215 
(24 %)
7,900 
(23 %)
From cohort 43,000 39,000 39,000 33,000
Source: Data taken from Table 1: Conscripts from a Youth Cohort of the Age of 
18 in Scandinavia, 1970/71–2000 (%) in Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in 
Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments.” 
Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 315.
First, as shown in Table 1, conscription was far more universal in 
Norway than in Denmark. Second, the size and composition of the 
forces differed significantly. Norway could mobilize almost three times 
the number of reserves that Denmark could, despite Denmark hav-
ing a larger population than Norway. Conversely, the Danish Army 
74 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 153; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 67–68.
75 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990–1991 (Lon-
don: Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 61–62, 
75–77.  
	 26	 Defence	and	Security	Studies	1-2010
was considerably more mechanized than the Norwegian Army, hav-
ing twice the number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers. 
Meanwhile, the Norwegian Navy was significantly larger than the 
Danish, having three times as many submarines and almost twice as 
many major surface combatants. Finally, the two countries’ air forces 
were quite evenly matched in terms of the number and quality of com-
bat aircraft available.76
The differences in the structure of the two countries’ armed forces 
can to some extent be explained by their different geography. Norway’s 
landmass covers 324,000 km² while Denmark’s only covers 43,000 
km². As Norwegian governments frequently pointed out during the 
Cold War, with limited resources the Norwegian Armed Forces had 
to defend a land area equal to the combined territory of Denmark, 
the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.77 As expressed 
by the then Inspector-General of the Norwegian Army in 1992, the 
choice of a militia system was logical because the army had to “de-
fend an area three times the size of England, with a population barely 
half that of London”.78 Under such conditions only total utilization of 
available manpower was deemed sufficient.
In addition to being much larger than Denmark, Norway also had 
very different terrain. As stated in one Cold War era textbook on mili-
tary defence in the Nordic states, while Denmark had an “open land-
scape […] favourable for air landing and mechanized troops”,79 Norway 
possesses an excellent defensive terrain due to “a nearly tree-less alpine 
landscape descending into the sea”.80 This rugged landscape was said 
to be particularly suitable for light infantry.81 In order to exploit this 
favourable defensive terrain most of the high-end Norwegian forces 
were concentrated in the mountainous county of Troms, with only a 
small “trip-wire” force deployed nearer the Russian border. Norway 
also had a considerably longer coastline than Denmark (25,148 km to 
7,314 km), and from the late 1970s was claiming partially disputed 
maritime economic zones of approximately two million km², six times 
76 Ibid.
77 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet i tiden 
1989–93, report to the Storting, no. 54 (1987–88), 20.
78 Arne Solli, “The Army: the future”, in Defence Forces of Norway, ed. T. D. Bridge and 
A. K. Slade (Tavistock, Devon: AQ & DJ Publications, 1992), 75.
79 Einar Lyth, Militärt försvar i Norden: Försvar och säkerhetspolitik (Stockholm: Centralför-
bundet Folk och Försvar, 1983), 28.
80 Ibid., 34.
81 Kjell Sundgot, “Det militære forsvar”, in Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk, ed. Finn 
Sollie, Bjørn Egge, and Thorleif Stokke (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1982), 70.
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the area of continental Norway.82 All this would seem to offer good 
military justification for Norway’s larger wartime forces, less mecha-
nized army and larger navy.
There were, however, also important political reasons for the high 
number of conscripts. In order to construct a national and unifying mil-
itary that would conscript nearly all able-bodied men, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces adopted a defensive military strategy designed around 
quantity rather than quality. Ståle Ulriksen goes as far as to claim that 
Norway had a military structure “constructed for nation-building – 
not warfare”.83 Critical shortage of equipment meant that only 2–3 of 
the army’s 13 mobilisation brigades were adequately equipped at the 
end of the Cold War, and training standards left much to be desired.84 
The need to equip and train such a large reserve force meant that even 
the few standing forces were never equipped with modern weaponry.85 
Some of the same deficiencies could however be found in the Danish 
mobilisation units.86
Nevertheless, the Norwegian political establishment seemed to 
have more faith in the value of their military forces than the Danish 
political leadership in theirs. It was the mantra of the Norwegian po-
litical elite that the Armed Forces had to be prepared to defend the 
country until allied reinforcements could arrive.87 No similar doctrine 
existed in Denmark, where few policymakers seemed to envisage that 
the Danish military would be able to defend the country that long.88 
The Danish chiefs of defence were also systematically less optimistic 
than their Norwegian counterparts.89
It is telling that in international-relations lingo the term “Den-
markisation” came to mean countries free-riding on the efforts of oth-
82 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, vol. 6, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (Oslo: Univer-
sitetsforlaget, 1997), 279–280.
83 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 228.
84 Gunnar Nils Johnsen, Øyvind Mølmann, and Erling Gunnar Wessel, Brigadenes mate-
riellbetingede operativitet i perioden 1990–95, FFI/RAPPORT-93/5036, (Kjeller: Norwe-
gian Defence Research Establishment, 1993).
85 Hjalmar I. Sunde, “Brigadens standard”, in Brigaden i Nord-Norge 1953–1995, ed. Leif 
Lundesgaard (Oslo: Elanders Forlag, 1995), 403–404.
86 See e.g. Michael H. Clemmesen, “Vi kunne være draget afsted med kejserens nye 
klæder”, Militært Tidsskrift 119, no. 4 (April 1990): 101–109.
87 Johan Jørgen Holst, “Norsk sikkerhedspolitik i 1980erne”, in Nordiske sikkerhedspro-
blemer, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Det sikkerheds- og nedrustningspolitiske ud-
valg, 1984), 46.
88 Arne Olav Brundtland, “Nordiske aspekter ved norsk sikkerhetspolitikk”, in Norsk 
utenrikspolitkk, ed. Johan Jørgen Holst and Daniel Heradstveit (Oslo: Tano, 1985), 
126.
89 John Fitzmaurice, Security and Politics in the Nordic Area (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), 
71–72.
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ers in a military alliance.90 The US had hoped Norway could serve as a 
model for Denmark, which was said to be lacking in Alliance solidari-
ty.91 In fact, the Norwegian government itself sometimes criticised its 
southern neighbour for its perceived lack of Alliance loyalty and ef-
fort.92 Denmark was normally the lowest spender of the NATO coun-
tries in percentage of GDP. Between 1985 and 1989 defence spending 
in Norway was almost three per cent of GDP, whereas in Denmark it 
was closer to 2.2 per cent. In NATO, only Luxemburg spent less on 
defence. In 1990 Denmark spent USD 2.2 defence billions compared 
to Norway’s USD 3.4 billion, and Norway was able to invest a much 
larger share of its defence budget in new equipment and infrastructure 
than Denmark was.
Many observers of Danish defence policy view the low mobilisa-
tion of personnel and resources for the Danish Armed Force in the 
Cold War as an indication that Denmark’s Armed Forces were consid-
ered to be more or less symbolic, and of low priority. In contrast, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces were able to mobilise more personnel and 
received more resources. A strong and credible national defence was 
held to be of great importance by Norwegian policymakers.93 To put 
it bluntly, we could say that, in the context of the Cold War, Denmark 
was considered to be the “bad boy” of the NATO class, whereas Norway 
was one of the “good boys”.94 This would change after the Cold War, 
when the willingness and ability to participate in international mili-
tary operations abroad became the new benchmark by which NATO 
member states were measured.
90 Hans Mouritzen, “Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: The Salient Action Spheres”, in 
Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997, ed. Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (Copen-
hagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 36.
91 Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred, 226.
92 Erich Hauser, “Enough Deterrence to Deter?”, in NATO’s Defence of the North, ed. 
Eric Grove, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No. 1 (London: Brassey’s, 1989), 96; Rolf 
Tamnes, “Kamp mot russerne på tysk jord? Tysklandsbrigaden og den kalde krigen 
1947–1953”, in Forsvarsstudier V: Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, Forsvarets 
høgskole, 1986, ed. Rolf Tamnes (Oslo: TANO, 1986), 137.
93 Johan Jørgen Holst, “The Contribution of Allied Reinforcements to Norwegian Se-
curity”, in Reinforcing the Northern Flank, ed. Ellmann Ellingsen (Oslo: Norwegian 
Atlantic Committee, 1988), 7.
94 Jens Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-omdømme: Fra Prügelkanb til duks (Dansk Institut for 
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Chapter	2
After the Cold War
In the aftermath of the Cold War the Norwegian and the Danish 
Armed Forces underwent radical change. From being manpower in-
tensive territorial defence forces intended to fight World War III, they 
became smaller, more capital-intensive and capable of expeditionary 
operations. In this new post-Cold War world PSOs in distant theatres 
became a major facet of day-to-day activity for Danish and Norwegian 
soldiers. This change was difficult and controversial for both countries, 
but they carried it out at very different speeds. While the transition to 
expeditionary defence began in the early 1990s in Denmark, Norway 
did not follow suit until a decade later.
This chapter charts the transformation of the Danish and 
Norwegian armed forces in the first decade after the Cold War, show-
ing how two historically similar countries differed so sharply in the 
area of military policy and pace of military reform.
Armed forces reform 1990–94
The defence commissions established by Norway and Denmark at the 
end stage of the Cold War both delivered largely similar recommenda-
tions. The Danish commission was appointed in July 1988 with a man-
date to assess what changes, if any, should be made to the organisation 
of the Danish defence forces in peace as well as in war.95 Submitting its 
findings in December 1989, the commission sketched out a best and 
worst case scenario, depending on the success of ongoing negotiations 
on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe. These treaties were seen as very beneficial for 
the Western Alliance in general, and the d efensibility of Denmark in 
95 Danish Defence Commission of 1988, Forsvaret i 90’erne (Copenhagen, 1989), 8.
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particular, with the former scenario more likely to materialise than the 
latter.96 The commission did not envisage radical changes in the role 
assigned to the Danish military, but moved to rationalise the Danish 
Armed Forces.
Most noticeable in operational terms was the recommendation to 
scrap the F-35 Draken aircraft and concentrate upon the F-16.97 As 
agreed previously in the March 1989 Defence Agreement,98 the Navy 
was to rationalise by concentrating activities and scrapping elderly 
vessels.99 The Army was the least affected service. It was to draft more 
conscripts, increasing its peacetime size somewhat.100 Bases should be 
closed to cut costs, sparking vociferous protests in the areas affected.101 
But while the 1988 Defence Commission argued for a rationalisation 
of the Danish defence establishment, it did not advise any radical de-
parture in terms of basic mission and organisation.102 Due to uncer-
tainties about international developments, decisions where effectively 
postponed.103
In Norway, a Defence Commission was also assigned to chart the 
way forward. The commission was appointed in January 1990, and 
submitted its findings in March 1992. Although these findings were 
issued more than two years after the Danish commission’s, they were in-
formed by the same wary conservatism. Considering the enormous changes 
in Europe over these two years, this was remarkable, not least consid-
ering the commission’s mandate, part of which was to evaluate the 
implications of recent developments in “Eastern Europe and East/West 
relations” for Norwegian defence.104 The commission chose to focus 
more on the defence of northern Norway, in light the improvements 
to the security of southern Norway caused by the changes in Eastern 
Europe. Instability in and conflict with Russia were seen as the main 
security challenges.105 The commission recommended cutting seven 
96 Ibid., 132–136.
97 Ibid., 205–240.
98 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1989–1991 (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 14 March 1989).
99 Danish Defence Commission of 1988, Forsvaret i 90’erne, 167–204; –––, Forsvaret i 
90’erne. Bilag 5–29 (Copenhagen, 1989), 19–20.
100 Danish Defence Commission of 1988, Forsvaret i 90’erne, 140–141.
101 Volden, Danske hærordninger, 79.
102 Michael H. Clemmesen, “The Politics of Danish Defence. 1967–1993”, in Adaptation 
and Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967–1993, ed. Carsten Due-Nielsen and 
Nikolaj Petersen (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1995), 124.
103 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 154.
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(Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste, 1992), 3–11.
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brigades of the planned wartime Army, from 13 to 6 and 11 inde-
pendent battalions, from 28 to 17, the reduced land forces being more 
heavily mechanized than before. For the Navy, the number of Missile 
Torpedo Boats (MTBs) should be cut from 36 to 22 and coastal artil-
lery fortresses from 29 to 13. The Air Force would retain its present 
count of about 80 fighter aircraft.106 
Altogether the Norwegian defence commission suggested, like 
its Danish counterpart, moving cautiously into the future. While ra-
tionalising the Armed Forces to make more room for investments in 
new equipment, neither of them heralded any radical changes in the 
organisation and mission of the Armed Forces. But as the cautious 
Norwegian defence commission delivered its findings, a new course 
was already being plotted for the Danish Armed Forces.
In November 1991 NATO’s heads of state and government adopt-
ed a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance.107 It envisaged a new 
conventional force structure for member states, dividing them into 
Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces, which 
would be mobile and flexible, and more traditional in-place Main 
Defence Forces. While Norway and Denmark responded positively to 
the new NATO Strategic Concept, Denmark would go much further 
towards contributing to the Alliance reaction forces than Norway.
Alignment towards expeditionary defence began in Denmark with 
the November 1992 Defence Agreement for 1993–1994. This defence 
agreement differed from those of the Cold War, given the absence of 
a defined military threat. The risk of an invasion of Danish territory 
was considered close to zero.108 It prompted a shift of emphasis away 
from territorial defence towards international operations, most notice-
ably with the establishment of a Danish International Brigade (DIB) 
of 4,500 soldiers.109 
Parallel with the creation of the DIB, Denmark also introduced 
the obligation for non-conscripted members of the Armed Forces to 
serve in military operations abroad. From January 1994, all Danish 
regular military personnel (and some civilians) had to state wheth-
er they wanted to limit international service to traditional missions; 
106 Ibid., 194–197.
107 NATO, “NATO Ministerial Communiqué: The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 
(Rome: NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, 7–8 November 1991).
108 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1993–1994 (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 13 November 1992), 1.
109 Nikolaj Petersen, “Adapting to change: Danish Security Policy after the Cold War”, 
in European Security – 2000, ed. Birthe Hansen (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political 
Studies Press, 1995), 101, 110–112.
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nearly all regular members of the Danish Armed Forces thus became 
eligible for deployment in international operations.110 A similar law 
allowing the Norwegian government to order officers to participate in 
international operations came into effect from January 1999. The law 
only applied to officers entering the Armed Forces from January 1999, 
and only when there was a shortfall of volunteers. This arrangement 
proved transitory, as in March 2004 new legislation required all regu-
lar serving members in the Norwegian Armed Forces to participate 
in international military operations. This was almost exactly 10 years 
after Denmark adopted the same principle.
The DIB should be capable of participation in “conflict-prevent-
ing, peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian and other similar 
operations on a mandate from the UN or the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)”. In this capacity, it replaced the 
Danish commitment of 1964 to maintain a permanent Danish mili-
tary force for the use of the United Nations. Until the DIB’s estab-
lishment Danish peacekeeping organisation had been ad hoc and 
outside the normal Army structure, as was the case for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.111 The DIB would also be available as a rapid-reaction 
brigade for NATO, and from 1995 was to contribute to the Allied 
Rapid Reaction Corps and deployed as part of the 1st (UK) Armoured 
Division. The brigade would be structured as a Danish armoured in-
fantry brigade, with about 20 per cent regular personnel and 80 per 
cent former conscripts who had signed a three-year readiness contract 
with the Armed Forces. Reaction time was seven days for the head-
quarters elements, and 14 days for the brigade as a whole. The brigade 
would enable Denmark to maintain 1,500 soldiers continuously in in-
ternational military operations abroad. The Danish Navy would have 
one corvette, one submarine and two mine-clearing vessels as NATO 
IRF and Rapid Reaction Forces contributions, the Air Force one F-16 
squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air squadron.
In December 1993 the Danish Parliament passed a new Defence 
Act stating explicitly that there was now no direct military threat to 
Danish existence, integrity, and sovereignty. The new act committed 
the Armed Forces to participate in “conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peace making [and] humanitarian missions” without any geographical 
limitations, as well as “crisis management and defence within NATOs 
110 Clemmesen, “The Politics of Danish Defence”, 128.
111 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 165; Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 237.
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area”.112 The law marked a shift towards a much wider definition of 
security, and towards viewing the Danish Armed Forces as a useful 
foreign policy tool rather than an instrument of last resort, intended 
solely to ensure national survival.113
Despite the massive changes that had taken place in the years 
1989–91, Norway did not, like Denmark, shift its focus from inva-
sion defence towards international operations. The recommendations 
of the Norwegian 1990 Defence Commission were not substantially 
revised, as were those of the 1988 Danish Defence Commission. While 
the new long-term plan noted the substantial changes in regional and 
global politics,, the objectives of Norway’s security policy, said the 
Government, remained unchanged. Norway was still neighbour to one 
of the largest military concentrations in the world, and therefore the 
defence of northern Norway would remain the dimensioning task of 
the Armed Forces.114 The changes made in the size and organisation 
of the Armed Forces where almost entirely in response to lack of re-
sources to sustain the Cold War structure, rather than any desire to 
give the military new tasks.115
In the early 1990s the army adopted the new manoeuvre warfare 
doctrine, though without this provoking any wish within the organi-
sation to reduce the size or number of wartime brigades. The central 
problem of the army’s doctrine remained how to fight a numerically 
superior enemy invading Norwegian territory.116 Through the early 
and mid-1990s, a number of revisions emphasised the importance of 
participation in international operations, but the changes to the mili-
tary structure were of a relatively minor and incremental nature.117 
Norway decided to contribute to NATO’s IRF with an infantry bat-
talion, an F-16 squadron, a frigate and two mine clearing vessels. In 
addition, the number of troops available for UN operations was in-
creased from 1,300 to 2,000. Unlike the DIB, the Norwegian UN 
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readiness forces were only trained, organised and equipped for classical 
peacekeeping operations, not warfighting.118
Gulf War I and the Balkan Wars
The policy changes which affected the Danish and Norwegian forces 
after the Cold War cannot be isolated from developments in interna-
tional politics in the 1990s. The broad changes taking place in the 
world, especially the winding down of the East-West confrontation, 
allowed for a wave of UN interventions around the world. These were 
to be very different from the traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping 
missions, in which the Scandinavian countries had participated from 
the start.119 The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the unrav-
elling of Yugoslavia from June 1991, offered Norway and Denmark an 
opportunity to adapt their armed forces to what was for them a novel 
exercise in international relations; that is, using the armed forces as an 
instrument of foreign policy. Denmark took to this new environment 
wholeheartedly, while Norway proved more hesitant.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Denmark and Norway came 
under pressure to contribute to the UN coalition being amassed in the 
region. The most direct military contribution the two countries would 
consider at this time fell under Security Council resolution 665, which 
called upon UN member states to uphold the embargo against Iraq.120 
On the day after the request was made by the Security Council the 
Danish government discussed the issue with members of the opposi-
tion and quickly decided to contribute a corvette to enforce the em-
bargo. The Danes then conferred with their Norwegian counterparts, 
who were less enthusiastic about the prospect of participating in the 
Gulf embargo.121 The Norwegian government was left in the position 
of having to respond to the Danish initiative, and the Danes now asked 
Norway to provide either a navy vessel or a supply ship for the Danish 
corvette. Norway decided to provide a Coast Guard vessel as a supply 
118 Alf Granviken, Wegger Strømmen, and Inge Tjøstheim, Bruk av norske styrker i ut-
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Berdal and Spyros Economides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
6–17.
120 United Nations Security Council, “RESOLUTION 665 (1990)”, (25 August 1990).
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and support ship for the Danish corvette, and a medical company from 
the Norwegian UN reaction force to the Gulf coalition.122
The Danish contribution was minor, but symbolically important. 
It was the first time Denmark had sent an armed unit “out-of-area” 
outside of a UN peacekeeping context.123 The Norwegian contribu-
tion was less groundbreaking. The Norwegian government made a 
conscious decision not to send combat units, just support units and 
humanitarian and economic assistance.124 This followed the estab-
lished Norwegian custom of contributing support units to UN coali-
tions, such as a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) in the 
Korean War.
Nearly two years after Iraq had been evicted from Kuwait, Norway 
and Denmark became involved in enforcing another UN embargo, this 
time against the former Yugoslavia. In November 1992 NATO, to-
gether with the Western European Union, began to enforce the UN 
arms embargo against Yugoslavia. As part of NATO’s standing na-
val forces, Norway and Denmark regularly rotated warships into the 
Adriatic for the duration of the Bosnian War, 1992-95.
While naval deployment was handled through NATO, the ground 
forces in Yugoslavia were initially a more traditional UN Chapter VI 
peacekeeping force. In February 1992 the UN Security Council estab-
lished the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in order 
to “create the conditions of peace and security required for the nego-
tiation for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”.125 The UN 
asked Denmark in March 1992 to contribute to UNPROFOR, and 
Copenhagen responded with a reinforced battalion with five manoeu-
vre companies and a support company, a total of some 940 soldiers. 
Norway provided a transport control unit, some civilian police and a 
few military observers, totalling 143 people.
Both Norway and Denmark contributed to the Nordic Battalion 
in Macedonia, established in March 1993, but the Norwegians made 
by far the largest contribution. Norway sent a manoeuvre company and 
joint staff company personnel, 218 troops in total. The Danish contri-
bution was limited to the commander of UNPROFOR’s Macedonian 
Command, with six staff officers and a UN observer. The deployment in 
122 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 189–192.
123 Petersen, “Adapting to change”, 108.
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Macedonia was relatively uneventful, and the Norwegian contribution 
was scaled down to about 30 men from August 1994.
Things were considerably less peaceful for the Danish units in 
Croatia and Bosnia. In April 1993 it was decided to reinforce the 
Danish contingent with UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia. The 
Danish Parliament voted to despatch additional sanitation, armoured 
transport, heavy mortars and anti-tank rockets, all in order to im-
prove the forces’ security and their ability to perform the mission. 
The decision meant that the Danish forces in the theatre became more 
robust, and yet more robustness was to come. In August 1993 the 
Danish Parliament voted to despatch an armoured squadron to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as part of Nordic Battalion II. Possessing 10 Leopard 
1 main battle tanks, this represented the first time in history that 
tanks where deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force.126 This force 
would be involved in the heaviest fighting any Nordic military unit 
had seen since the Second World War. In a single engagement, on 29 
April 1994, Danish tanks fired 72 main-gun tank rounds in anger, re-
putedly killing as many as 150 members of the Bosnian Serb Army in 
the engagement.127 This operation was widely reported in the interna-
tional press, changing international perceptions of the Danish Armed 
Forces. Whereas Denmark used to be the “peace-loving, foot-dragging 
footnote country”, it now gained a more martial reputation.128 
The Norwegian contribution on the ground in Bosnia was less 
robust: a medical company and a helicopter detachment (NORAIR). 
In June 1994 it was decided to send a Norwegian logistical battalion 
to Bosnia, which was in place in theatre about three months later. 
It was the Norwegian government’s policy to limit Norwegian par-
ticipation in peacemaking operations only to support units, such as 
engineers, maintenance, logistics or medical units. First and foremost 
the Norwegians wanted to avoid peace enforcement and concentrate 
on traditional UN peacekeeping tasks, where Norway was thought to 
have certain comparative advantages.129
In December 1995 the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) 
replaced UNPROFOR in Bosnia. IFOR numbered 60,000 troops, 
and was much more strongly equipped both in weaponry and rules 
126 Per Amnitzbøl Rasmussen, For fredens skyld (Copenhagen: Forsvarets Oplysnings- og 
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of engagement than UNPROFOR.130 Both Norway and Denmark 
agreed to have their UNPROFOR forces “switch hats” and become 
part of IFOR, as a joint Nordic-Polish Brigade together with Sweden, 
Finland and Poland. Denmark contributed a manoeuvre battalion 
with one mechanized and one armoured company, numbering approx-
imately 800 troops in total. Norway contributed a supply battalion 
and a medical company, totalling 921 troops. When IFOR became 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996, Norway’s participation 
changed too. For the first time, combat units were deployed in a peace 
enforcement operation.131 The Norwegian government decided to con-
tribute a mechanized infantry battalion and an independent mecha-
nized infantry company, hoping these forces would be more visible, 
and hence give more political influence.132 Less visibly, Norwegian 
Special Operations Forces were deployed in the Balkans from 1996. 
This represented a new, robust capability, as well as one of the first 
deployments of standing, combat ready army units in international 
operations.133
In March 1997 Italy offered to lead a multinational intervention 
force to stabilize Albania, known as Operation Alba.134 Denmark par-
ticipated with a light reconnaissance squadron of 59 soldiers, inte-
grated into a French infantry regiment. This was possible because the 
Danish unit was a standing, volunteer unit with light equipment, 
which made it possible to deploy it rapidly.135 Norway chose not to 
participate in the ad hoc coalition in Albania, and in any case had few 
standing high-readiness units suitable for such a deployment.
In February 1998 an armed insurgency broke out in Kosovo, a part 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Western diplomacy failed 
to defuse the conflict, which by early 1999 had become an outright 
civil war. On 24 March 1999 NATO aircraft started attacking targets 
in the FRY. The object of the bombing campaign was, according to 
most European leaders, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused 
130 Marcus Cox, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Limits of Liberal Imperialism”, in Build-
ing States to Build Peace, ed. Charles T. Call and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 249.
131 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 147.
132 Gjeseth, Hæren i omveltning, 163–164.
133 Tom Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces, Defence and Security Studies, no. 1 (Oslo: Institute for Defence Stud-
ies, 2007): 41–43.
134 The operation was authorised by the UN Security council. United Nations Security 
Council, “RESOLUTION 1101 (1997)”, (28 March 1997).
135 Søren Knudsen, “Den danske indsats i ‘Operation ALBA’”, Militært Tidsskrift 126, no. 
5 (December 1997): 524–543.
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by a vicious campaign of persecution by FRY military and paramili-
tary forces against the Kosovar Albanian population.136 Denmark and 
Norway contributed combat aircraft to the air campaign; Denmark 
with four operational F-16s, plus two reserve aircraft, which were em-
ployed in air-to-air and air-to-ground roles.137 Norway made a similar 
contribution, and operated together with the Danish Air Force from 
the Grazzanise base in Italy. However, the Norwegian F-16s could not 
be used in an air-to-ground role. Norway therefore avoided the more 
controversial action of attacking ground targets.138 There were signs 
of increasing Norwegian robustness in 1999. The Norwegian Army 
Special Operations Forces were among the first units to enter Pristina 
as part of a British Special Forces unit.139
Norway and Denmark thereafter chose to make a battalion-sized 
contribution to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which moved 
into the province after the Yugoslavian force had agreed to withdraw. 
Denmark found it difficult to deploy a battalion to KFOR of approxi-
mately 875 soldiers while simultaneously having a battalion in SFOR, 
and the size of the Danish battalion in Kosovo had to be reduced to 
about 500 soldiers in February 2001.140 Norway contributed a re-
inforced mechanized battalion of approximately 1,200 soldiers, but 
experienced problems getting the unit ready despite winding down 
deployment in Bosnia at the same time.141 The decision to deploy was 
taken on 14 June 1999, but the battalion was not fully deployed in 
Kosovo until 12 October 1999. The Norwegian deployment hence took 
nearly four months. While it was not a secret that Norway had never 
been able to fulfil NATO’s IRF reaction-time requirement, something 
the government readily admitted by before the Kosovo deployment, a 
reaction time of four months was considered far too long.142 Denmark 
also struggled with the reaction-time requirement, and needed eight 
weeks to deploy the Danish DIB battalion in Kosovo.143 The perform-
ance of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces in the Kosovo War 
136 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: conflict, interna-
tional response, lessons learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 67–98.
137 Hækkerup, På skansen, 130–131.
138 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 223.
139 Ibid., 225.
140 Hækkerup, På skansen, 135–137.
141 Robert Mood, “Erfaringer fra KFOR I”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 168, no. 6/7 (2000): 
6–7.
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thus strengthened the argument for more regular, standing units with 
contracted personnel to enable the military to respond rapidly to this 
kind of crisis.
The Baltic states
The Balkans was not the only area in which the Danes were pushing 
to use their military as a foreign policy tool. Towards the end of the 
Cold War Denmark had been an early and outspoken supporter of the 
Baltic movement for independence, and continued to take a leading 
role after independence in matters such as military cooperation with 
the newly independent states.144 Norway chose to keep a lower pro-
file.145 The Danes also seemed to view themselves as the Baltic states’ 
best friend;146 indeed, Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen de-
scribed the Baltic states as a Danish sphere of influence in the 1990s.147
Denmark also took the lead, along with Canada and the 
Netherlands, in developing high-readiness forces for the UN. In 
January 1995 Denmark appointed a working group to develop a 
Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations 
Operations (SHIRBRIG). The brigade would consist of 4-5,000 
troops, and have a reaction time of 15 to 30 days. By 1999, 11 coun-
tries had chosen to participate, and the brigade was declared available 
to the UN from January 2000. While Norway was a signatory coun-
try, it was the Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup who had 
been the most active promoter of SHIRBRIG.148 The Danes where 
initially told that Norway had trouble in meeting the expected reac-
tion time.149 The Norwegian Ministry of Defence and senior Armed 
Forces figures believed the initiative was incompatible with Norway’s 
role in the Alliance and military posture.150 The Norwegian contribu-
tion to the SHIRBRIG force pool was limited to a helicopter detach-
144 Nikolaj Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 1973–2003, vol. 6, Dansk Udenrigs-
politisk Historie (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2004), 482–495.
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ment, whereas Denmark contributed part of the brigade headquarters, 
a reconnaissance squadron and a military police company.
Defence reforms after the Bosnian War
A new Danish Defence Agreement 1995–1999 was signed in December 
1995.151 The agreement further rationalised the structure of the Navy 
and Air Force by cutting the number of bases, and reduced the number 
of Army brigades from four to three. Although the Army’s wartime 
strength fell to 58,000 troops, the DIB received new equipment, and 
by 1999 five of eight investment programmes benefited the brigade 
directly.152 The number of internationally deployable land units re-
mained unchanged from the prior 1993–1994 Defence Agreement, 
but the navy and air force increased their contributions.
Most importantly, a new defence commission was to be convened 
in 1997 and deliver its report in 1998. The commission’s report would 
form the basis of the next Danish Defence Agreement after 1999. The 
Danish defence commission of 1997 consisted, like its predecessors, 
of politicians, officers and experts from the ministries and academia. 
In its report, submitted in November 1998,153 it noted the general 
changes that had taken place since the last defence report of 1988, and 
the new role for the armed forces as an active instrument of Danish 
security policy.
While Denmark was rapidly adapting its Armed Forces for expe-
ditionary operations, and was clearly more willing to use them in com-
bat than Norway, Denmark also demonstrated greater affinity with the 
“new NATO” than did Norway. In April 1999 NATO again revised 
its Strategic Concept, moved a step further towards enlargement and 
took the organisation “out of area”, giving it a more proactive role 
besides its classic collective defence mission.154 Unlike Norway, it had 
been Denmark’s wish since the early 1990s for NATO to take on mis-
sions on behalf of the UN and CSCE.155 Denmark therefore supported 
the American effort to take NATO “out of area” at the Washington 
151 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1995–1999 (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 8 December 1995).
152 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 151.
153 Danish Defence Commission of 1997, Fremtidens forsvar: Hovedbind (Copenhagen: Dan-
ish MoD, 1998).
154 North Atlantic Council, “Press Release NAC-S(99)65: The Alliance’s Strategic Con-
cept”, (Washington D.C.: NATO Press Office, 24 April 1999).
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summit in 1999, as well as to enlarge NATO’s membership.156 In par-
ticular, Denmark repeated its longstanding argument that the Baltic 
states had to receive the same treatment as the other Central and 
Eastern European countries.157 Norway remained sceptical: NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace, Oslo suggested, could be an alternative to en-
largement.158 Norway toned down its scepticism towards enlargement 
and the new tasks, partly for tactical reasons, including the fear of be-
ing viewed as the last “Cold Warrior” within the Alliance.159
The Danish Defence Agreement 2000–2004, agreed in May 1999, 
was based on the conclusions of the 1997 Defence Commission re-
port.160 It sought to shift the emphasis in the Armed Forces even fur-
ther away from a mobilisation-based territorial defence towards crisis 
management. The Army’s contribution to NATO’s IRF was increased 
from a platoon-sized light reconnaissance unit to a company-sized unit, 
and the DIB was given an integrated helicopter unit. The Navy’s con-
tribution to NATO was reduced, due to the overall reduction in plat-
forms. The Air Force added radars and a logistical unit to its existing 
contribution. The Danish Home Guard was assigned more territorial 
defence tasks, in order to allow the other branches of the Armed Forces 
to focus more on international operations.161 All in all the change in 
the Danish force posture was not such a radical one, because the Armed 
Forces had already begun orienting themselves towards international 
operations before the engagement in the Balkans. As such, the defence 
agreements from 1995 to 2004 merely continued along a path staked 
out by the Defence Agreement for 1993–1994.
Norway, on the other hand, would experience a largely unantici-
pated radical shift in its defence posture around the turn of the mil-
lennium. Despite the engagement in the Balkans, the Long Term Plan 
for the Armed Forces 1999–2002 did not envisage radical changes 
to the Armed Forces. While noting the absence of a “military threat 
to Norway today”, the Government still expressed its concern that 
156 Interview with Niels Helveg Petersen in Jakob Kvist and Jon Bloch Skipper, Udenrigs-
minister: Seks politiske portrætter (Copenhagen: People’s Press, 2007), 301–303.
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security developments were plagued by uncertainty.162 The Armed 
Forces should still be designed to meet an invasion of Norwegian 
territory.
The Norwegian Armed Forces faced critical shortages of certain 
types of equipment in the late 1990s, especially the Army, where many 
units existed only on paper.163 According to the Chief of Defence, the 
Armed Forces were not receiving the resources they needed to main-
tain the structure laid down in the 1999–2002 long-term plan. In 
November 1998 he commissioned a defence study. It would become 
the first high-level proposal for a radical restructuring the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.164 The current total defence structure, designed to en-
sure national survival, was passé. The Armed Forces should be designed 
for more relevant scenarios requiring better and more responsive units. 
The latter required rapid deployment capabilities - for operations at 
home and internationally.165
In June 1999, immediately following the Kosovo War, the 
Government presented a White Paper entitled Adapting Norway’s 
Armed Forces to the Requirements of International Operations.166 It pro-
posed the creation of the Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces 
(FIST), which would be available for international operations. Norway 
now abolished the separation between NATO IRF and UN standby 
forces, something Denmark had already done in creating the DIB in 
November 1992.167 FIST would consist of units from the Army, Navy 
and Air Force, totalling approximately 3,500 soldiers. The Army’s 
contribution to the High Readiness Forces (FIST-H) would be one 
mechanized battalion for rapid-reaction, and one battalion equivalent 
of follow-on forces. For the first time the Army planned to deploy 
tanks and artillery in military operations outside Norway. The Navy 
would contribute a frigate, a submarine, a minesweeping vessel, a 
command-and-control vessel, four missile patrol boats and a platoon 
162 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling 
i tiden 1999–2002, report to the Storting, no. 22 (1997–98), 7.
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of combat divers. The Air Force would contribute an F-16 squadron, 
four transport helicopters, a NASAMS equipped air-defence unit, two 
C-130 transport aircraft and a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. In addition 
some unspecified Special Forces, intelligence and medical personnel 
would be made available. Significantly, the reform brought the level 
and capabilities of the Norwegian land units available for international 
operations close to those Denmark had possessed since the decision to 
create the DIB in 1992. However, it was still only a modification of 
the existing structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not a wholesale 
reform. However, such a reform soon followed.
In February 2001, the Norwegian Government presented the 
2002-2005 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces. It was informed by 
the findings of the 2000 Defence Study and Defence Policy Committee 
report of the same year.168 The Government was aware of the critical 
state of the Armed Forces, which were “not up to solving the tasks of 
the future”.169 According to the then Minister of Defence, Bjørn Tore 
Godal, this was a much more provocative formulation than what one 
would normally find in a government document.170 The white paper 
listed some of the problems Norway had experienced providing rel-
evant rapid-reaction forces to NATO operations as examples of the 
problem. Despite considerable resources and highly qualified person-
nel, the Armed Forces in its present form lacked the capabilities re-
quired by the government. The Armed Forces had to increase mobility 
and flexibility, shorten reaction time, and make themselves ready for 
use nationally and in PSOs.
Because of the lack of a parliamentary majority, the plan was passed 
by Parliament with modifications. The Defence Policy Committee had 
proposed increasing the number of brigades retained from two to three, 
and questioned the proposal to phase out the Navy’s existing MTBs 
and not acquire the new Skjold class.171 Picking up on these sugges-
tions, the Standing Committee on Defence recommended continued 
mothballing of some of the coastal artillery installations in preference 
to discarding them completely, acquiring new MTBs and maintain-
ing the Home Guard at its present strength.172 In the end Parliament 
168 Norwegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000: Sluttrapport; Norwe-
gian Defence Policy Committee of 1999, NOU 2000: 20 Et nytt forsvar (Oslo: Statens 
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170 Bjørn Tore Godal, Utsikter (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), 55. 
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decided to maintain a larger Army and Navy than originally envisaged 
by the Government. The Home Guard remained at 83,000 troops, and 
the Army was cut from six to three brigades.173 Despite these altera-
tions, the main suggestions of the Chief of Defence and his staff were 
implemented.
One example of the evolution of a static in-place organisation into 
a more mobile one was the replacement by the Norwegian Navy of a 
territorial organisation in favour of a functional and radically central-
ised structure.174 Another novelty which received widespread atten-
tion, was the creation of an Army battalion employing enlisted soldiers 
on three-year contracts rather than conscripts.175 This professionalised 
Telemark Battalion was much more robust and capable than its pred-
ecessor, and could realistically be expected to participate in operations 
across the full range of military operations, including high-intensity 
operations, with a relatively short reaction time.176 An attempt was 
made amongst the parties in Parliament to adopt the Danish system of 
broad, long-term defence agreements. This had been the recommen-
dation of the 2000 Defence Policy Committee.177 However, it proved 
impossible to reach any such broad-based settlement.178
As the 20th century drew to a close, Norway was emulating Denmark 
in replacing its Cold War invasion defence structure with a smaller, 
more deployable force. Something resembling a Norwegian brigade 
was now available for rapid deployment abroad, with forces so robust 
as to be realistically expected to take part in high-intensity warfare. 
Can one then reasonably talk about convergence between Danish and 
Norwegian defence policy in 2000–01? Indeed, overseas deployment 
capacity of the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces were now 
remarkably similar with the establishment of the FIST, particularly in 
qualitative terms. The Norwegian forces were as robust and capable of 
high-intensity operations as the Danish. Furthermore, Norwegian air 
and land combat forces in the Kosovo War represented a milestone in 
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Norwegian willingness to conduct actual warfare. The beginning of 
the new millennium thus marked a point in time at which Norway 
came to resemble Denmark in terms of capabilities and willingness to 
fight. However, this convergence was to prove short lived.

Chapter	3
In the aftermath of 9/11
The first decade of the new millennium saw Norwegian and Danish 
soldiers being sent to warzones in some unlikely places, namely 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially, relative parity existed between the 
forces deployed by the two countries and their missions in the theatres 
of operation, indicating convergence had taken place in the early years 
of the 2000s. However, in 2003 Denmark took part in the Iraq war as a 
belligerent state, while Norway’s participation was very limited. Then 
in 2004 Denmark undertook a radical transformation of its Armed 
Forces, turning them into a mostly professional expeditionary corps. 
This was followed in 2006 by a Danish decision to send combat forces 
to the war in southern Afghanistan, where Norway again chose not to 
participate.
This chapter describes Norwegian and Danish defence policy in 
the post-9/11 years, and shows how the two states continued to differ 
in the new millennium with regard to adapting their armed forces to 
expeditionary operations and willingness to participate in warfighting 
alongside their allies.
Afghanistan and Iraq
Following the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon, Norway and Denmark made immediate and very 
similar contributions to the American-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan. In January 2002, a Danish Special Forces 
unit was despatched to Afghanistan, remaining in theatre until June. A 
Norwegian Special Forces unit was also in place by January 2002, and 
like their Danish colleagues remained until June. Among other tasks, 
the Danish and Norwegian Special Forces participated in Operation 
Anaconda in March 2002. Both states also sent support personnel 
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such as mine clearers, and a joint Danish-Norwegian-Dutch C-130 
transport aircraft detachment was also in Afghanistan from March to 
September 2002.
At Washington’s request, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands 
despatched six F-16 combat aircraft each to Kyrgyzstan in October 
2002. Their role was to provide combat air support to coalition forces 
in Afghanistan. During their tour of duty, aircraft from Denmark and 
Norway dropped live ammunition in support of friendly forces. For 
Norway, 27 January 2003 therefore became an historic date. While 
Danish forces had seen combat before, including bombings in Kosovo, 
for Norway these were reportedly the first official rounds fired at an 
enemy since 1945.179
In the Balkans the Danes had always been quicker to send robust 
ground forces than the Norwegians. In Afghanistan it would initially 
be the other way around. In December 2003 Norway sent a compa-
ny from the Telemark Battalion to Kabul, as part of the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In July 2004 Norway 
also assumed responsibility as lead-nation in one of ISAFs multi-
national battlegroups. In 2006 the Norwegian manoeuvre company 
moved from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, where 
they were to provide the Quick Reaction Force for ISAF’s Regional 
Command North. Norway already had a military presence outside 
Kabul at this time. In September 2005, the Norwegian Armed Forces 
assumed responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Maymana from the United Kingdom.
While the Norwegians provided robust ground forces in 
Afghanistan, the Danes initially made only limited contributions. The 
Danish forces varied between 50 and 140 soldiers in 2003 and 2004, 
all in various support functions. In 2005, additional smaller Danish 
contributions were made to various PRTs in the north. In this ini-
tial PRT phase the Danish soldiers were more involved in rebuilding 
than combat operations.180 Not until autumn 2006 did any significant 
Danish ground forces arrive in Afghanistan, in the form of the light 
reconnaissance squadron from Bornholm, an artillery-locating radar 
team, and a civilian-military cooperation unit. All these new forces 
179 Lyng et al., Ved forenede kræfter, 254–255; Nina Græger and Halvard Leira, “Norwe-
gian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective”, 
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180 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Umulig mission? Danmark i Afghanistan og Irak (Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal, 2008), 105–157.
	 Norwegian	and	Danish	defence	policy		49
were deployed in the south of Afghanistan, in support of the British 
PRT and ISAF’s regional headquarters in Kandahar. The total number 
of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006 rose to approximately 390.
The reason Denmark delayed so long in sending more forces to 
Afghanistan was not any greater reluctance to go, but simply that the 
Danish Army was overstretched. Unlike Norway, Denmark had joined 
the American-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.181 Danish partici-
pation in the multinational invasion of Iraq was argued to be necessary 
in order to help remove a threat to peace and security in the region.182 
The initial contribution had comprised of a submarine, a corvette, and 
a medical detachment. In May 2003, the Danish Parliament also voted 
to contribute to the stabilisation forces in Iraq. The force was to be 
part of the British-led division in southern Iraq. The initial contribu-
tion consisted of a battalion with a reconnaissance squadron, a mech-
anized infantry detachment, military police and a civilian-military 
cooperation unit, totalling approximately 380 soldiers. By October 
it had proved necessary to reinforce the battalion with more military 
police, a full mechanized infantry company, and some engineers. This 
increased the size of the force to more than 500 soldiers. The Danish 
forces were periodically engaged in heavy urban warfare with Iraqi 
insurgents.183 Parallel to the military engagement, Danish civilian 
authorities were involved at many levels within the Iraqi Coalition 
Provisional Authority.
Norway did not consider itself part of the coalition forces in Iraq. 
The Government decided to send military forces to Iraq only after 
the Security Council in May 2003 asked member states to assist in 
stabilising the country.184 An engineer company numbering approxi-
mately 136 soldiers, initially from the Telemark Battalion, was sent to 
the theatre two months later and stationed close to Basra in southern 
Iraq. Under British command, the company remained in Iraq until 
July 2004, when it was withdrawn. Only a few Norwegian staff offic-
ers remained in Iraq, along with a few Norwegian NATO instructors 
for the Iraqi Army. The Norwegian battalion in Kosovo was similarly 
181 Denmark was a signatory of the January 2003 “letter of eight”. Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen et al., “Europe and America must stand united”, Times 30 January 2003.
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wound down in July 2004 in order to allow the Armed Forces to focus 
on Afghanistan.185
Due to the challenge of being engaged in three geographically sep-
arate regions (Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan), while being dimensioned 
for just two, the Danish Army was overstretched.186 This overcommit-
ment of the Danish Armed Forces has been described as a small-state 
version of imperial overstretch.187 Not until its engagement in Iraq 
was wound down, ending in August 2007, were the Danish Armed 
Forces able to project considerable forces to Afghanistan. Once disen-
tangled from Iraq, the Danish Armed Forces became heavily involved 
in Afghanistan. In May 2007 it was decided to send a Danish battalion 
to make up a part of the British Task Force Helmand, while reduc-
ing or winding down the participation in the PRTs in the north. The 
number of Danish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan was estimated to 
rise to approximately 640. The engagement also soon took on a quali-
tatively new nature. In October 2007, the Danish Government de-
cided to send an armoured platoon to Afghanistan, making Denmark 
one of the few countries to deploy tanks in the theatre. In June 2008 
a detachment of four Fennec reconnaissance/observation helicopters 
were also ordered to Helmand province.
The Danish engagement in Afghanistan came later than the 
Norwegian one, but it was of a very different nature. Firstly, and un-
like most nations contributing troops to ISAF, Denmark placed no 
national caveats on its deployed troops.188 Secondly, immediately after 
ISAF took over responsibility from the American Operation Enduring 
Freedom in southern Afghanistan, Danish troops became involved in 
continuous combat in the region. The first major encounter was in 
August 2006, when the Danish light reconnaissance squadron endured 
36 days of heavy combat defending the village of Musa Qala against 
the Taliban. An estimated 25 enemy combatants were killed during 
the siege, and several Danish soldiers were wounded.189 The light re-
connaissance squadron continued to engage regularly with the Taliban 
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thereafter. The unit employed their light weapons, mortars, 84mm 
recoilless rifles and coalition air support during Operation Medusa and 
Sarwe in September 2006.190 But while the Danes participated will-
ingly, the Norwegian government actively resisted calls by NATO al-
lies to allow for deployment of its forces in southern Afghanistan.191
Two years later it was more or less routine for Danish forces to 
engaging the Taliban in fire fights. On 5 January 2008, Danish tanks 
were once again engaged in combat: the first time since Bosnia in 1994. 
On this occasion, Danish tanks fired 20 rounds from their main guns 
in the battle.192 In October 2008, the Danish battalion in Helmand 
engaged in another major operation, in which speculative reports 
claimed that 30 to 50 Taliban insurgents may have been killed.193
The most dramatic incident for the Norwegian forces in 
Afghanistan occurred 7 February 2006, when the Norwegian PRT in 
Maymana came under attack. Six Norwegian soldiers were injured, 
and four Afghans killed.194 Perhaps the engagement most resembling 
regular combat occurred in early November 2007, when Norwegian 
soldiers from the Quick Reaction Force engaged insurgents with small 
arms, heavy weapons and air support.195 This was the first time the 
CV9030N IFVs were used in combat, and the first time Norwegian 
ground forces called in coalition air support.196 Nevertheless, for 
Norwegian combat forces in the north the service in Afghanistan was 
much less hazardous than for the Danes in the south, and direct com-
bat with the enemy was the exception rather than the norm. Danish 
and Norwegian casualties reflected this. By September 2009 Denmark 
had lost 25 soldiers in Afghanistan, most of them as a result of direct 
combat with the Taliban. By comparison, Norway had lost four sol-
diers due to enemy action.
190 Thomas Larsen, Dagbog fra Afghanistan (Copenhagen: Borgen, 2008), 22–36.
191 Michael Evans, Richard Beeston, and Roger Boyes, “You must do a lot more to pull 
your weight, Nato chief chides refuseniks”, Times, 13 September 2006; Anne Vinding, 
Camilla Ryste, and Ingunn Andersen, “Norge sier nei til NATO”, Verdens Gang, 18 
October 2006.
192 Christian Reinhold, “Kampvognene for alvor i ilden”, (Copenhagen: Forsvarskom-
mandoen, 14 January 2008).
193 Mari Åsland, “– Danske soldater drepte opptil femti Taliban-opprørere”, Aftenposten, 
26 October 2008.
194 Aslak Nore, Gud er norsk: Soldatene fra fredsnasjonen (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2007), 193–
194.
195 Norwegian Armed Forces, “Pressemelding nr. 17/2007: Harde kamper i Afghani-
stan”, (Stavanger: Fellesoperativt hovedkvarter, 2007).
196 Tom Bakkeli and Hans Petter Aass, “Norske 20-åringer påførte Taliban tap”, Verdens 
Gang, 7 November 2008.
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Defence reforms 2002–08 
While SHIRBRIG, as we saw previously, was a Danish project in 
which Norway followed with some reluctance, the Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) was different. 
It was established in 1997 in order to facilitate Nordic cooperation in 
PSOs, replacing the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN mat-
ters. In 2003 it was agreed to set up a NORDCAPS force catalogue 
with the purpose of providing a Nordic multinational brigade for UN, 
OSCE, NATO, and UN operations.197 Norway and Denmark both of-
fered their available international deployable forces for NORDCAPS, 
Denmark the DIB and Norway the FIST. While the Danish Army con-
tribution was more robust than Norway’s, including armour and self-
propelled artillery, the Norwegian Air Force and Navy contributed 
considerably more than their Danish counterparts.198 The force cata-
logue was never employed, and was eventually declared obsolete in May 
2006 due to functional overlap with other multilateral force pools.199 
Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the change in Norwegian capability 
and willingness to use military forces abroad. While SHIRBRIG was 
initiated when Denmark had just experienced success with employ-
ing its Armed Forces actively abroad, Norway’s Armed Forces at that 
time remained focused on the defence of Norwegian territory. When 
the NORDCAPS brigade pool was created, Norway was in a position 
to offer a much larger force thanks to the establishment of the FIST in 
June 1999, and the implementation of the new Long Term Plan for the 
Armed Forces 2002–2005.
However, just as Norway was starting on the path towards creat-
ing an expeditionary unit similar in robustness and size of the DIB, 
Denmark downgraded territorial defence further and took steps to 
make international operations the effective raison d’être of the Danish 
Armed Forces. The new Danish Defence Agreement 2005–2009 took 
the final step away from invasion defence. Since the radical shift oc-
curred in November 1992, with the decision to create the DIB, the 
Danish Armed Forces had remained in principle unchanged. While 
units intended for international operations in the following two de-
fence agreements received more attention and resources, the old Cold 
197 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in 
Peace Operations after the Cold War”, International Peacekeeping 14, no. 4 (August 
2007): 459–461.
198 See Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, Table 8.1 NORDCAPS force pool (2004), 210.
199 Jakobsen, “Still Punching”, 460.
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War structure of long-term conscription and static mobilisation de-
fence forces remained.200 The 2004 Defence Agreement did away with 
this legacy force structure, replacing it with a two-pillar structure: a 
professional expeditionary force and a total defence force.201 
The agreement was not preceded by defence commission inquiry, 
though a smaller working group had been appointed, chaired by the 
diplomat Hans Henrik Bruun. Presenting its report in August 2003, 
the group reiterated the findings of the 1997 Defence Commission: 
there was no direct territorial threat to Denmark. The group went 
further and concluded that the remaining territorial defence capacity 
in the Danish Armed Forces was no longer needed, nor was there any 
need to retain a base from which to regenerate such a force. A small 
state such as Denmark had limited ability to sustain a sizable force 
in PSOs abroad. In order to make more effective and visible contri-
butions, the group therefore recommended specialising in delivering 
rapidly deployable initial-entry forces, capable of taking part in high-
intensity warfighting operations alongside allied forces.202
Signed in June 2004, the new Defence Agreement aimed at in-
creasing the ability to deploy military forces internationally, and of the 
Armed Forces to combat terrorism and its effects.203 The agreement 
drew inspiration from the new US national security strategy from 
June 2002, as well as the creation of the US Department of Homeland 
Security in January 2003.204 Support functions were now only to be 
dimensioned by the military’s operational units, and the Army was re-
duced to the Danish Division with two mechanized infantry brigades. 
The 1st Brigade would be a standing brigade with mostly regular serv-
ing personnel, available for NATO on high readiness. The 2nd Brigade 
would consist of personnel on reaction-contracts, as well as soldiers 
receiving basic training. The Navy would receive three new frigates 
and two flexible support ships, primarily to participate in internation-
al military operations far away from Denmark.205 This was a marked 
improvement, because most of the existing Cold War era materiel in 
200 Ringsmose and Rynning, “The Impeccable Ally?”, 59.
201 Bertel Heurlin, “The New Danish Model: Limited Conscription and Deployable Pro-
fessionals”, in Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of Western militaries, 
ed. Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 166.
202 Hans Henrik Bruun, et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik (Copen-
hagen: Danish MFA, August 2003).
203 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2005–2009 (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 10 June 2004), 1.
204 Bruun et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår, 24.
205 Kurt Birger Jensen, “Danmarks fremtidige flåde”, Militært Tidsskrift 133, no. 3 (Oc-
tober 2004): 458–464.
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the Navy had been intended solely for operations in the Baltic and the 
North Sea.206 The Danish Air Force also aspired to become an expedi-
tionary air force, phasing out elements intended primarily to defend 
Danish airspace in favour of deployable capabilities seen as relevant for 
international military operations.207
The new defence agreement scrapped Denmark’s submarines, 
along with the ground-based air defence composed of DeHawk mis-
siles. By slaughtering the “sacred cows” of the mobilisation forces and 
two whole weapon categories, it was possible for the Danish Armed 
Forces to develop credible deployable capabilities with the limited 
resources available.208 Conscription was reduced to four months, and 
trained personnel who did not enlist in the regular forces would spend 
three years as mobilisation personnel in a new total-defence force of 
12,000 lightly-armed troops. This new total-defence force would be 
employed, along with the police and the Home Guard, according to a 
total-defence concept.209 A key task would be to defend society against 
the threat of international terrorism. After the implementation of the 
agreement, the Danish Armed Forces would have standing forces ca-
pable of rapidly responding to international crises, as well as to con-
stantly maintain approximately 2,000 troops in international military 
operations.210 This doubling in the number of deployable troops would 
come at no extra cost to the Danish taxpayer, since the defence budget 
remained effectively fixed.211
In March 2004 the Norwegian Government presented its Long 
Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2005–2008.212 Coming only three 
months prior to the new Danish defence agreement, it showed how 
much Norwegian defence planning had changed since the Kosovo 
War. The Norwegian defence force envisaged by new long-term plan 
looked remarkably similar to the Danish Armed Forces. But while the 
goals and tasks of the defence forces in both countries were now almost 
206 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Efterkoldkrigstidens danske forsvarspolitik”, in Dansk 
Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1992, ed. Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (Copenhagen: 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1993), 49–50.
207 Søren Nørby, Det danske forsvar: Opgaver, udstyr og mandskab i det nye årtusind (Copenha-
gen: Aschehoug Dansk Forlag, 2006), 179–181.
208 Stefan Thorbjørnsen, “Fra ‘grønthøster’ til ‘slagtning af hellige køer’”, Militært Tids-
skrift 133, no. 4 (December 2004): 755–768.
209 Danish Minister of Defence, Et robust og sikkert samfund: Regeringens politik for beredskabet 
i Danmark (Copenhagen: Danish MoD, June 2005).
210 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om ... 2005–2009, 5.
211 Hans Jesper Helsø, “Transformation ist der Schlüssel zur Relevanz der Streitkräfte”, 
Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, no. 4 (2005).
212 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen … 2005–2008, Proposition 
to the Storting, no. 42 (2003–2004).
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identical, the Norwegian Armed Forces retained a greater focus on 
purely national tasks.213
The Norwegian long-term plan at least theoretically did away 
with the distinction between units envisaged for national defence and 
units intended for international operations. All units in the Armed 
Forces were now in principle available for operations outside national 
territory.214 In practice, this would be less the case for Norway than 
Denmark, however, given the former’s decision to retain long-term 
conscription. In Denmark, only the units performing the basic four 
month training of the conscripts would be unavailable for interna-
tional deployments. The 1st Brigade would be available to respond 
rapidly to international crises, while the 2nd Brigade would maintain 
the Danish Army’s long-term commitments abroad.
In Norway, only the Telemark Battalion within the Brigade North 
would be a standing unit composed of volunteers. The other deploy-
able units within the brigade would consist of personnel on readiness 
contracts. The entire brigade would be available for deployment inter-
nationally; this was the first time Norway adopted a policy allowing a 
brigade-sized expeditionary force.215 However, the Norwegian brigade 
would have a considerably longer reaction time than the Danish.216 
Also, the intended tasks were different. The Danish 1st Brigade was 
envisaged in a “first in – first out” capacity, capable of high-intensity 
coalition warfare,217 while the Norwegian brigade was more likely to 
be deployed as a rotating brigade in an ongoing operation.
The primary tasks of the Norwegian Navy would be national, but it 
should also have sufficient capacity to contribute to international mili-
tary operations. Taking part in and possibly leading NATO’s Standing 
Naval Force Atlantic were particularly mentioned.218 The Navy would 
get new, high quality equipment, including five new frigates and six 
new MTBs. Thus, while the Danes were investing in capabilities de-
signed primarily for expeditionary operations, particularly units of the 
213 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar (Oslo: 
Norwegian MoD, 31 January 2005), 4.
214 The Border Guard battalion in Kirkenes and the Royal Guard battalion in Oslo were 
the exceptions.
215 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen … 2005–2008, 61–63.
216 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 61.
217 Poul Kiærskou, “Forberedelse til indsættelse i den internationale mission”, Militært 
Tidsskrift 132, no. 4 (December 2003): 565–566.
218 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen … 2005–2008, 63–65.
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Army, the Norwegians were allocating resources to the Navy, the focus 
of which remained basically national.219
Both in Norway and Denmark the respective 2004 defence plans 
transformed the Home Guard into a force designed for assisting the 
police and civilian authorities, e.g. with combating terrorism. Both 
created a prioritised reaction force within their guard, of 5,000 and 
3,000 soldiers respectively. This force would be able to react rapidly, 
and be better trained and equipped than their regular Home Guard 
units. In Norway, an additional 20,000 strong reinforcement force 
would make up a mobile component of the guard, another 25,000 
would be available for securing vital infrastructure, and an untrained 
pool of 33,000 soldiers would make up a reserve force. In Denmark the 
50,000 strong guard was divided into an active and a passive compo-
nent, with about 23,000 members active as of December 2007. The 
Danish Home Guard remained more specialised than the Norwegian 
one, having, for example, a dedicated Police Home Guard tasked with 
providing assistance to the civilian police.
In February 2004, as part of the process to establish a European 
Rapid Reaction Force, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
agreed to establish battalion-sized EU battlegroups available for rap-
id deployment. In November 2004, Norway, declared together with 
Sweden and Finland that it would contribute to building a Nordic mul-
tinational EU battlegroup, the Nordic Battlegroup. The Norwegian 
contribution would consist of about 200 soldiers, serving in support 
functions such as medical service, logistics and strategic lift.220 Due 
to the Danish reservations against the European security and defence 
policy (ESDP), Denmark did not participate in the battlegroup.221 
However, according to the 2004 Defence Agreement, the structure of 
the Danish Armed Forces would be such that an immediate entry into 
the ESDP would be possible following a lifting of the Danish reser-
vation.222 This nevertheless represented a departure from earlier prac-
tice in relation to Nordic multinational forces, where Denmark had 
normally taken the lead. The self-imposed Danish restrictions thus 
allowed Norway to become a more active player in an important new 
219 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 63.
220 Jan Joel Andersson, Armed and Ready? The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic 
B attlegroup (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2006), 37–38.
221 See Danish Institute for International Studies, De danske forbehold over for den Europæiske 
Union: Udviklingen siden 2000 (Copenhagen: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 
2008).
222 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om ... 2005–2009, 1–2.
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joint multinational military venture than Denmark, a change from the 
earlier trend of the mid-1990s characterised by Danish activism and 
Norwegian reluctance.223
In January 2005, a new law on military personnel in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces came into effect, creating a new class of professional, 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs).224 Introducing the new law, the 
Norwegian Government noted how the Armed Forces had suffered 
from a surplus of older and a lack of qualified younger officers and 
NCOs to command lower-level units. A reform of the personnel struc-
ture of the military was therefore necessary.225 In essence, Norway em-
braced the Danish model of professional NCOs, explicitly modelling 
its new NCO corps on the Danish system.226
In January 2008, a new Defence Study was presented by the 
Norwegian Chief of Defence, calling for further professionalisation 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces.227 It recommended slashing the 
MTBs, reducing the Home Guard to 30,000 troops and converting 
two conscript battalions to a volunteer battalion. The Defence Policy 
Committee agreed with most of the military recommendations, 
though it wanted to retain one conscripted manoeuvre battalion while 
adding the one professional battalion. It also wanted a 40,000 strong 
Home Guard.228
In March 2008, the Norwegian Government presented its new 
Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2009–2012, based on the 
Defence Policy Committee’s recommendations.229 The overall structure 
of the Armed Forces would remain basically the same, but lowering 
the number of bases and units would help streamline the organisation. 
There was an increased focus on responsiveness, to be accomplished 
by increasing the number of regular contracted soldiers and soldiers 
on reaction-contracts. However, the most controversial proposal put 
223 See e.g. Pernille Rieker, “Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian Participation 
in the EU’s Security Policy”, European Security 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 288–291.
224 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “LOV 2004-07-02 nr 59: Lov om personell i Fors-
varet”, (2004).
225 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Om lov om personell i Forsvaret, Proposition to the Stort-
ing, no. 60 (2003–2004), 11–17.
226 Pål Remy Østbye, Støtte til militærfaglig utredning 2003 (MFU 03) – utredning om be-
falsordning, FFI/RAPPORT-2003/01485, (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Es-
tablishment, 2003).
227 Norwegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport (Oslo: 
Norwegian MoD, 2007).
228 Norwegian Defence Policy Committee of 2006, NOU 2007:15 Et styrket forsvar (Oslo: 
Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, 31 October 2007), 58–60.
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forward by the Chief of Defence, to replace the two conscript-based 
manoeuvre battalions in Brigade North with an all-volunteer battal-
ion, was rejected. The MTBs were also retained, and the Home Guard 
was given an authorised strength of 45,000. Norway therefore did not 
choose to move as radically towards an all-volunteer force as Denmark 
did. While rejecting further professionalisation of the Army, contrary 
to Denmark’s decision four years previously, the Norwegian authori-
ties did follow Denmark in moving towards a new total-defence con-
cept, aimed amongst other things at combating terrorism.230
Understanding the 1990−2008 difference
The preceding three chapters have outlined the development of Danish 
and Norwegian defence policy from approximately 1990 to 2008. 
While the two nations’ armed forces shared similar missions and force 
postures around 1990, a decade later these missions and postures had 
become very different indeed. While differences had narrowed some-
what after the Norwegian defence reforms in 1999 and 2001, they 
nevertheless grew again once Denmark abolished territorial defence 
and long-term conscription altogether in 2004.
Anthony Forester, in his 2006 study of armed forces and society in 
Europe, argues that in the 21st century, the armed forces of Denmark 
and Norway parted ways, and now belonged in his view to different 
categories. While Norway retained a territorial defence model, the 
type of armed forces both countries had possessed during the Cold 
War, Denmark had transformed its military into a late modern force.231
230 See e.g. Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-mili-
tært samarbeid, Report to the Storting, no. 39 (2003–2004).
231 Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 53–65.
	 Norwegian	and	Danish	defence	policy		59
Table 2: Different typologies of armed forces
Territorial Defence Model Late Modern Model
Have generally been willing to engage in 
peacekeeping tasks only to a very limited 
degree, with still less enthusiasm for high 
intensity peacemaking and war-fighting 
operations, and relatively few resources 
have therefore been allocated to the 
development of a rapidly deployable 
forces.
[Has a] dual mission providing 
what might be termed a “residual 
Territorial Defence function”, 
but in parallel a commitment to 
provide a significant contribution 
as a proportion of overall sizes to 
international peacekeeping.
Source: Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 54, 62.
Denmark had also moved towards a war-fighting focused conceptu-
alisation of peacekeeping, Forester suggests, which included high- 
intensity warfare, and was more willing to make use of force without a 
Security Council mandate, when circumstances required action (the so-
called post-Westphalia position).232 This change in Danish policy had 
contributed to inverting the Cold War era transatlantic relationships 
of Norway and Denmark. During the Cold War Atlanticism had been 
stronger in Norway than in Denmark, and it was the former country 
that had led the latter into NATO.233 In the 21st century the tables had 
turned. Denmark and the United States were now criticising Norway 
for its supposedly inadequate effort in Afghanistan.234 Danish efforts 
in expeditionary warfighting had boosted its reputation in NATO as 
a country that contributed to the Alliance in both treasure and blood, 
and were awarded with several high-profile summits between Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and President Bush.235
It is important to reiterate once more that we are talking about a 
difference of degree. While the Danish Armed Forces have experienced 
a stronger reorientation towards international operations than the 
Norwegian, the latter are nevertheless said to have undergone one of the 
greatest public-sector reforms in modern Norwegian history.236Also, 
232 Ibid., 217, 205.
233 Nikolaj Petersen, “Atlantpagten eller Norden? Den danske alliancebeslutning 1949”, 
in Danmark, Norden og NATO 1948–1962, ed. Carsten Due-Nielsen, Johan Peter 
Noack, and Nikolaj Petersen (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 
1991), 27–42.
234 Evans, Beeston, and Boyes, “You must do a lot more”; Jarle Brenna, “Danmark kritis-
erer Norges NATO-nei”, Verdens Gang, 25 November 2006.
235 Frantzen, Clemmesen, and Friis, Danmarks krigshistorie 2: 1814–2008, 352–353.
236 Thomas Brachel, Ingunn Botheim, and Gunnar Bakkeland, Omstillingen av Forsvaret 
2002–2005 – dokumentering av resultater og måloppnåelse, rapport nr. 2006:7 (Oslo: Stat-
skonsult, 2006), 5.
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while it is true that Danes were more willing to take part in high-
intensity combat than the Norwegians, comparison with the US or 
UK paints a different picture.237 Finally, while the Danish military has 
been more positive towards an all-volunteer force than the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, Norway and Denmark nevertheless are two of the last 
NATO countries with any conscription at all.238 Thus one should not 
overemphasise the differences between Norway and Denmark com-
pared to other countries.239
Nevertheless, there are substantial differences, and they need to 
be accounted for. Why did Denmark pay more attention and allocate 
more resources to international military operations than Norway, and 
why were the Danes much more willing to engage in combat opera-
tions in risky areas of the world? The following four chapters will ex-
amine one by one the four main factors identified as driving this early 
and persistent reform of the Danish Armed Forces for deployment in 
expeditionary missions, and will also explain the more measured pace 
of the Norwegian military transformation. When viewed together, 
these factors provide the answer to the second research question, why 
Norway and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War.
237 Joseph Soeters and Miepke Bos-Bakx, “Cross-Cultural Issues in Peacekeeping Opera-
tions”, in The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field, ed. Thomas W. Britt and 
Amy B. Adler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 292.
238 Of the 19 “old” members of NATO, only Germany, Greece, Turkey, Norway and 
Denmark retained conscription in 2008, and of the 10 “new” members only Estonia. 
Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 163–164.
239 One comparative study of military cultures found Norway and Denmark to score simi-
larly on most indicators. Joseph L. Soeters, Cristina-Rodica Poponete, and Joseph T. 
Page Jr., “Culture’s Consequences in the Military”, in Military Culture, vol. 4, ed. Amy 
B. Adler, et al., (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 18.
Chapter	4
The impact of geopolitics
Norway has access to rich natural resources in vast ocean areas, and bor-
ders on to a great power in the north. These two factors largely define 
[Norway’s] regional dimension.
The 2004 Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces240
With its newly gained and unique level of security in relation to traditio-
nal conventional threats, Denmark in the 1990s developed an interest in 
preserving the global and especially regional framework for this security.
The 2003 Bruun report on Danish defence policy241
A key factor causing the difference in Norwegian and Danish defence 
policy after the Cold War was their different geopolitical situations. 
Even with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact, Norway was left with two geopolitical problems which pre-
cluded a radical and immediate reorientation towards expeditionary 
operations: the shared border with Russia and the huge and partially 
disputed maritime economic zones. Denmark, on the other hand, faced 
neither a lingering territorial threat nor the same need to exercise au-
thority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones. These geo-
political differences facilitated the rapid transformation of the Danish 
Armed Forces and its employment abroad, while forcing Norway to 
remain focused upon national issues even in the post-Cold War era.
This chapter accounts for the different geopolitical calculations 
made by Norwegian and Danish policymakers after the Cold War, in 
240 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret (Oslo: 
Norwegian MoD, 2004), 42.
241 Bruun et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår, 19.
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particular in the areas of defence reform and weapons procurement. It 
argues that their different geopolitical situations allowed for the rapid 
Danish reorientation towards international deployment, but barred 
Norway from pursing a similarly rapid and radical change of priorities.
The security environment of the 1990s
That the disappearance of a territorial threat opens up a space for 
reorienting the armed forces is hardly unique to Denmark. Karl W. 
Haltiner, in his study of the decline of mass armies in Europe, finds 
that countries closely integrated into multilateral security institutions, 
and facing no territorial threat, have reoriented their armed forces more 
towards standing, volunteer forces intended for expeditionary opera-
tions.242 In this, Denmark and Norway seem to be no exceptions. The 
Danish academic Bertel Heurlin finds that, for all the Nordic states, 
geographical proximity to Russia provides a major source of explana-
tion for the degree of change away from territorial defence after the 
Cold War. Norway, Sweden and Finland all shared proximity to, and 
therefore continued to feel uneasy about, their giant neighbour in the 
east. Denmark, however, was suddenly surrounded by friendly states 
on its east flank, acting as a buffer against Russia.243
By the early 1990s local Danish and German air and sea forces were 
able to counter all likely threats in Denmark’s vicinity. The Danish 
Army had consequently only a very limited operational role on Danish 
territory.244 A number of official acts and inquiries coming directly on 
the eve of the Cold War recognised Denmark’s new security situation, 
and were instrumental in moving official Danish policy towards a more 
comprehensive view of security.245 Denmark’s relocation from the front-
lines to the backwater of the Alliance thus made it possible to reorient 
the Armed Forces, and especially the Army, towards crisis management 
away from Denmark proper.246 Thus, from an early point in the post-
Cold War era the disappearance of a concrete threat to Danish territory 
242 My italics. Karl W. Haltiner, “The Decline of the European Mass Armies”, in Hand-
book of the sociology of the military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic, 
2003).
243 Bertel Heurlin, “Verden eller nationen?”, Politiken, 3 October 2007.
244 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Present and future command structure: A Danish view”, in 
Command in NATO After the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considera-
tion, ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 1999), 191.
245 Bertel Heurlin, “Forsvar og sikkerhed i Norden: Ligheder og forskelle hos de nordiske 
lande”, in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Co-
penhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 31.
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enabled Denmark to direct its defence policy towards combating chaos 
on the fringes of the international system.247 Heurlin argues that since 
Denmark was “faced with an international environment without any 
possible conventional military threats, the only usable choice for the 
Danish military was in international operations.”248 The Armed Forces 
were also transformed into a foreign policy instrument in order to retain 
influence in the new NATO, and especially with the sole superpower.249 
As the Danish journalist Jørgen Dragsdahl expresses it: “[the Armed 
Forces] are to be visible and harvest good-will in Washington”.250 
Heurlin thus sees the shift towards expeditionary operations as a result 
of Denmark’s altered geopolitical position.
Indeed the Danish relationship with the American superpow-
er has been central in post-Cold War Danish security policy. Hans 
Hækkerup, Minister of Defence 1993–2000, stated that Denmark 
aimed to be America’s best friend.251 Per Stig Møller, the foreign min-
ister of Denmark since 2001, emphasised the tremendous benefits to 
Denmark of the close bilateral ties it enjoyed with the US. This close 
relationship was seen as giving Demark a say in the major internation-
al issues of the day.252 Announcing Denmark’s intention of joining the 
American coalition in the Gulf in 2003, Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen argued that supporting the United States would always be 
in Denmark’s interests.253 
The Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen further argues that 
with German unification Denmark faced the unpleasant scenario of 
being placed in Germany’s shadow once more. The EU served as a 
way of preventing this, by tying Germany into a European political 
structure from which it could be controlled. However, without full 
integration in the EU, due to the opt-out on defence, a strong and 
well-functioning NATO would have to serve as the Danish instrument 
for tying Germany down effectively.254 Denmark’s “opt-out” from the 
European security and defence policy in 1992–93 served to make the 
247 Interview with Heurlin in Niels Tobiesen, “Fjenden hedder kaos: Sikkerhedspolitisk 
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August 1993.
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country all the more dependent upon NATO and its relationship with 
the United States.255
Henning Sørensen, unlike Heurlin and Mouritzen, sees the trans-
formation as less of a necessity and rather more of a luxury. The in-
creased sense of security after the Cold War allowed Denmark, 
Sørensen argues, to move towards selective security, allowing the state 
to employ its Armed Forces to deal with problems that did not di-
rectly constitute an existential threat to Denmark. The structure of the 
armed forces came to reflect this selective security environment, offer-
ing soldiers a number of different options depending upon what kind 
of service they wanted to render state and society, rather than universal 
conscription designed to defend the survival of the nation.256 However, 
whether they see the new Danish Armed Forces as a necessity or matter 
of choice, both Heurlin and Sørensen agree that Denmark’s changed 
geopolitical circumstances was the main engine driving the change in 
mission and organisation of the Armed Forces.
But while Danish officers and politicians in the early 1990s were 
wondering in public “where is the front?”,257 and looked for new tasks 
for the armed forces, there was little such existential soul-searching 
among the Norwegian officer corps and political leadership. According 
to Norwegian historian Olav Riste, Norway’s next-door neighbour 
gave the country “good reasons for seeing that the end of the Cold War 
was not ‘the end of History’”.258 The massive military presence in the 
Leningrad Military District did not disappear overnight, nor did the 
Northern Fleet in the Kola Peninsula, with its strategic nuclear mis-
sile submarines. Russian democracy was seen as unstable, and Russia 
still had an unsolved territorial dispute with Norway. Russia remained 
a source of long-standing uncertainty, to which Riste attributes the 
relative stability of Norwegian defence spending after the end of the 
Cold War.259 Even if Russia slashed its military spending to a normal 
European level, there would still exist a huge local military disparity 
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257 H. T. Havning, “Hvor er fronten?”, Militært Tidsskrift 119, no. 5 (May/June 1995): 
150–153.
258 Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 277.
259 Ibid., 277–278. 
	 Norwegian	and	Danish	defence	policy		65
between Norway and Russia.260 The Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes 
similarly shows an awareness in the Norwegian government of certain 
persisting geostrategic factors after the Cold War.261 Norway was still 
located “within the Russian great power sphere of influence”,262 and the 
great natural resources located in the partially disputed northern areas 
were seen as a potential source of conflict with Moscow.263 Norwegian 
security and defence policy therefore exhibited greater continuity in 
the post-Cold War era than in most other NATO countries, at least 
prior to the eastern enlargement.264
The guiding principle of Norwegian defence planning throughout 
the 1990s was the continued possibility of a military invasion of north-
ern Norway. To Norwegian intelligence, the strategic importance to 
Russia of the High North had grown, and Russian forces in the region 
were deemed to be sufficient to launch an isolated attack on north-
ern Norway.265 There remained uncertainty in Norway about Russia’s 
actual stability in the 1990s, due to the economic woes and political 
instability plaguing the country. The Armed Forces also needed to 
maintain sufficient air and sea power to conduct surveillance and ex-
ercise authority and sovereignty in the Norwegian maritime economic 
zones, a mission with increased importance as Norway began to de-
velop oil and gas resources further north.
The Norwegian view of the importance of geopolitical continu-
ity was shared by prominent politicians in Denmark. That geopolitics 
played an important role in creating different defence policies is cer-
tainly the impression of the former Danish Minister of Defence, Hans 
Hækkerup. “[H]aving Russia as a neighbour rather than the Soviet 
Union does not make much of a difference”, he says by way of explaining 
the continuation of Norway’s territorial defence posture.266 Denmark 
had a much stronger sense of a sudden change in the geopolitical situ-
ation, which facilitated the move from invasion defence towards an 
expeditionary defence posture.267 In particular, Poland’s transforma-
260 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Defense Without Threat? The Future of Norwegian Military 
Spending”, Cooperation and Conflict 27, no. 4 (1992): 403.
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tion from foe to friend drove this change in threat perception. Poland’s 
accession to NATO, says Hækkerup, was supported so enthusiastically 
by Denmark because it “would change Denmark’s geographical place-
ment decisively”.268
Like Hækkerup, former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen also sees Danish assertiveness as partly driven by its 
new geopolitical circumstances. Danish policy on the Baltic states to-
wards the end of the Cold War and after was about, says Ellemann-
Jensen, exploiting the window for action which had suddenly opened, 
further facilitated by Denmark’s dual membership of both NATO and 
the EU.269 Danish outspokenness on the Baltic issue can hence be ex-
plained at least in part by its strategic distance from Moscow.270 By 
way of contrast, Norway did not share Denmark’s vital interests in the 
Baltic region, being more concerned about the Barents Sea. Further, 
Norway’s shared border with Russia made it wary of opposing Russian 
interests.271 Clive Archer describes Norway’s policy as having been 
“Russia first”, which was also the case for Sweden and Finland. Only 
Denmark gave priority to the relationship with the Baltic states.272 
Thus, while Denmark during the Cold War could hardly be defended, 
the post-Cold War world left Denmark safely at a distance from “the 
realities of great power politics”.273 
Norway’s huge maritime economic zones also tied down a great 
deal of Norway’s military resources. Between 1977 and 1980 the en-
largement of the maritime economic zones to 200 nautical miles had 
given Norway approximately two million km² of oceanic territory. 
This huge area had to be managed, under conditions where the legal 
rights of Norwegian authorities to do so were constantly challenged.274 
The discovery of large quantities of petroleum in the North Sea in 
268 Ibid., 15.
269 Interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister, 227–
228.
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104.
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1969 had also given Norway new responsibilities, and by the 1990s 
Norway had become the world’s second largest producer of oil, and 
Europe’s second largest source of natural gas.275 While the direct de-
fence implications were modest, being mainly the responsibility of the 
Special Forces, the growing importance of Norway’s energy resources 
was frequently invoked as a reason why the country needed to maintain 
air and sea forces capable of maintaining situation awareness and ex-
ercising authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones.276
Reforms in the 21st century
The difference in their respective geopolitical situations seems to of-
fer several convincing reasons for Norwegian continuity and Danish 
change in defence policy after the Cold War The question then be-
comes, if proximity to Russia and oceanic jurisdiction favoured con-
tinuity in the territorial defence posture of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, why then did Norway choose to reform its military in the early 
21st century? Did geopolitics diminish in importance around the turn 
of the millennium? I argue that geopolitics still played a prominent 
role, but that circumstances had changed since the early 1990s.
Firstly, Norway experienced a similar problem to Denmark: dimin-
ishing allied interest in its territory.277 As one Norwegian foreign min-
ister expressed the attitude in Washington, “the problem with Norway 
is that there is no problem with Norway”.278 Like Denmark, Norway 
could no longer maintain a relationship with the United States based 
simply on American interests in Norway’s strategic location. Providing 
Norwegian forces for US-led multilateral military operations, mostly 
within NATO, consequently became a new way of maintaining friendly 
relations with the sole remaining superpower.279 In doing so, Norway 
hoped to sustain NATO and by association the American security 
guaranty that made up the cornerstone of the Alliance.280 It became a 
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50 år: Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, ed. Chris Prebensen and Nils 
Skarland (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomité, 1999).
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277 Tamnes, Oljealder, 139–145.
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common understanding among the political leadership that if Norway 
expected to receive allied assistance when needed, the country had to 
contribute to the alliance in turn.281 It is indicative that when the new 
long-term plan, initially unveiled in 2001, began to be implemented, 
it was warmly welcomed by top NATO officials.282
However, even as Norway reformed its Armed Forces in response 
to NATO’s call for a more modern and expeditionary-capable force, 
it was always done with a view to keeping NATO’s classic collec-
tive defence role relevant.283 In a bid to justify sending Norwegian 
troops to Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre emphasised 
Norway’s need of the Alliance given its particular location, geography 
and resources.284
Secondly, the nature of the threat from the east changed after the 
Cold War. Specifically, the deterioration of the Russian military, and 
advancements made in military technology, had affected Norway’s 
strategic environment. Norway’s shift away from conscripted reserve 
units and towards more regular contracted units in 2001 was there-
fore in some respects driven by the realisation that Russia contin-
ued to be a potential threat, but that scenarios involving Russia had 
changed from the threat of a massive Russian military invasion to 
more limited scenarios.
That the Russian conventional forces had decreased tremendous-
ly in size and capabilities in the decade after the Cold War, even in 
the Kola Peninsula, was something of which the Norwegian authori-
ties were keenly aware.285 Qualitative reforms in the Russian Armed 
Forces meant that Russia was also expected to develop more limited 
means of accomplishing their military objectives, such as stand-off 
guided munitions, rather than having to carry out a full-scale conven-
tional ground invasion.286 In the Norwegian defence establishment, 
the large, mobilisation-based, relatively static invasion defence army 
therefore came to be seen as increasingly unsuitable to the most likely 
scenarios involving Russian forces. A massive invasion designed to 
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take control of most of Norway now seemed very implausible. Rather, 
limited Russian military operations against Norway were more likely, 
designed to achieve limited aims. Under these circumstances better 
and more mobile units, with shorter reaction times, would be required 
to win in this type of limited warfare scenario.287 Crisis management 
replaced invasion defence as the main task of the Norwegian military 
units in northern Norway.288 The seriousness of these new tasks was 
underlined by the heightened probability that an actor could use lim-
ited force in or near Norway, since such a limited conflict would not 
automatically escalate.289 Under these circumstances, quality and re-
sponse time became more important for the Norwegian Armed Forces 
than quantity and endurance.
Thirdly, and finally, the importance of the Norwegian maritime 
economic zones increased in the new century. This was due to its abun-
dant food resources, the promise of significant oil and gas deposits in 
the region and its role as a maritime transport hub to and from Asia 
via the Northeast Passage.290 By 2008, the Norwegian Chief of Defence 
Sverre Diesen considered strategic competition over access to these re-
sources as the most likely source of conflict in the region. It would most 
likely take the form of a tactical confrontation involving mainly air 
and sea forces, and possibly short-term air or sea-launched raids with 
limited land forces against valuable military and economic targets.291
These new tasks required mobile and flexible forces, available all 
year, with short reaction times and the ability to work alongside units 
from allied countries. In short, virtually the same kind of units needed 
for participation in international operations abroad.292 The Coastal 
Artillery provided a good example. Because technology had made 
fixed coastal artillery vulnerable, the Coastal Artillery was converted 
in 1998 into smaller, more agile, high-technological, mobile forces. Its 
successor, the Coastal Ranger Command, established in 2001 to train 
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wegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000: Sluttrapport, 7.
288 Kjell Inge Bjerga, Enhet som våpen – Øverstkommanderende i Nord-Norge 1948–2002 (Ber-
gen: Eide forlag, 2002), 196–216.
289 Svein Vigeland Rottem, Geir Hønneland, and Leif Christian Jensen, Småstat og energis-
tormakt: Norges sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i nord, vol. 3, Nordområdepolitikk (Bergen: Fagbok-
forlaget, 2008), 118–119.
290 Jon Bingen, “Nordområdene og polhavsdiplomatiet”, in Mellom maktene: Norske stra-
tegiske interesser, ed. Marianne Marthinsen and Stein Ørnhøi (Siggerud: Res Publica, 
2008).
291 Sverre Diesen, “Security and the Northern region”, in High North: high stakes: Security, 
energy, transportation, environment, ed. Rose Gottemoeller and Rolf Tamnes (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2008).
292 Norwegian Defence Policy Committee of 1999, NOU 2000: 20, 67.
	 70	 Defence	and	Security	Studies	1-2010
conscripts, gradually became a standing, volunteer force. In the fall of 
2005, the unit was active with four Combat Boat 90s on an exercise 
with British and Dutch marines off the coast of Senegal, and had a 
reconnaissance squad in Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness for 
contingencies in Norway. Thus the new organisation proved equally 
employable on Norwegian territory as on the global arena.
Similar to the Coastal Artillery, the Norwegian Army had re-
mained bound throughout the 1990s to a static defence concept, and 
was only really capable of tactical mobility in the mountainous Troms 
county. Such limited tactical mobility was now no longer sufficient; 
the Army needed to be rapidly strategically deployable and capable of 
winning in limited scenarios. The threat of vertical envelopment cre-
ated by an increasingly air-mobile Russian military further made the 
old, relatively static defensive concept unsuitable for modern condi-
tions.293 The new, smaller Army had increased availability, responsive-
ness, mobility, firepower and protection, and at least parts of it would 
in principle be equally capable of deploying to win a limited tactical 
engagement in northern Afghanistan as in northern Norway.294
Even as the Norwegian Armed Forces grew remarkably similar to 
the Danish military after 2001, the motives for the Norwegian reforms 
were nevertheless different. The justification for restructuring towards 
a smaller number of volunteer units was not solely or even primarily 
the requirements of PSOs in distant theatres, but rather the need for 
military forces to be available for national contingencies requiring a 
capacity for rapid reaction.295
The importance of the High North was, however, not a constant: 
it fluctuated during the 1990s and 2000s. By the turn of the millen-
nium, political interest in the area reached an all-time low. By 2005, 
however, the new centre-left coalition Government was becoming in-
creasingly committed, at least rhetorically, to an active High North 
policy.296 Increasing the presence of the Armed Forces was part of this 
policy, and the High North can therefore be said to have experienced a 
renaissance in Norwegian security and defence policy towards the end 
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of the period examined here.297 As expressed by the State Secretary in 
the Ministry of Defence: “Many of the geopolitical factors we used to 
think of as obsolete are once again relevant.”298 Although no new Cold 
War had replaced the old, Norwegian policymakers remained aware 
of Russia’s military resurgence and the growing geopolitical and energy 
importance of the High North.299
Weapon procurement
Norway’s continued territorial focus and Denmark’s expeditionary fo-
cus are clearly apparent in weapon procurement decisions taken in the 
early 21st century. When the Norwegian Government decided in the 
autumn of 2008 to replace the F-16 with the F-35, the reason the 
new aircraft were important was the role they could play in national 
crisis management, surveillance and in Norway’s ability to enforce 
national sovereignty.300 Indeed the main competitor of the F-35, the 
JAS Gripen, was considered adequate for NATO missions abroad, but 
was ultimately rejected because it failed the requirements of national 
tasks.301 In contrast, in a study conducted by the Danish Institute for 
Military Studies, the choice of future Danish aircraft rested essentially 
on their ability to take part in international military missions abroad; 
a capacity for homeland defence (air policing) was listed only as a sec-
ond criterion.302
The five new Fridtjof Nansen class frigates which began to be 
phased into Norwegian service in 2006 offer another case in point. 
Not having been requested by NATO, the need to acquire the frig-
ates was primarily legitimised by reference to national priorities in 
national waters.303 Strengthening the capacity for crisis management 
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in Norwegian waters was considered their most important operational 
task by the Government.304 Similarly, the procurement of Skjold class 
MTBs was not justified by their capacity for force-projection abroad. 
On the contrary, they were optimised for anti-invasion operations in 
coastal areas.305 Norway also continued to maintain a strong Coast 
Guard, numbering 15 vessels in 2008, whose main task was exercis-
ing Norwegian sovereignty and authority in its northern waters. New 
vessels were delivered to the Coast Guard, which acquired five small 
Nornen class patrol ships in 2006–07; three Barentshav class vessels, 
each displacing 4,000 tons, were being constructed in 2008. Northern 
and maritime dimensions hence took on a relatively greater impor-
tance in post-Cold War Norwegian defence policy, raising the priority 
of the Navy at the expense of the traditionally dominant Army.306 The 
service mainly concerned with operations abroad therefore diminished 
compared with one focusing mainly on national tasks. 
The Danish, for their part, downsized their Navy more rapidly 
than the Norwegians after the Cold War, and concentrated new ac-
quisitions around larger platforms suitable for operations outside the 
Navy’s traditional Baltic theatre of operation, indicating the increased 
priority assigned by Denmark to PSOs and NATO standing naval 
forces away from national waters.307 While patrolling the Danish eco-
nomic zones around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands continued to be 
important, it now became the sole responsibility of the Thetis, Agdleq, 
and Knud Rasmussen class arctic patrol ships. Force projection and sea-
to-land operations were the priority of the new Danish Navy. The new 
6,300 ton Absalon class could carry 200 extra soldiers in addition to 
the 100 regular crewmembers, had a roll-on-roll-off platform which 
could even accommodate the heavy 62 ton Leopard II main battle 
tank, and was equipped with a 127mm canon that could provide naval 
fire support up to 100 km inland. The Danish Navy’s ambition was to 
“create a fleet that can do on water what Danish soldiers are doing on 
land”, that is, take part in distant international military operations far 
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away from Denmark proper.308 The Danish Navy can in some respects 
be said to have returned to the 18th and 19th centuries, when Danish 
ships-of-the-line displayed the Danish flag and protected Danish ships 
in distant waters.309 For example, the DKM Absalon in August 2008 
assumed command of the Combined Task Force 150, the international 
naval force conducting anti-terrorism operations, as well as protecting 
shipping from terrorist and pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.
The impact of geopolitics
While Denmark in the wake of the Cold War transformed its Armed 
Forces into a professional expeditionary corps, safe in the knowledge 
that no conventional military threat to Danish territory exists, Norway 
has not enjoyed the same feeling of safety and security. Due to its 
uncertainty vis-à-vis its great power neighbour in the northeast, and 
its need to exercise authority and sovereignty over huge maritime eco-
nomic areas, Norway has retained a stronger territorial focus in its 
Armed Forces. This is one important reason why Norway has had 
fewer capabilities available for deployment abroad, despite spending 
much more on its Armed Forces than Denmark.
But while geopolitical differences provide an important and indeed 
necessary condition for the difference between Norwegian and Danish 
post-Cold War defence policies, they fail to provide a sufficient explana-
tion for the differences. The enhanced security environment only gave 
Denmark the opportunity to orient its Armed Forces towards expedi-
tionary operations, but it does not explain why this opportunity was 
seized so early and so decisively. Also, Norway’s move away from inva-
sion defence came rather late. In the crisis year of 2001, the Norwegian 
Government itself declared that failure to reform the armed forces had 
left them unprepared to deliver the kind of military power required by 
the new security environment.310 That Denmark subsequently became 
the stated model of several studies and reforms in Norway is indicative 
of the opinion among Norwegian authorities, at least in some respects, 
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that the Danish Armed Forces were more aptly organised for the new 
tasks of the post-Cold War era.311
Because geopolitics alone only partly explains why Norway and 
Denmark differed so markedly in defence policies, I shall therefore use 
the following three chapters to examine in turn the role of the indi-
vidual leaders and the cultural factors that decided the shape of Danish 
and Norwegian defence policies after the Cold War.
311 See e.g. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse; Arne Røksund, “Befalsor-
dningen”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 172, no. 2 (2003).
Chapter	5
The impact of leadership
If the Alliance were to falter, we [the Norwegians] would be among the last 
ones to leave the sinking ship. 
Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian Minister of Defence312
When the Cold War was over, the work began to restore Denmark’s ruined 
credibility as an ally and partner in international cooperation. 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs313
One of the key reasons Norway and Denmark pursued different post-
Cold War foreign policy strategies is that senior policymakers had dif-
ferent assessments of the need for change and the changes required. 
Decision-makers in Norway were generally satisfied with existing pol-
icies, and did not feel the need for making substantial changes to de-
fence policy before the turn of the century. Denmark’s decision-makers, 
on the other hand, actively sought to create a new political consensus 
around new policies. These leaders wanted to remake Danish defence 
policy and enable the Armed Forces to promote Danish interests and 
values abroad, and especially to ensure that Denmark was seen as be-
ing in the vanguard of the Atlantic community. In this endeavour they 
succeeded very well indeed.
This chapter will highlight the importance of individuals with 
fresh ideas and new projects. This is a factor that has all too frequently 
312 Johan Jørgen Holst, in an interview with International Defence Review, no. 9 (1989): p. 
1161. Quoted in Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North 
(Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), 303.
313 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig (Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal, 2004), 291.
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been dismissed in the literature on post-Cold War Nordic defence 
policy, often in favour of more “objective” material factors, such as 
geopolitics.
Decision-making structures
Norway and Denmark have broadly similar decision-making struc-
tures in the defence sector. The prime minister and minister of foreign 
affairs wield considerable influence over defence policy; both employ 
expert advisors and staffs who work with defence and security issues. 
The minister of defence has the widest institutional powers over the 
defence sector, and can therefore bring to bear tremendous influence on 
defence policy issues. Both Norway and Denmark also have relatively 
independent chiefs of defence, both of whom act as chief advisor to 
their respective minister of defence, but who also exercise direct con-
trol over the armed forces in peacetime.
Parliament has broad powers of oversight and control in both 
countries, especially in terms of budgetary powers. However, a con-
stitutional difference between Norway and Denmark is that while 
the deployment of troops abroad requires parliamentary approval in 
Denmark, this is not the case in Norway. The Norwegian Government 
nevertheless consult the parliamentary Expanded Foreign Affairs 
Committee before taking major security and defence decisions, and 
parliament thus nevertheless exercises a great deal of influence de facto 
on the government’s decision-making process.
Denmark: the “dynamic duo”
The Danish academic Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that while a “zero-
threat environment” which “moved Denmark from the frontline to the 
backwater” was indeed a requirement for the rapid Danish transition 
to expeditionary defence, it also required dynamic leadership to build 
political consensus and public support.314 To send Danish combat 
troops abroad was in no way a natural choice, and it broke decisively 
with past practice in Denmark.315 Jakobsen especially identifies two 
314 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold 
War: A New Model in the Making?”, International Peacekeeping 5, no. 3 (1998): 117; 
Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 92.
315 Peter Viggo Jakobsen,“Stealing the Show”, 41–42.
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successful defence policy entrepreneurs, the Liberal Foreign Minister 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Social Democratic Minister of Defence 
Hans Hækkerup, whom he describes as the “dynamic duo” of Danish 
defence policy in the early post-Cold War years.316
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen served as Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
from 1982 to 1993. He was deeply dissatisfied with what he perceived 
as Denmark’s wholly inadequate support to its allies during the Cold 
War, which he described as virtual appeasement of the Soviet Union.317 
Ellemann-Jensen felt ashamed by the role Denmark had played in 
NATO as a “footnote-country”.318 The new policy introduced by him 
in 1989 was termed “active internationalism”, and was meant to rem-
edy Denmark’s damaged reputation as a “wimp state” (pusling-land).319 
Denmark should be a reliable and predictable ally and stand by its 
friends. This was particularly important in relations with the United 
States.320 This change of policy was enabled by the restoration of con-
sensus in Danish politics, following the elections of 1988, and the 
close cooperation of Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup.
Ellemann-Jensen saw the 1990–91 Gulf War as an opportunity 
to rebuild Denmark’s reputation as a reliable ally, and to move the 
frontier of what was considered possible with respect to the employ-
ment of the Danish military. Ellemann-Jensen set out to change 
Denmark’s foreign policy by sending the corvette KDM Olfert Fischer 
to the Gulf in 1990. In this he was supported by future Minister of 
Defence Hækkerup, who sat on the Standing Committee on Defence 
in the Danish Parliament and was defence policy spokesman of the 
Social Democrats.321 Despatching the KDM Olfert Fischer to the Gulf 
was the closest to actual participation in the US coalition Danish do-
mestic politics would allow, and was only possible because Ellemann-
Jensen, Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, then Chief of Defence Staff, and 
Hans Hækkerup worked closely together.322
To Ellemann-Jensen the Gulf War marked a watershed. Unlike in 
the past, Denmark did not let its allies down.323 Sending a warship 
316 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 93–94.
317 See his book on this topic, Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl.
318 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Vejen, jeg valgte: Ti Mands Minde-foredrag på Vartov (Copenha-
gen: Gyldendal, 2007), 172–173.
319 Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl, 291–292.
320 Interview with Ellemann-Jensen in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister, 183.
321 Hækkerup, På skansen, 94–98.
322 Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl, 298–302; –––, Din egen dag er kort, 247–249; Hækkerup, På 
skansen, 94–98.
323 Ellemann-Jensen, Din egen dag er kort, 239. 
	 78	 Defence	and	Security	Studies	1-2010
to the Gulf in 1990 was considered important by Hans Hækkerup as 
well, as it changed Danish attitudes towards the use of military force.324 
Like Ellemann-Jensen, Hækkerup had been very uncomfortable with 
Denmark’s status as a ‘footnote state’, but like the Liberal Foreign 
Minister he justified staying on despite the policy because his resigna-
tion would not have changed it.325 Upon becoming Minister of Defence 
in January 1993, Social Democrat Hækkerup continued the Liberal 
Party’s Ellemann-Jensen’s policy of employing the Armed Forces proac-
tively abroad, most noticeably in the Balkans. Hækkerup stood his 
ground and pushed for the deployment of the Danish tank squadron to 
Bosnia, despite the scepticism of the UN. Unlike the Dutch, who de-
ployed to the safe area of Srebrenica without heavy-weapons, the Danes 
came heavily armed to their zone in Tuzla. The result was disaster and 
humiliation for the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica, and comparative 
success for the joint Swedish-Danish-Norwegian battalion at Tuzla.326
Hækkerup also took a strong interest in the organisation of the 
DIB, which he regarded as “the jewel in the crown” of the November 
1992 Defence Agreement.327 Hækkerup himself described the DIB as 
his “pet project”.328 His enthusiasm for the brigade was such that its 
first commander, Brigadier General Finn Særmark-Thomsen, was ini-
tially concerned about undue ministerial interference.329 The strong po-
litical patronage was an important reason why the DIB received a clear 
procurement priority with the Danish Armed Forces.330 SHIRBRIG 
also enjoyed Hækkerup’s personal patronage. He feared that his pet 
project would fail if it was not used, which was the main reason why 
SHIRBRIG was deployed to Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000.331 If the UN 
called and SHIRBRIG did not respond, Hækkerup feared it would fall 
apart. As he put it, “a soufflé rises only once”.332 The UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea therefore marked a brief return to traditional, 
non-robust UN peacekeeping for Denmark.333
324 Hækkerup, På skansen, 97–98.
325 Ibid., 140–142.
326 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 93–94.
327 Hækkerup, På skansen, 178.
328 Ibid., 203.
329 Finn Særmark-Thomsen, Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv (Copenhagen: Eget For-
lag, 2008), 136.
330 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 151.
331 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 95–96.
332 Hækkerup, På skansen, 90.
333 See e.g. Ole Luk Sørensen, Kasper Søegaard, and Kjeld G.H. Hillingsø, Udsendinge 
for fred: Danske soldater i internationale konflikter (Copenhagen: Documentas, 2006), 
144–173.
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The Liberal politician Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as 
Prime Minister from 2001 to 2009, took the “dynamic duo” project a 
step further. It demonstrates the level of success of the dynamic leader-
ship, but also shows that the new leader was brave enough to challenge 
domestic constraints and past practice. The need to make a break with 
the embarrassing past and reinvent Denmark as a reliable, assertive 
ally, which “punched above its weight”, was important to Rasmussen. 
A new chapter in the process of breaking with the past came with his 
decision about Danish participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.334 
The sense of Denmark having a “debt of honour” to its allies was thus 
still felt when Denmark joined the US/UK coalition.335 Rasmussen 
viewed past Danish foreign policy as “hiding behind others and fol-
lowing a policy of passive adaptation”.336
Rasmussen adopted Ellemann-Jensen’s rhetoric of the early 1990s 
and, to a lesser extent, Hækkerup’s of the late 1990s. The three man-
aged to build a remarkably broad cross-party political support for the 
new policy, which endured for two decades almost without cracks. 
Only with regard to participation in the Iraq War did the consensus 
actually break down. While it was quickly restored when the Social 
Democrats supported the presence of Danish troops to stabilize the 
country, consensus again broke down in March 2006. This acceler-
ated the Rasmussen Government’s decision to withdraw from Iraq 
in 2007.337 Unlike previous experiences in the Gulf and the Balkans, 
participation in the Iraq War has subsequently been seen as less 
successful.338
While an early desire for change in Denmark was decisive in re-
vamping Danish defence policy at an early date, its continued suc-
cess rested on an ability to make difficult choices about priorities. The 
senior leadership of the Danish Armed Forces played a crucial role 
in this respect, and particularly so with the milestone 2004 Defence 
Agreement. While the August 2003 Bruun Report was given little 
334 Martin Kaae and Jesper Nissen, Vejen til Iraq: Hvorfor gik Danmark i krig? (Copenha-
gen: Gads Forlag, 2008), 214–235.
335 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Fra Palæstina til Afghanistan – danske soldater i international 
tjeneste 1945–2005”, in Hvor som helst i det britiske verdensrige: Danske frivillige i britisk 
tjeneste 1945–48, ed. Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Rasmus Mariager (Copenhagen: Dansk 
Institut for Internationale Studier, 2006), 6–8.
336 Kaae and Nissen, Vejen til Iraq, 218.
337 Frantzen, Clemmesen, and Friis, Danmarks krigshistorie 2: 1814–2008, 365–368.
338 Tonny Brems Knudsen, “Denmark and the War against Iraq: Losing Sight of Interna-
tionalism?”, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, ed. Per Carlsen and Hans Mour-
itzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004).
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media attention,339 the so-called K-note (Capacity Memorandum) from 
the Danish Defence Command received a lot. Presented publicly in 
September 2003 by Chief of Defence General Jesper Helsø, it was the 
first time the Armed Forces themselves had taken a leading role in 
the political debate about defence reform.340 The K-note effectively 
sidelined those who wanted to retain the remnants of territorial de-
fence, and accelerated the new defence agreement. With the K-note 
the Armed Forces themselves led the way towards expeditionary de-
fence.341 They made sure that the tools in the military toolbox “would 
be of an expeditionary nature”.342
This prioritising of expeditionary capabilities was aided by a polit-
ical leadership which dared to cut entire military capabilities. Minister 
of Defence Søren Gade presided over the 2004 Defence Agreement 
which disbanded the Navy’s submarines, the Air Force’s ground-to-air 
missiles and the Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System. Denmark’s 
low defence spending left a choice between starving the military or 
transformation, and the civilian and military leadership boldly chose 
the latter.343
Norway in the 1990s: continuity
In Norway, no political entrepreneurship was forthcoming after the 
Cold War to match the Danes. Political leaders tended to support the 
status quo as far as the Armed Forces were concerned, and if anything, 
they were not particularly interested in military affairs.344 “Tampering” 
with the Armed Forces, cautioned Per Ditlev-Simonsen, Conservative 
Minister of Defence from October 1989 to November 1990, was 
undesirable at this point in time.345 In this he was supported by his 
Chief of Defence, Admiral Torolf Rein, who called for prudence and 
339 Bruun et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår.
340 Heurlin, “The New Danish Model”, 165.
341 Bertel Heurlin, “Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demo-
kratisering”, in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin 
(Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 101–103.
342 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “Camp Eden: The 2004 Defence Agreement, Military 
Power, and Danish Values”, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005, ed. Per Carlsen 
and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), 
57.
343 Heurlin, “The New Danish Model”, 165–166.
344 Tormod Heier, “Forsvarets utvikling etter den kalde krigen – den vanskelige veien”, 
Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 169, no. 3 (2000): 21–22.
345 Per Ditlev-Simonsen, “Aktuelle forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer: Fore-
drag i Oslo Militære Samfund den 8. januar 1990”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 160, no. 
2 (1990): 4–5.
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no dramatic changes to the mission or shape of the Armed Forces.346 
The 1990 Defence Commission, chaired by the former Conservative 
Prime Minister Kåre Willoch, did argue that the Armed Forces should 
be prepared to participate in peace enforcement operations under 
the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.347 Overall, however, the recom-
mendations given by the commission in 1992 were very conservative 
considering Denmark’s contemporaneous establishment of the DIB. 
Generally, Norwegian Governments seemed more comfortable with 
traditional peacekeeping.348
In his vision of Norway’s security policy in the 1990s, the well-
known academic and Labour politician Johan Jørgen Holst, who served 
as Minister of Defence 1986–89 and 1990–93, made no mention of 
Norwegian participation in international military operations,349 de-
spite his enthusiastic and energetic participation in the process of re-
shaping NATO for the post-Cold War era.350 Holst supported the idea 
of NATO-run enforcement missions in the interest of regional order, 
provided the mandate came from the UN and CSCE.351 This implied 
that the Norwegian IRF force could also be used for such missions. 
However, when Parliament discussed in June 1993 the Government’s 
proposal to create the IRF battalion, few politicians seemed to think 
the unit would be utilized for warfighting abroad.352 The only politi-
cians interested in debating the proposal belonged to the Socialist Left 
Party, which traditionally opposed anything involving NATO.353 The 
IRF battalion represented the only real innovation in the structure of 
the Armed Forces likely to improve overseas deployment capability, as 
the Navy and Air Force already possessed units capable of embarking 
346 Torolf Rein, “Forsvaret, status og perspektiv i en omverden i endring: Foredrag av 
Forsvarssjefen i Oslo Militære Samfund den 14. okt 1991”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 
161, no. 12 (1991): 1–10.
347 Norwegian Defence Commission of 1990, NOU 1992: 12, 149.
348 Alf Granviken, Rammebetingelser for internasjonale operasjoner – militært perspektiv, FFI/
Rapport -96/06059 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 1997), 9.
349 Johan Jørgen Holst, “Security Policy for the 1990s”, in Defence Forces of Norway, ed. T. 
D. Bridge and A. K. Slade (Tavistock, Devon: AQ & DJ Publications, 1992).
350 Olav F. Knudsen, “Policy, Politics and Analysis: Summing Up”, in Strategic Analysis 
and the Management of Power: Johan Jørgen Holst, the Cold War and the New Europe, ed. 
Olav F. Knudsen (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996), 220–221.
351 Johan Jørgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe, no. 12, Security Policy 
Libary (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1992), 8–9. 
352 Tor Aagaard Borgersen, “Forsvaret i skuddlinjen: En analyse av debatten rundt oppret-
telsen og iverksettelsen av Telemark bataljon” (MA Thesis, University of Oslo, 1998), 
55–61.
353 Græger, “Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990–2005”, 65–68.
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on IRF missions.354 Nevertheless, as Ståle Ulriksen argues, even this 
relatively limited force was more symbolic than real.355
There was a feeling that the events of 1989–91 had not altered 
things as radically from the Norwegian point of view as from the 
Danish. Preserving NATO’s historic role remained therefore essential. 
Thus the Government spent much time and energy salvaging what 
could be salvaged of equipment prepositioning programmes, NATO 
headquarters and dedicated allied reinforcements.356 Less was spent on 
reforming the Armed Forces, whose main task remained invasion de-
fence. Leif Mevik, who served as Norway’s NATO ambassador 1992–
98, describes how Norway was increasingly seen as out of touch with 
what other NATO countries viewed as the defence and security chal-
lenges of the day.357 This criticism was sometimes voiced publicly by 
NATO officials.358 As the 1990s wore on, Norway became more and 
more a special case in an Alliance increasingly oriented towards other 
tasks than collective defence.359 Norwegian foreign ministers and min-
isters of defence continued to focus upon the relevance of Article 5, 
the High North and Russia.360 While always careful to emphasise the 
new comprehensive security challenges, this commitment was much 
stronger in word than in deed.
The Labour politician Jørgen Kosmo served as Minister of Defence 
from 1993 to 1997. He was thus the main player in implementing 
the Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 1994–1998, and in draft-
ing the plan for the next period 1999–2002. Together with his Chief 
of Defence, General Arne Solli, Kosmo adopted a cautious approach 
towards implementing the plan. Under Kosmo and Solli plans to 
continue downsizing the Armed Forces were shelved; personnel ex-
penditure again took up a growing proportion of the budget, at the 
expense of equipment acquisitions.361 When the 1999–2002 plan be-
gan to be drafted, Kosmo wanted to examine the economic feasibility of 
maintaining the invasion defence structure. Any major changes to the 
354 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 196–197.
355 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 238.
356 Tamnes, Oljealder, 137–144.
357 Leif Mevik, Det nye NATO: en personlig beretning (Bergen: Eide forlag, 1999), 98–101.
358 Gunnar Johnsen, “NATO er bare mellomfornøyd med Norge”, Aftenposten, 1 February 
2001, morning edition.
359 Rolf Tamnes, “The Strategic Importance of the High North during the Cold War”, in 
A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years (Volume 3), ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 274.
360 See e.g. Jørgen Kosmo, “Defence and Security: Perspectives and Priorities”, in Our 
Security and The Alliance, ed. Jørgen Kosmo and Robert E. Hunter, Security Policy 
Library no. 3 (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1996).
361 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 137–138.
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organisation of the Armed Forces or the present system of conscrip-
tion were ruled out.362 Under Kosmo and his successor, the Christian 
Democrat Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (1997–99), “uncertainty” became a 
watchword legitimising continuity in defence policy.363 Fjærvoll could 
see “no responsible alternative” to a conscripted, mobilisation-based 
total defence force.364
Prominent politicians did not call for a radical reorientation of 
Norwegian defence policy in the 1990s, partly because few votes were 
to be gained, and many lost by doing so.365 By one calculation, al-
most nine per cent of the working population of northern Norway 
were directly employed by the Armed Forces in 1992, and a total of 15 
per cent were affected. In some northern municipalities military em-
ployment exceeded 40 per cent.366 The Norwegian Armed Forces were 
therefore an important employer in these relatively rural areas, a factor 
complicating any attempts at rationalising and reforming them. The 
“municipality-military complex” which had emerged during the Cold 
War, consisting of local base commanders, municipal and county poli-
ticians, and local businessmen, proved effective at squashing attempts 
to rationalise the number of bases.367 The drawn-out political decision-
making process required to enact change left ample opportunity for 
local communities to mobilize effectively against reforms considered 
undesirable, such as those involving base closures.368 Furthermore, 
maintaining rural communities in northern Norway had itself become 
“securitised” during the Cold War,369 justifying the many bases as a 
security gain in themselves.370 Many defence policy decisions were in 
fact taken with rural habitation policy in mind from the outset.371
362 Jørgen Kosmo, “Langsiktige utfordringer for Forsvaret: Foredrag i Oslo Militære Sam-
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Norway after 2000: change
By the turn of the new millennium, Norway had reached a turning 
point in its defence policy. Several key political and military leaders 
were now convinced that the Norwegian Armed Forces were in a crisis, 
and that radical reforms were needed. There were two reasons for the 
new mindset: resource imbalance and task imbalance. Firstly, due to 
shrinking budgets, failure to cut costs and inaccurate planning costs, 
the Armed Forces could not invest sufficiently in force modernisation 
and training. Secondly, even if adequate funding were available, the 
structure of the Armed Forces was such as to render them incapable of 
delivering the kind of relevant military power demanded by the politi-
cal leadership. In Norwegian defence policy documents these factors 
were collectively referred to as the dual imbalance.372
The first imbalance was said to be turning the Armed Forces into a 
“technical museum” because of lack of funding for new equipment.373 
Equipment acquisitions were being postponed regularly. The latter 
imbalance had been clearly demonstrated by the Kosovo War. When 
the Norwegian units arrived in Kosovo three months after the Kosovo 
Force had already deployed there, the British commander Lieutenant 
General Sir Michael Jackson was supposed to have asked sarcastically, 
“what took you so long? Have you been walking?”374 Clearly the slow 
responsiveness of the Army was an embarrassment to the Norwegian 
political leadership. While the Danish leadership experienced the same 
unpleasant surprise, the Danish Armed Forces nevertheless performed 
better than their Norwegian counterparts.375 The political consensus 
in Norway after the Kosovo War was that Norway needed more high-
quality capabilities with shorter response time.376
Much of the intellectual and ideological impetus for the reforms 
came from within the Armed Forces themselves,377 the key figure be-
ing the future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen. Since early in his career 
372 This definition of “dual imbalance”draws on the “official”definition presented by the 
government in Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 
2002–2005, 6.
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lagre tømmes”, Aftenposten, 14 October 2000, morning edition.
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174, no. 2 (2004): 5.
375 Hækkerup, På skansen, 135–137.
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he had been an advocate for a standing military with a high number of 
service members on contracts.378 After the Cold War he continued to 
argue the need for more standing forces of higher quality with shorter 
reaction time.379 The role of the military had changed fundamentally 
in the new age, and Norwegian Armed Forces had to keep up with the 
times, he insisted.380 The old invasion defence force was neither fit for 
purpose nor affordable anymore.381 The Armed Forces should become 
a volunteer-oriented, capital-intensive, power-political instrument for 
the state, adapted for limited rather than total war.382 
His leading role in drawing up Defence Study 2000 made Diesen 
the chief ideological architect of the transformation of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.383 While the study was commissioned for financial 
reasons,384 it soon became a vehicle for updating the Armed Forces 
to a new international and technological environment.385 The work 
proceeded in close association with the work of the Defence Policy 
Committee, whose support provided extra weight.386
The reforms were carried out under the leadership of two reform-
minded ministers of defence. First, plans for a new defence were drawn 
up during the tenure of the Labour politician Bjørn Tore Godal, 
Minister of Defence in the vital period 2000–01, when the radical 
Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2002–2005 was prepared. After 
a new Government took office in October 2001, the Conservative 
Kristin Krohn Devold served as Minister of Defence for the entirety of 
plan’s implementation period.
Godal saw the threat of a full-scale invasion as a thing of the 
past; it would take at least 10–15 years for a new threat to emerge.387 
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New multi-dimensional challenges were replacing yesterday’s thre-
ats.388 However, as he saw it, the Armed Forces were still adapted to 
yesterday’s scenarios. Norway needed military instruments that could 
rapidly be utilized along with other instruments, both in the High 
North, and if necessary out of area, alongside its allies.389 The present 
invasion defence structure was neither economically sustainable,390 
nor, more importantly, needed or fit to face the new challenges of the 
post-Cold War era.391 Territorial defence tasks could largely be trans-
ferred to the Home Guard.392 Public and expert reactions were unex-
pectedly passionate. Godal compares the response of many groups in 
Norway to that of “sleeping beauty” upon being wakened not by a 
prince, but a monster. In this case, the monster was showing the pub-
lic a picture of reality they did not want to see.393 Notwithstanding 
vocal opposition in many quarters, by providing political leadership 
and acting as a public spokesman for the reforms, Godal played a 
decisive role in ensuring that most of the ideas for a “new defence” 
were in the end adopted.394 Putting the reforms into practice, how-
ever, would be the responsibility of Godal’s successor, Kristin Krohn 
Devold. She was his equal in her determination to enable the Armed 
Forces to perform their new tasks. 
It was during Devold’s ministership that Norwegian Armed 
Forces took active part in combat operations abroad for the first time. 
Within a month of assuming office, she had offered a significant con-
tingent of Norwegian forces to the US-led War of Terror. Within 
two months, Norwegian Special Forces took part in combat opera-
tions in Afghanistan, something that was noticed and appreciated by 
the US. Devold wanted to shorten response times and improve abil-
ity to conduct more complex missions.395 She especially wanted bet-
388 Bjørn Tore Godal, “Det nye NATO”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 166, no. 1 (1997): 4–7.
389 Norwegian News Agency, “Godal: Ny virkelighet krever omlegging”, Norsk Telegram-
byrå, 8 January 2001.
390 Bjørn Tore Godal, “Omstilling for en ny tid – et moderne og fleksibelt forsvar”, Norsk 
Militært Tidsskrift 171, no. 2 (2001): 4–5.
391 Ibid.: 12.
392 Bjørn Tore Godal, “Bjørn Tore Godal forsvar”, Nordlys, 7 April 2001, morning edi-
tion.
393 Godal, Utsikter, 54–56.
394 “A New Defence” was the title of the report delivered by the Defence Policy Com-
mittee appointed in July 1999. Norwegian Defence Policy Committee of 1999, NOU 
2000: 20; Græger, “Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990–2005”, 266–267.
395 Kristin Krohn Devold, “Interview – Kristin Krohn Devold: Norwegian defence min-
ister”, NATO Review (Winter 2002): 26–28.
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ter deployability,396 declaring to the American press, “we want to be 
relevant”.397 
Devold became an active exponent of the idea of developing niche 
capacities for overseas use alongside larger allies, her stated strategy be-
ing to “identify what you are good at, and concentrate on it”, because 
“that way you can play with the big boys even if you are small”.398 Her 
enthusiasm to transform the military and enable the use of Norway’s 
Armed Forces abroad made her quite popular with Norway’s NATO 
allies, enough to make her a serious candidate for the post of General 
Secretary of NATO.399
However, Godal and Devold were less successful at building the 
type of broad, cross-party political support needed to make clear de-
fence policy priorities. Unlike Denmark, Parliament did not sanction 
an expeditionary concept which emphasised a “first in, first out” ca-
pacity at the expense of sustainability. Nor did Parliament accept that 
Norwegian forces were rendered technically obsolete. The formula to 
come out of the discussions was that the Norwegian Armed Forces “had 
to be both modern and large, and should underscore NATO as well 
as UN-related operations”.400 Parliament also refused to cut military 
units, insisting for instance on acquiring and retaining the Skjold class 
MTBs counter to the advice of repeated military studies.401 Finally, 
Parliament was reluctant to trimming base and support structures to 
the extent recommended by the Armed Forces.402 Political vacillation 
in Norway clearly slowed the process of modernisation. The Danish 
situation was different, and modernisation could proceed at a faster 
pace. This was a key reason why Denmark was able to get seemingly 
the same range of deployable capabilities from their armed forces, de-
spite a much lower defence budget.403
Godal and Devold also failed to make a convincing case for partici-
pation in warfighting abroad, unlike Denmark. In 2005 the decision 
to deploy fighter aircraft to Afghanistan again was still so controversial 
that MPs from one of the Government parties publicly protested the 
396 Kristin Krohn Devold, “What Europe wants from NATO?”, speech at the NATO/
GMFUS Conference, Brussels (3 October 2002).
397 Matthew Brzezinski, “Who’s Afraid of Norway?”, New York Times, 24 August 2003.
398 Ibid.
399 Stephen Castle, “Robertson to step down as Nato’s Secretary General”, Independent, 23 
January 2003.
400 Heier, “Influence and Marginalisation”, 231.
401 Norwegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000: Sluttrapport, 20; –––, 
Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport, 20.
402 Olav Versto, “Forsvarets krisespiral”, Verdens Gang, 18 November 2006.
403 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 59–61, 74–75.
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decision.404 The 2006 debate on whether to despatch ground forces 
to southern Afghanistan similarly revealed a lack of consensus on the 
issue.405
The importance of leadership 
In a way, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen played the part of forerunner in Danish 
defence policy; he advocated a new policy even before the security en-
vironment justifying it had fully materialised. His ambitious “active 
internationalism” in the Gulf and towards the Baltic states was, thus, 
slightly ahead of events. Hans Hækkerup worked to consolidate the 
embryonic approach begun by Ellemann-Jensen and himself by des-
patching the Danish Armed Forces to Croatia and Bosnia in the early 
to mid 1990s. By then, the post-Cold War security environment from 
which Denmark benefited had been realised, but Hækkerup’s determi-
nation to see the Armed Forces play a decisive part in risky operations 
in the Balkans drove a change that was in no way predetermined by the 
country’s new strategic situation. The policy of breaking with the past 
continued in the new century, with Anders Fogh Rasmussen adopting 
the same rhetoric as Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup when Denmark 
went to war in Iraq. Early, decisive and successful leadership must 
thus be said to have been a vital factor in driving Denmark’s rapid 
transformation from “weakest link” into one of NATO’s most willing 
members when it came to warfighting. The Armed Forces senior lead-
ership finalised the transformation into an expeditionary force with the 
K-note issued in late 2003.
In Norway, no ambitious leader with a program for radical change 
took the helm after the Cold War, and the structure suggested by the 
1992 Defence Commission was neither economically sustainable nor 
militarily appropriate to Norway’s security environment of the late 
1990s. The failure of political leadership to enact timely reforms 
therefore made of the 1990s a “lost decade” in Norwegian defence 
policy.406 That little was done to downsize and restructure the Armed 
Forces resulted in a feeling of crisis in 2000, when the Armed Forces 
proved inappropriately organised and much too expensive.
404 Sveinung Bendiksen, “SV-protest mot egen regjering”, Stavanger Aftenblad, 9 Novem-
ber 2005.
405 Vinding, Ryste, and Andersen, “Norge sier nei til NATO”.
406 Brachel, Botheim, and Bakkeland, Omstillingen av Forsvaret 2002–2005, 13–14.
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At this point two political leaders did come forward in Norway, 
and they were willing to propose and to carry through a massive reor-
ganisation. Godal’s programme of reform was, however, drawn up by 
ambitious reformers in the Armed Forces themselves, chief of these 
being Brigadier Sverre Diesen. They were subsequently enacted by the 
energetic Devold, who worked tirelessly to change Norway’s reputa-
tion of being out of sync with its allies.
In summary, when we regard the impact of leadership in the two 
countries, what conclusions can be drawn? Decisive political leader-
ship in Denmark, driven by a strong cross-party desire for change, was 
a key reason for early and thorough reform and active use of the Danish 
Armed Forces. In Norway, leadership remained comfortable through-
out the 1990s with the existing tasks and structure of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, and therefore the status quo was mostly maintained. 
Thus different leaderships proved very important in causing the great 
difference in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War. 

Chapter	6
The impact of strategic culture
The successful Danish military participation in the Gulf and in the 
Balkans served finally to rid the country of the defeatist “what’s the use of 
it” attitude which had persisted since 1864.
-Hans Hækkerup, Danish Minister of Defence407
Peace and justice provide the safest shield for lands and peoples, and the 
people that make peace their purpose will thereby have gained an honourable 
place in the history of the world.
-Halvdan Koht, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs408
Another important reason for the different post-Cold War defence 
policies pursued by Norway and Denmark was the countries’ differ-
ent strategic cultures. The Danish and Norwegian strategic commu-
nities came to exhibit very different “ideas, conditioned emotional 
responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour” in the post-Cold War 
period.409 Firstly, this was due to Denmark’s successful deployment of 
forces overseas, which drove the reconfiguration of its relations with 
its Armed Forces, and made it reappraise the utility and morality of 
utilising force. Norway, on the other hand, did not undergo those 
changes and therefore retained a more traditional Nordic position on 
sovereignty and the use of force. Secondly, however, Denmark also de-
veloped a different threat perception, where new and distant threats 
were perceived as national security challenges. In Norway, however, 
humanitarian reasons rather than national security tended to justify 
407 Hækkerup, På skansen, 9.
408 Halvdan Koht was a renowned Norwegian historian who served as Foreign Minister 
1935–1941. Quoted in Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 254.
409 Jack Snyder quoted in Gray, “Out of the Wilderness”: 6.
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overseas deployment of the Armed Forces. Essentially then, the differ-
ent views on the desirability and possibility of utilising force lay be-
hind Denmark’s much more frequent use of it than Norway did in the 
post-Cold War era. Finally, unlike the Danish, the Norwegian Armed 
Forces continued to have important strategic tasks at home, defending 
the country and building the nation.
This chapter will demonstrate the significance of two countries’ 
different strategic cultures after the Cold War, with a special emphasis 
on how culture affected force employment, threat perception and view 
of international law. Their dissimilar strategic cultures, I shall argue, 
was a key reason why Norwegian and Danish defence policies contin-
ued to be very different in the 21st century.
Denmark: reinventing itself
The successful entrepreneurship of members of the Danish political 
class, made possible by a benign security environment, and aided by a 
military both able and willing to do warfighting abroad, all served to 
produce a change in Danish strategic culture. It changed fundamen-
tally the conception of what was normal and routine in Danish defence 
policy. Having Danish soldiers participate in high-risk combat opera-
tions far from home would certainly not have been normal just a few 
years previously. It became nevertheless “an axiom that hardly anyone 
questioned”.410 Once policymakers, officers and the public grew ac-
customed to the successful use of the Armed Forces as instruments of 
Danish foreign policy, and the military came to view such activity as 
its main raison d’être, it became self-reinforcing. Hans-Henrik Holm 
finds the changing Danish conception of the use of armed force to have 
emerged from a gradually change in practice:
The Minister of Defense at the time, Mr. Hans Hækkerup, fun-
damentally changed the traditional Danish approach to the role 
of the armed forces in Danish foreign policy. They were seen as a 
prospective tool that could be used to support a policy of active 
internationalism.411
410 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 94.
411 Hans-Henrik Holm, “Danish foreign policy activism: the rise and the decline”, in 
Danish foreign policy yearbook, ed. Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2002), 13.
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Peter Viggo Jakobsen agrees with Holm:
The deployment of Olfert Fischer to the Gulf got the snowball 
rolling and the subsequent (from a Danish perspective) success-
ful deployments in Croatia and Bosnia created an avalanche that 
changed the Danes’ understanding of their appropriate role in 
the world.412
Far from being seen as useless and purely symbolic anymore, in the 
1990s the Danes came to regard their Armed Forces as a useful tool 
for achieving security.413 The military-diplomatic policy towards the 
Baltic countries provides another example of change in Danish stra-
tegic culture since the end of the Cold War. Christian Hoppe, a sec-
tion head at the Danish Foreign Ministry, argues that post-Cold War 
Danish policy towards the Baltic states demonstrates that Denmark 
had put the legacy of defeatism from 1864 behind it. Under the old 
Danish attitude, a small state like Denmark had no international in-
fluence. Now the view in Denmark was that Danish activism towards 
the Baltic states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, had an impact.414 
What made this change in Danish defence policy possible, Mikkel 
Vedby Rasmussen suggests, was the new consensus that was built on 
an amalgam of Danish “Scandinavian cosmopolitanism” and “defen-
cism”. Adherents of the former ideology had traditionally been active 
supporters of the UN and sceptical of NATO and the Armed Forces. 
Supporters of the latter had been enthusiastic about NATO member-
ship and a strong defence, but less interested in what they viewed 
as an altruistic foreign policy by the cosmopolitanists.415 These two 
traditions came increasingly closer on the need for Danish Armed 
Forces to combat indirect threats to peace and stability in Europe and 
beyond.416 This political consensus was instrumental in the creation 
of the DIB, and thereafter in giving first priority to capabilities that 
412 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 94.
413 Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the ESDP out-out: A new way of doing nothing?”, in 
New Security Issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP, ed. 
Clive Archer (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 80.
414 Christian Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik”, in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1993, ed. 
Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets 
Forlag, 1994), 68–69.
415 Rasmussen, “‘What’s the Use of It?’”: 72–76. For an early 1990s analysis of Nordic/
Scandinavian identities, see Ole Wæver, “Norden Rearticulated”, in Nordic Security in 
the 1990s: Options in the Changing Europe, ed. Jan Øberg (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1992). 
416 Rasmussen, “‘What’s the Use of It?’”: 77.
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were internationally deployable, such as the DIB in the Army, tactical 
transport helicopters for the Air Force and flexible support ships for 
the Navy.417 This clear set of priorities on internationally deployable 
capabilities of the Danish political and military leaderships was com-
bined with a willingness to make use of the new expeditionary force to 
engage in high-risk combat operations. As expressed by Mikkel Vedby 
Rasmussen, “activism means that Denmark had begun to think of 
armed interventions as a natural part of its foreign policy and organize 
its defence accordingly.”418 Whether military force was useful or not 
was now no longer a matter of debate. The Armed Forces had become 
an unquestionable tool in the foreign policy toolkit.419
To Sten Rynning, the Danish relationship with its Armed Forces 
is reminiscent of the mid 19th century, when Denmark was willing to 
employ force to achieve its aims in its relations with its German neigh-
bour states. Denmark once again sought to become a strategic actor. 
The development of an expeditionary intervention force was intended 
to secure Danish influence in NATO and with the US, and to further 
a law-governed liberal world order from which Denmark would ben-
efit.420 What emerged was something akin to a great power mentality 
in Denmark, claims Poul Villaume, driven forth by military activism 
and close alignment to the United States.421 Anders Wivel in turn ar-
gues that the Danish worldview in the post-Cold War period moved at 
least somewhat towards that of the US, in seeing security and a liberal 
world order as requiring the possession and use of military force.422
Norway: a humanitarian superpower
In Norway, not many norm-entrepreneurs came forward to delib-
eratively change what was considered natural or appropriate, as 
Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup did in Denmark.423 Less assertive use 
of Norwegian military forces after the Cold War slowed recognition of 
417 Michael H. Clemmesen, “De danske væbnede styrker i fremtiden – en skitse fra side-
linien”, Militært Tidsskrift 132, no. 2 (June 2003): 267.
418 Rasmussen, “‘What’s the Use of It?’”: 82.
419 Ibid.
420 Sten Rynning, “Denmark as a Strategic Actor? Danish Security Policy after September 
11”, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, ed. Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (Co-
penhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003).
421 Poul Villaume, “Aktivisme – eller tilpasning?”, Politiken, 24 September 2006.
422 Anders Wivel, “Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma”, 
Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 417–421.
423 Jakobsen, “Stealing the Show”, 42.
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the new paradigm of using the Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool, 
and when it did occur, it did not penetrate the collective Norwegian 
mindset as deeply. Norway consequently found it much harder to adapt 
to the new international PSO environment, where use of force beyond 
self-defence was becoming increasingly common. This new paradigm 
was seen to run counter to the traditional Norwegian emphasis on 
peaceful conflict resolution and mediation.424
According to Norwegian political scientist Halvard Leira, 
Norwegian foreign policy culture had been characterised since the late 
19th century by a strong emphasis on conceptions of the peaceful na-
ture of Norway and its people. This powerful peace discourse in the 
foreign policy realm meant that defence issues were seen as something 
apart from foreign policy, as the defence discourse lacked an interna-
tional dimension. It necessitated the portrayal of Norwegian military 
engagements abroad as inherently humanitarian, in extension of this 
peace tradition.425 For a Norwegian politician to challenge the estab-
lished tradition by advocating a more proactive use of Norwegian mil-
itary forces would involve taking considerable political risk.426 There 
was therefore a gap between the new paradigm, where military force 
was associated with a wider foreign policy conception, and domestic 
Norwegian practice. In 1990 it was considered unnatural to contribute 
combat forces to the Gulf War;427 there was “nothing in our historical 
tradition” which suggested Norway should participate.428 As we have 
seen, this refusal to send combat troops to peacemaking operations did 
not disappear until 1997 and the creation of SFOR. Denmark, while 
also exhibiting much of the same discourse, had a stronger tradition 
for thinking strategically about military force in terms of foreign pol-
icy, and its peace tradition was less missionary than the Norwegian.429
Torunn Laugen Haaland suggests that in the early 1990s, while 
wanting to demonstrate Norway’s solidarity with its allies, the 
424 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Nordic Peacekeeping Model: Rise, Fall, Resurgence?”, 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 3 (September 2006): 389–390.
425 Halvard Leira, “Folket og freden: Utviklingstrekk i norsk fredsdiskurs 1890–2005”, 
Internasjonal Politikk 63, no. 2–3 (2005): 135–160; –––, “‘Hele vort Folk er naturlige 
og fødte Fredsvenner’. Norsk fredstenkning fram til 1906”, Historisk tidsskrift, no. 2 
(2004): 153–180. 
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428 State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Helga Hernes. Quoted in Heidi 
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Norwegian political leadership did not want to be associated too close-
ly with military matters. By way of compromise, they emphasised the 
non-military aspects of Armed Forces’ operations abroad, portraying 
Norwegian soldiers as military humanitarians.430 It continued during 
Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan operations, even as the Norwegian mili-
tary contributed increasingly robust combat forces. Norwegian poli-
ticians still continued to accent the non-military and humanitarian 
aspects of the military activities abroad, downplaying and even using 
clever rhetorical ploys to mask the military aspect of overseas opera-
tions.431 Kjell Magne Bondevik, the Norwegian Prime Minister during 
the 1999 Kosovo War, was accused of trivialising Norway’s military 
involvement by describing it as “limited military operations”.432 It is 
also revealing to read the account of the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
2000–01, Thorbjørn Jagland. While recognising that NATO’s Article 
5 had been invoked, he still praised the toppling of the Taliban as 
a humanitarian intervention,433 and made no mention of Norwegian 
military participation.434 This fits Marc Houben’s finding: Norwegian 
participation in international military operations was mostly justified 
by international obligations and humanitarian concerns, and far less by 
material national interests.435 Noting this, Karsten Friis argues,
[T]hat Norwegians have to kill and die on another continent to 
secure national strategic security appears to have been difficult 
to state publicly for the government. The humanitarian version 
is safer and less controversial.436
The resulting gap between rhetoric and reality was very wide, leading 
to something akin to cognitive dissonance.437
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War, risk perception and sovereignty
Neither the Danish Government nor prominent members of the 
Danish public had the same inhibitions as their Norwegian coun-
terparts when it came to talking publicly about using the military. 
Prominent Danish politicians repeatedly stated publicly that the 
country was at war and that Denmark was being defended in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.438 These public statements became so common that, ac-
cording to Jakobsen, “nobody [in Denmark] raises an eyebrow” when a 
politician describes Danish operations in the Iraqi desert or mountains 
of Afghanistan as part of the defence of Denmark.439
Danish risk perception, unlike Norwegian, related to more dis-
tant and non-classical threats, such as terrorism. A newspaper article 
written by the Norwegian Minister of Defence legitimising military 
engagements abroad listed humanitarian and developmental aid as 
the primary purpose. Her Danish counterpart drew attention rather 
to Denmark’s security.440 The centre-right Government that took of-
fice in November 2001 aligned itself closely with the US and the War 
on Terror, arguing that Denmark was a belligerent in a global war on 
terrorism that had both an offensive and a defensive side.441 The US 
concept of Homeland Security was warmly embraced in Denmark, and 
became the main task of Danish forces on Danish soil.442 Meanwhile 
the Government claimed to be pursuing an offensive foreign policy, 
citing involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples.443
The Danish Government also seemed to be more receptive than 
the Norwegian to the idea of engaging in war without a UN Security 
Council mandate if the situation arose.444 The 2003 Iraq War was 
a case in point, marking a break with Danish foreign policy of the 
438 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, “Missionen i Afghanistan skal have bedst mulig opbakning”, 
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past.445 While the initial Danish decision to join the US-led coali-
tion of the willing can to some extent be attributed to the election 
of Fogh Rasmussen’s Government in 2001,446 opposition in Danish 
society was limited, and after the invasion the Social Democratic op-
position initially supported Danish presence in Iraq.447 Norway, how-
ever, remained insistent on the primacy of international law.448 This 
clearly placed Denmark squarely in the “post-Westphalia” group of 
countries, as Anthony Forester argues, while Norway remained tied to 
Westphalian norms as far as the use of military force was concerned.449 
Overall Norway remained committed to a more traditional Nordic 
position regarding sovereignty and use of force, whereas Denmark had 
reappraised the utility and morality of utilising force.450
The effectiveness of the Danish contribution in the 1990s was 
reinforced because Denmark tended to concentrate its deployments 
in fewer locations, whereas Norway tended to participate in a larger 
number of missions. Denmark also favoured NATO PSO missions 
earlier, whereas Norway continued to spread its priorities between 
the UN and NATO until the late 1990s.451 The net result was that, 
despite still being among the lowest spenders in NATO on defence, 
Denmark boosted its reputation among its allies after the Cold War.452 
In comparison, Norway lost at least some of the favourable status it 
had enjoyed in the Alliance compared to Denmark.453
Lingering strategic tasks
Differences in perceptions of the desirability of using force and adher-
ing to Westphalian norms of sovereignty were important strategic dif-
ferences between Norway and Denmark. However, there were also other 
reasons. The two countries espoused different strategic rationales for 
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maintaining armed forces at all. It may seem paradoxical that Danish 
scepticism about the usefulness of military force during the Cold War 
could give way such a strong military activism in the post-Cold War 
era. In fact, however, it is precisely the absence of such missions dur-
ing the Cold War that allowed the rapid transition towards Danish 
expeditionary defence after 1990. Given the obsolescence of the pri-
mary function of providing a symbolic defence, and influence in the 
Atlantic Alliance now increasingly married to what a country did to 
support international operations, conditions were ripe for rapid change 
in Denmark.454 When the need for a symbolic resistance to an invasion 
orchestrated by the Warsaw Pact disappeared, there were simply too 
few functions left for the Armed Forces to fulfil.
Norway’s Armed Forces were more diverse in purpose than 
Denmark’s, and calls for change were therefore fewer and less success-
ful. While the end of the Cold War shocked most Western states into 
reorganising their armed forces, neither Norwegian politicians nor the 
Norwegian Armed Forces were sufficiently shocked by the end of the 
Cold War to seek radical change.455
Firstly, unlike Denmark’s, the Norwegian Armed Forces were not 
seen as merely providing a symbolic defence of the nation; they were 
viewed as actually capable of defending the country.456 Secondly, the 
Norwegian military continued to be seen as an homogenising insti-
tution for the young men of the nation.457 In the 19th century, ties 
between the Norwegian Armed Forces and civic society were already 
close due to the work of voluntary organisations and broad parliamen-
tary oversight.458 Conscription in Norway was said to serve a socialis-
ing and educational purpose, gluing the nation together.459 For the 
duration of the Cold War there was little conflict between society’s 
desire for universal male conscription, and the functional requirements 
of the Armed Forces. In order to secure the territory of the state, virtu-
ally the entire nation would need to be mobilized in some capacity.460 
454 Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-omdømme, 7.
455 Græger and Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II”: 54.
456 Brundtland, “Nordiske aspekter ved norsk sikkerhetspolitikk”, 126.
457 Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: 
Developments and Arguments”, Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 316; 
Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 253–266.
458 Tom Kristiansen, “Grunntrekk i norsk militærhistorie til Atlanterhavspakten”, in 
Finsk og norsk forsvar: Alltid for samme formål – alltid med ulik kurs?, ed. Arne Olav 
Brundtland (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1996).
459 Ørnulf Nåvik, Vernepliktens historie 950–1996 (Oslo: Elanders Forlag, 1996), 211–212.
460 Sigurd Sørlie and Helle K. Rønne, Hele folket i forsvar: Totalforsvaret i Norge frem til 
1970 (Oslo: Unipub forlag, 2006), 215.
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With the end of the Cold War, however, what society wanted and what 
the military was supposed to do increasingly parted ways. Despite this 
there was little debate on national service. Conscription was institu-
tionalised and so strongly tied to national mythology, it was difficult 
to challenge on functional grounds.461 Any attempt to reform the sys-
tem faced strong emotional reactions.462 This was how Norway dif-
fered from Denmark, where the institution of conscription was weaker, 
and the system of long-term conscription easier therefore to reform.463
The significance of strategic culture
The formative 1990s established a new Danish culture in matters per-
taining to the use of military force, including situations for which 
there was little justification in international law. The country came to 
see the use of force as an acceptable and effective method to advance 
general foreign policy. Denmark and Norway also differed in their 
evaluation of the necessity of employing force, because remote threats 
such as terrorism, rogue states and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction were held to seriously threaten Danish national security, 
but received less attention in Norway. Further, the disappearance of 
the one primary strategic purpose of the Danish Armed Forces after 
the Cold War made reorientation that much easier.
On the other hand, Norwegian strategic culture remained more 
tied to pre-1989 norms of consent and only defensive use of force. 
Norway also retained a stronger attachment to Westphalian norms and 
international legal principles, and did not have the Danish sense of be-
ing endangered by remote threats. Rather, Norway’s military engage-
ment abroad often sought justification in humanitarian and idealistic 
motives, and efforts were made to make operations appear as pacific 
as possible. The Armed Forces were also still expected to defend the 
country and build the nation, strategic tasks beyond expeditionary 
defence.
461 Alf-Åge Hansen, “Anakronisme eller arvesølv? En studie av den norske verneplikten” 
(MA Thesis, University of Tromsø, 1999), 119–123; Heier, “Forsvaret etter den kalde 
krigen”, 91–106; Karsten Friis, “Stat, nasjon, verneplik: En genealogisk analyse av 
stats- og nasjonsbyggingen i Norge med fokus på verneplikten” (MA Thesis, Univer-
sity of Oslo, 1998), 118–121.
462 Heier, “Forsvarets utvikling etter den kalde krigen”, 22.
463 Pertti Joenniemi, “Farewell to Conscription? The Case of Denmark”, in The Changing 
Face of European Conscription, ed. Pertti Joenniemi (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 
2006), 28–30; Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia”, 316.
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It thus seems clear that some of the differences between Norwegian 
and Danish defence policy can be traced back to differences in strategic 
culture during the two decades following the end of the Cold War. 
This explains why the differences persisted into the 21st century, after 
Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup had left politics and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces had become more willing and capable of projecting mil-
itary force beyond national territory. 

Chapter	7
The impact of military culture
During the Cold War we used to joke that everything would be O.K., be-
cause it was all just a joke […] When we started receiving the first fallen 
Danish soldiers from international operations […] the joke was over.
Col. Lars R. Møller464
Many of my colleagues say they joined the military to defend Norway, and 
not to embark on foreign adventures.
Gen. Sverre Diesen465
The final factor behind the great difference between Norwegian and 
Danish defence policy after the Cold War was the countries’ dissimilar 
military cultures. While the Danish Armed Forces quickly became a 
willing and capable foreign policy tool, the capacity of the Norwegian 
military to perform the new expeditionary missions was lower, and it 
lacked the inclination moreover to do so. The reasons were threefold. 
Firstly, the Danish military was involved in overseas combat operations 
much sooner after the Cold War, promoting and accelerating the adop-
tion of expeditionary warfighting more quickly than in the Norwegian 
case. Secondly, because the Danish Armed Forces had traditionally de-
pended less on conscription and standing volunteer units were more 
easily employable for warfighting abroad, the personnel structure was 
more suitable for expeditionary missions. Thirdly, the Danish Armed 
Forces had a longer history of out of country operations. The historical 
mission of the Norwegian Armed Forces was more strongly associated 
464 Lars R. Møller, Det danske Pearl Harbor: Forsvaret på randen af sammenbrud (Copenhagen: 
Informations Forlag, 2008), 57.
465 Brzezinski, “Who’s Afraid of Norway?”
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with the territory of Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces therefore 
resisted the state’s attempt to task them with a growing number of 
new and demanding missions abroad, while the Danish Armed Forces 
quickly accepted and supported the new expeditionary missions.
This chapter will highlight the significance of different organisa-
tional cultures within the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces, and 
argue that while the former acted as a catalyst, the latter was an inhibi-
tor in determining the speed at which the two organisations became 
willing and capable of performing the new post-Cold War missions.
Different experiences in the 1990s
In proportion to its population, Denmark contributed more troops 
than any other nation to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, and 
such forces as were deployed were involved in the most intense combat 
engagements Danish forces had experienced since the Second World 
War.466 Between 1992 and 1997 over one third of all Danish Army 
officers and nearly half of all NCOs had done service in Bosnia.467 This 
war-like experience, which the Danish soldiers gained in the Balkans 
1992–95, helped change the self-perception of the Danish Armed 
Forces. When Danish officers came face-to-face with the harsh reality 
of PSOs in the post-Cold War era, so different from the “beach party” 
days in Cyprus, even older officers came to a different worldview.468 
As Henning-A. Frantzen argues, participation in the Balkans led the 
Danish Armed Forces to adopt a robust approach to PSOs, a “warfight-
ing first” doctrine.469 The Armed Forces came to accept their new role 
as an instrument in foreign relations within this warfighting-focused 
framework, whereas previously, peacekeeping duty had been a side 
show and a bad career move for officers.470
While these deployments sustained the Danish commitment to 
UN peacekeeping operations, the risk involved and the very robust 
nature of the Danish contribution were something new.471 The conse-
quences of making a mistake abroad were no longer comparable with a 
466 Sørensen, “Denmark: From Obligation to Option”, 125.
467 Henning Sørensen, “Danish Senior Officers’ Experiences from IFOR/SFOR”, in War-
riors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters ; A Comparative Study 
Based on Experiences in Bosnia, ed. Jean Callaghan and Mathias Schönborn (Münster: 
LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 2004), 86.
468 Møller, Det danske Pearl Harbor, 56.
469 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 172.
470 Ibid., 167, 176.
471 Petersen, “Adapting to change”, 108–109.
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bungled exercise in West-Germany, but could literally result in Danish 
soldiers returning in coffins.472 Consequently, the requirements of in-
ternational military operations increasingly determined force structure 
and procurement priorities of the Armed Forces, eventually supplant-
ing all other considerations.473 The “hot” combat-exposed parts of the 
organisation began to take precedence, at the expense of the “cold” 
peacetime establishment.474
The effect of operations in the Balkans on the Danish approach 
to PSOs can be illustrated by the way they organised their camps and 
military units in Croatia and Bosnia respectively. In Croatia the camps 
were located on the demarcation line, and designed more for conven-
ience than defensibility. In contrast, the camps built in Bosnia were es-
tablished well away from the buffer zone and built-up areas, with clear 
fields of fire around the base. The organisation of the battalion sent 
to Bosnia was also more robust and organised into regular manoeuvre 
companies rather than observation teams. This was a result of lessons 
learned from the vulnerability of small observation posts and teams in 
the Croatian deployment to intimidation and being taken hostage by 
the warring parties.475
While they were assigned to PSO missions, Danish officers did 
not feel the need for special PSO training or doctrine, because their 
ability to conduct PSO missions was based on their ability to fight. 
The commander of the Danish battalion in the Nordic-Polish Brigade 
found the Danish battalion better prepared for the mission because 
it was organised like a regular Danish mechanised infantry battalion. 
The other battalions in the brigade, including the Norwegian battal-
ion, were specially equipped, trained and organised for PSOs. Because 
the Danish battalion was more robust and prepared for warfighting, it 
would be better able to execute the full range of tasks to which it could 
be assigned in Bosnia, according to its commander.476 Similarly, the 
Danish commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast (MCN-NE) 
emphasised the corps’ warfighting ability as the foundation on which 
472 Møller, Det danske Pearl Harbor, 57.
473 Jakobsen, “Stealing the Show”, 39–40.
474 See Soeters, Winslow, and Wibull, “Military Culture”, 247.
475 Kim Schmidt, “FN- og NATO-tjeneste i Kroatien og Bosnien – en kompagnichefs 
erfaringer”, Militært Tidsskrift 125, no. 2 (June 1996): 100–104.
476 Eigil Schjønning, “Hæren og de fredsstøttende operationer!”, Militært Tidsskrift 128, 
no. 1 (March 1999): 83–87.
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all other tasks relied, even though its most probable mission would be 
low-intensity PSOs.477
The Norwegian contingents in the Balkans 1992–95 were pri-
marily involved in support functions, and did not, therefore, gain 
first-hand experience of regular platoon and company-size combat en-
gagement as did the Danes. While serving in support functions in 
Bosnia by no means meant serving in the rear, the Norwegian units 
in theatre did not have combat as their assigned role.478 Although the 
Norwegian forces experienced almost the same quantitative shift as the 
Danish forces in being deployed abroad, they did not experience the 
qualitative shift as strongly in terms of the types of mission they were 
asked to perform.479 Differences in the size and role of the Norwegian 
forces serving in international operations, slowed the embedding 
of new practices in the Norwegian Armed Forces . The Norwegian 
Armed Forces continued to espouse a view of international operations 
as “an unwelcome diversion of personnel and resources, rather than an 
opportunity to gain valuable experiences”.480
During the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia, atti-
tudes in the Norwegian military began to change. Norwegian officers 
serving in SFOR in Bosnia 1996–97 began to sense a more positive 
attitude in the Armed Forces towards participating in international 
operations.481 High-ranking officers wanted the government to pro-
vide more than the support units being despatched to internation-
al operations. The commander of the Norwegian contingent in the 
Nordic-Polish Brigade, Colonel Kjell Grandhagen, saw no compara-
tive advantage to Norway when it came to logistics and medical serv-
ices. Problems recruiting specialised personnel to those units created 
in fact a comparative disadvantage.482 Secondly, Grandhagen felt that 
the type of contribution Norway was making gave the country little 
credit in the Atlantic Alliance. Norway should send manoeuvre units 
477 H. H. Ekmann, “MULTINATIONAL CORPS Northeast”, Militært Tidsskrift 128, no. 
2 (May 1999): 162–169.
478 Gjeseth, Hæren i omveltning, 144.
479 Torunn Laugen Haaland, “Den norske militære profesjonsidentiteten: Kriger, hjem-
landsforsvarer og statsansatt tjenestemann”, in Krigerkultur i en fredsnasjon, ed. Håkan 
Edström, Nils Terje Lunde, and Janne Haaland Matlary (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2009), 
48–52.
480 Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach”, 166.
481 Interview with Kjell Narve Ludvigsen, who served as a senior officer in Sarajevo 1997, 
in Wegger Strømmen and Dag Leraand, I kamp for freden: UNIFIL i Libanon – Norge i 
UNIFIL 1978–1998 (Oslo: Gazette Bok as, 2005), 333–334.
482 Kjell Grandhagen, “Med IFOR til Bosnia-Herzegovina: Erfaringer fra den Nordisk-
Polske brigade”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 166, no. 2 (1997): 46.
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to Bosnia, urged Grandhagen.483 He also wanted units to be more ro-
bust, capable of forcing their will upon uncooperative parties in the 
area of operations.484 Other officers urged greater use of Norwegian 
Special Forces in robust PSOs abroad, as initial entry forces and for 
direct action missions.485
This initial trickle of support for a new overseas deployment policy 
grew into a flood after the Kosovo War, with officers such as Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Mood calling for change on his return from abroad.486 
The officers with experience of both actual and virtual combat op-
erations abroad returned with new ideas about how the Norwegian 
Armed Forces should be structured, organised, trained and equipped. 
They challenged the old worldview and its fixation on the peace-time 
training establishment the Norwegian Armed Forces had been dur-
ing the Cold War.487 In Lebanon and Bosnia in the 1990s Norwegian 
Army units had only been trained and organised for peacekeeping. 
After Kosovo there was a new emphasis on high-intensity warfighting 
capability as the benchmark for all other activities.488 What had tran-
spired in Denmark in the early 1990s, started to take place in Norway 
as well.
The early Danish emphasis on robust peacekeeping was well ahead 
of UN thinking at the time, but echoed the recommendations of the 
Brahimi Report submitted to the UN General Assembly in August 
2000, which emphasised the need for bigger, better equipped forces 
capable of offering a credible deterrent.489 While UN members in-
creasingly despatched well-equipped forces with robust rules of en-
gagement for peacekeeping operations in the wake of the Brahimi 
Report, it was policy in Denmark as early as the mid 1990s.490
SHIRBRIG, the Danish UN prestige project, was initially an ex-
ception to the Danish robustness rule. It was more of a traditional, 
infantry-based peacekeeping brigade. However, in June 2004, the 
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.: 19.
485 Erik Dokken and Magne Rødahl, “Norske Spesialstyrker i fremtidige internasjonale 
fredsoperasjoner”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 167, no. 10 (1998): 4–13.
486 Mood implored his political superiors and fellow officers “let us not do this again”. 
Mood, “Efaringer fra KFOR I”.
487 Interview with Major General Robert Mood January 2009 and Major General Per 
Arne Five February 2009.
488 Interview with Major General Kjell Grandhagen in Kjetil Eide, “Alltid beredt på det 
verste”, Hærfra – Tema: Vern om veteranene 8 (November 2004): 7.
489 UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (United Nations, 2000).
490 William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, “The Purposes of Peace Operations”, in 
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009, ed. A. Sarjoh Bah (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 12–13.
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Danish Government and most of the opposition parties agreed as part 
of the Danish Defence Agreement, 2005–2009, that Denmark would 
work towards developing SHIRBRIG so as to deploy with more robust 
units in the future, capable of executing Chapter VII missions of the 
UN Charter.491 The failure of this revitalisation project led to the deci-
sion to abolish SHIRBRIG in late 2008.492
In contrast to the Danish emphasis on robust, warfighting-capable 
units, the Norwegian UN readiness force remained structured around 
lightly equipped infantry until it was merged with the Norwegian 
NATO IRF units in 1999. The Norwegian unit was only capable of 
classic, consent-based peacekeeping missions, as opposed to the mus-
cular type of peacekeeping which became common in the 1990s. The 
supposedly warfighting-capable IRF battalion was also found lacking 
when it was required to deploy in Kosovo in 1999. When the battalion 
was initially established, it consisted of an infantry company equipped 
with wheeled lightly armoured vehicles and two infantry companies 
mounted in unarmoured tracked all-terrain vehicles. Considering 
the forces were in principle intended for high-intensity warfare, the 
battalion seemed inadequately equipped in terms of protection and 
firepower.493
Personnel policies
While the Norwegian military lacked the experience of the Danish 
Armed Forces of robust peacekeeping in the Balkans, there were other, 
more deep-seated reasons why the Norwegian military was a less man-
ageable foreign policy instrument than the Danish Armed Forces. The 
Norwegian approach to post-Cold War international military opera-
tions represents what Peter Viggo Jakobsen has called “an interesting 
combination of civilian activism and military foot-dragging”.494 In 
other words, the Norwegian military was a less-than-willing instru-
ment, even for those Norwegian politicians who wanted to employ the 
Armed Forces abroad.
Bjørn Tore Godal describes the confrontation over the 2002–2005 
Long Term Defence Plan as a “collision between two different views 
491 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om ... 2005–2009, 6.
492 Ritzau [Danish news agency], “Nordiske lande vil ud af FN-styrke”, Berlingske Ti-
dende, 7 August 2008.
493 Granviken, Strømmen, and Tjøstheim, Bruk av norske styrker i utlandet, 44–46.
494 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 145.
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on what the tasks of the Armed Forces were”. A large group of redun-
dant officers of colonel and lieutenant colonel rank, in alliance with 
retired senior officers and civilians who saw themselves as friends of 
the Armed Forces made up the traditionalists and the reactionaries op-
posing the reforms. This group was, according to Godal, still thinking 
in terms of yesterday’s security challenges. One of the reasons Godal 
gives to explain the strength of the opposition to reform is the or-
ganisation’s top-heavy structure. Despite being much smaller than the 
Swedish military, the Norwegian Armed Forces had twice as many 
admirals and generals.495 In 2002, Norway had three times as many 
officers at lieutenant colonel/commander level as Denmark, nine per 
cent of all military personnel in Norway compared to three per cent in 
Denmark.496 Three-quarters of the Danish Armed Forces were either 
enlisted soldiers or sergeants. In Norway it was about a quarter.497
If the Norwegian military wanted to carry out sustained military 
operations abroad, it had to be streamlined. The number of young, 
low-level “trigger-pullers” would have to grow, and the number of old, 
high-ranking desk officers fall. Re-introducing a professional NCO 
corps, as the leader of a working group proposed after the reform in 
2001, was meant to address this problem.498 Naturally, officers facing 
redundancy would be inclined to resist this process. Indeed, two of 
the three military unions were against the bill.499 A more profound 
question was, however, at stake in the reform. The reformists wanted 
to reduce the number of redundant traditionalist officers. While a vol-
untary separation package offered by the Norwegian government had 
slimmed the ranks of the Armed Forces, it was feared that if nothing 
was done to change the officer training system, a new group of re-
dundant older senior officers would soon emerge. These officers would 
re-entrench themselves and again make reforming the Armed Forces 
difficult.500
Another aspect of the NCO reform was the question of egalitarian-
ism in the Armed Forces. The military unions argued against the (re)
introduction of a professional NCO corps because it would allegedly 
495 Godal, Utsikter, 65–78.
496 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 54.
497 “Figur 5.14 Personellstrukturen i Danmark og Norge (2002)” in ibid., 53.
498 Røksund, “Befalsordningen”, 12–14.
499 Norwegian Union of Military Officers (NOF) and Military Officers’ Association 
(BFO), Om ny befalsordning i forsvaret (Oslo: NOF and BFO, 2003).
500 Røksund, “Befalsordningen”, 12–14.
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introduce an elitist class system into the Armed Forces.501 The new 
system, they claimed, would violate Norwegian values.502 An impor-
tant reason for merging the officer and the NCO corps had been to 
secure equal access to education and do away with outdated social di-
vides.503 As a consequence of this reform not only did Norway have a 
more top-heavy military hierarchy than Denmark, but leaders at lower 
levels were also consistently less experienced.
Norway had stood out in the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold 
War for lacking specialised leaders at the squad and section level, and 
this absence was frequently commented on by Norway’s allies.504 In 
most Alliance countries, e.g. Denmark, this was where the technical 
expertise in low-level tactics and weapons would lie.505 With increas-
ing military involvement abroad in the 1990s, resulting in increased 
risk for members of the Armed Forces, senior Norwegian officers and 
intellectuals pressed for an urgent revision of the system and the in-
troduction professional NCOs.506 Eventually the new system was in-
troduced in January 2005, giving Norway a military personnel system 
somewhat similar to the Danish on which it was modelled.507
There was, however, another key difference in the area of personnel 
that made the Danish Armed Forces much more capable of expedition-
ary operations: namely their enlistment contract system. In 2002, 46 
per cent of all Danish active regular soldiers had enlisted voluntarily, 
compared to nine per cent in Norway.508 At the same time, 25 per 
cent of all active soldiers in Denmark were conscripts, whereas the 
corresponding number in Norway was 57 per cent. This high percent-
age was an obstacle to projecting military force abroad. For the early 
UN missions to Suez and Congo, Norway had despatched conscripts. 
By the time of the Lebanon peacekeeping mission in 1978, Norway 
had revised its policy in this area, and conscripts were no longer de-
501 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 247–249.
502 Peter Andre Moe, “Leder: Landsstyret maner til kamp”, Befalsbladet 110, no. 1 (March 
2004): 3.
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bok for Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, Forsvarets høgskole, 1983–1984, ed. Rolf Tamnes 
(Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1984), 250–252.
505 Leif Lundesgaard, Brigaden i Nord-Norge 1953–1995 (Oslo: Elanders Forlag, 1995), 
197–201.
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ployed.509 Consequently, a higher percentage of volunteer enlisted sol-
diers gave Denmark an advantage when it came to making contribu-
tions to NATO and UN PSOs.
It is interesting to note that the Danish Home Guard had always 
been a voluntary organisation. While initially conceived as a voluntary 
force in Norway as well, concerns about recruitment and calls for a 
proper “people’s defence” resulted in the introduction of conscription 
for the Home Guard.510 More important than the principle of rely-
ing on volunteers or conscripting soldiers was, however, the issue of 
whether to employ regular, standing forces on contract (profession-
al soldiers). The 1973 Danish Defence Agreement had introduced a 
mixture of units manned by contracted soldiers alongside conscripted 
units, and the Social Democratic Party had been in favour of an all-
volunteer, standing military from the early 1970s to the late 1980s.511 
The military unions also supported wider professionalisation, and pro-
posed in September 1990 reducing the Army to two brigades manned 
by regular contracted soldiers, reserving conscripts for seven local de-
fence battalions and the Royal Guard battalion. Mobilisation-based 
units were to be cut to a minimum.512
In Norway, proposals to recruit a large number of volunteer enlisted 
soldiers during the Cold War were always controversial. Consequently, 
the group was restricted to a few specialists with certain technical 
skills for the duration of the East-West confrontation. The Norwegian 
Army never had more than about 250 contracted soldiers during this 
period.513 This did not change markedly with the establishment of 
the IRF battalion in 1993; the military and civilian leadership con-
tinued to be deeply concerned about “elite” units. The traditionally 
favoured Border Guard and Royal Guard battalions were given prior-
ity over the new battalion when conscripts were scarce, demonstrating 
the higher priority units with strictly national tasks were still held to 
509 Petter Marki, UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force: DANOR-bataljonen og det norske 
feltsykehuset: Suez, Sinai og Gazastripen 1956–1967 (Oslo: FN-Veteranenes Landsfor-
bund, 2008), 108; Sven-Erik Grieg Smith, Borger og soldat: Historien om det norske reser-
vebefalet og det forsvaret de tjente (Oslo: Grøndahl Dreyer, 1996), 130–132; Strømmen 
and Leraand, I kamp for freden, 237–239.
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Reconstruction 1945–46”, in Forsvarsstudier III: Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk forsknings-
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enjoy.514 Concerns over elite units can arguably be traced back to the 
strong Norwegian emphasis on egalitarianism.515 Historical accounts 
from the Second World War tended to idealise the Norwegian citizen-
soldier, who took up arms despite lack of proper military equipment 
or training.516
Resistance against all-volunteer units in Norway persisted beyond 
the reorientation of the Armed Forces after 2001. When the Chief of 
Defence proposed replacing two conscripted battalions with a volun-
teer battalion in 2008, the military unions lobbied for a larger Army, 
with four conscripted and only one all-volunteer battalion (which was 
already in existence).517 The traditional resistance to a small, profes-
sionalised military thus persisted into the new millennium, contin-
uing to deflect the Norwegian Armed Forces from employing more 
contracted units.
Different responses to internationalisation
While the debates about personnel structure were important because it 
affected the Armed Forces’ ability to participate in international mili-
tary operations, another debate dealt with the issue of whether such 
participation should be an obligation or a matter of choice. It is interest-
ing to note that while the Danish military unions argued for greater 
international orientation of the Danish Armed Forces, the Norwegian 
military unions did exactly the opposite. This is all the more interest-
ing because, during the Cold War, the Armed Forces in both countries 
had shared a negative attitude towards their one major source of mili-
tary deployment abroad: peacekeeping.
This attitude changed relatively rapidly in Denmark after the 
Cold War, partly driven by the success of robust peacekeeping opera-
tions in the Balkans, as outlined above. However, there were also some 
deeper reasons. First of all, the conceptual leap required to deploy the 
Armed Forces beyond national territory was smaller in Denmark than 
in Norway. Unlike the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Danish military 
514 Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach”, 155.
515 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 200–204.
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Pax Forlag, 1995), 163–164.
517 Norwegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport, 7–8; Nor-
wegian Union of Military Officers (NOF) and Military Officers’ Association (BFO), 
Forsvarsstudie 07: Arbeidstakerorganisasjonenes omforente syn på utvalgte forslag (Oslo: NOF 
and BFO, 2007), 5–8.
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had been charged during the Cold War with defending not only their 
own territory, but, in a forward-defence role, parts of Germany as well. 
To do this they had been tightly integrated with German land, air and 
sea forces through LANDJUT and Allied Forces Baltic Approaches.518 
Because the Danish PSO doctrine came to emphasise robustness and 
capacity for warfighting over and above classic peacekeeping and the 
missions were initially in the Balkans, the new international tasks 
could be seen as a continuation of the old NATO tasks of defending 
the near abroad as an extension of defending Denmark.519 By 1993–94, 
high-ranking members of the Danish officer corps were no longer be-
ing trained in the defence of Danish territory, but in conflict resolu-
tion, crisis management and the conduct of joint operations without 
reference to any particular geographical area. Examples were taken 
from all over the world.520
The shift towards projecting forces outside national territory was 
hence less of a revolution in Denmark than in Norway, where the 
Armed Forces had solely been tasked with defending Norwegian ter-
ritory in case of a general war.521 However, the mental shift required 
in the Norwegian case was probably even greater than this would 
suggest. Norwegian national romanticism has historically been par-
ticularly tied to Norwegian landscapes and geography, and histori-
cal accounts tend to reflect this by focusing on events that took place 
within the realm.522 Norwegian military history has therefore tra-
ditionally ignored historical accounts of military operations outside 
Norwegian territory. The objective has been to present the Armed 
Forces primarily as an institution tied to the territory and nation of 
Norway, a nation-building institution in other words.523 Norwegian 
officers have therefore not considered, even in historical terms, warf-
ighting abroad as a natural part of their sphere of duty as much as their 
Danish counterparts.
The difference in mentalities can be seen in the different respons-
es to increasing internationalisation of the armed forces of the two 
518 Volden, Danske hærordninger, 65–68.
519 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 169–173.
520 J. K. B. Pedersen, “Det nationale forsvars stilling”, Militært Tidsskrift 124, no. 1 
(March 1995): 57–64; Per Skov-Christensen and Jens Claus Hansen, “Det danske 
stabskursus”, Militært Tidsskrift 124, no. 1 (March 1995): 64–68.
521 Arne Olav Brundtland, “Nordisk optikk”, in Norge i det politiske kraftfeltet: Norden og 
USAs betydning for norsk politkk, ed. Bernt Bull and Anders Kjølberg (Oslo: Cappelen, 
1993), 124.
522 Anne Eriksen, “Norge – en naturlig historie”, Historisk Tidsskrift 76, no. 1 (1997): 
76–86.
523 Neumann and Ulriksen, “Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk”, 108–117.
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countries. There seemed to have been little grass-roots resistance to fur-
ther internationalisation within the Danish Armed Forces. Indeed, the 
military unions themselves created the momentum to set up the DIB 
by proposing in September 1990 to create a reserve brigade manned 
by volunteer soldiers for operations outside Denmark.524 When service 
in international operations became mandatory, only five per cent of 
the serving members of the Armed Forces chose to reserve themselves 
against this.525 Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, the Chief of Defence Staff, 
took this low number of reservations to indicate widespread support 
for the new international tasks that Danish Armed Forces were becom-
ing involved in.526
In contrast, when the Norwegian Government latterly proposed 
making participation in international military missions obligatory, it 
caused widespread debate and controversy. It was particularly contro-
versial within the ranks of the Armed Forces, evoking strong opposi-
tion from the largest military unions.527 Major General (ret.) Werner 
Christie led the charge against the Government. A soldier’s duty was 
to protect home and fatherland against those who would threaten their 
liberty; peace enforcement missions in distant conflict zones had noth-
ing in common with this objective.528 Christie also opposed moves to 
make service abroad more rewarding for officers’ careers.529 Being or-
dered to fight in distant conflicts would reduce Norwegian soldiers to 
the level of mercenaries, he said.530 The result of such military concerns 
was the interim 1999 law, under which it would have taken decades 
before the entire officer corps could be ordered to serve overseas. Only 
in 2004 was a genuine universal obligation for regular members of the 
Armed Forces to serve abroad introduced. By then military obstruc-
tionism had delayed legislation for a full decade after its adoption in 
Denmark.
The Norwegian academic and politician Espen Barth Eide sees the 
cause of this resistance to ordering soldiers overseas in a narrow view of 
524 Union of Privates and Corporals in the Danish Army (HKKF) and Central Association 
of Permanent Defence Personnel (CS), Et forsvar, der er brug for, 92.
525 Jakobsen, “The Danish Approach”, 121.
526 Hans Garde, “Dansk forsvars internationale engagement”, in Dansk Udenrigspoli-
tisk Årbog 1993, ed. Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (Copenhagen: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1994), 66.
527 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 201.
528 Werner Christie, “Tvangsbeordring til FN-tjeneste?”, Aftenposten, 23 February 1995, 
morning edition.
529 Werner Christie, “Tvangsbeordring. Det bøyelige gevær”, Aftenposten, 26 February 
1995, morning edition.
530 Werner Christie, “Beordret til å drepe. Ny lov om internasjonale militære operas-
joner”, Arbeiderbladet, 15 May 1996.
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the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not least within the institu-
tion itself.531 Changing established views and ways of doing things was 
a painful process for most of the Norwegian officer corps.532
The obligation to serve abroad is an example of military foot drag-
ging; the awarding of medals for doing so is another. As a result of the 
engagement in the Balkans, the Danish Armed Forces quickly felt the 
need to reward those distinguishing themselves in the line of duty. 
Consequently, in 1996 the Armed Forces introduced a medal for brav-
ery in combat, and one for those wounded in the line of duty. Norway 
finally introduced a universal medal for participation in international 
operations in 2000. But it took until 2005 before a medal was created 
honouring soldiers who had died or been wounded in combat. By 2008 
the question of whether or not to award a medal for bravery in combat 
still remained a hotly contested topic in Norway, over a decade after 
the first such post-World War II medal was awarded in Denmark.533
When Norwegian defence policy did take the proverbial leap to 
embrace expeditionary defence, with the new long-term plans intro-
duced in 2001 and 2004, the reforms still provoked the same fierce 
criticism from the older members of the officer corps. Commodore 
(Ret.) Jacob Børressen was the most articulate and persistent critic. 
He expressed his discontent with the reforms’ lessening emphasis on 
conscription as it severed the ties between nation and military, and 
weakened Norway’s ability to control and defend its own territory in-
dependently of its allies. Quality should not replace quantity to the 
degree now occurring, and interoperability with allies and the ability 
to deploy outside Norway should not be the be-all and end-all for all 
parts of the Armed Forces.534 Børressen quickly became the standard-
bearer for critics of the reforms.535 The ideological architect of the re-
forms, future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, had to answer allegations 
531 Espen Barth Eide, “Forsvarets internasjonale rolle”, Aftenposten, 18 April 1995, morn-
ing edition; –––, “En nordisk utenforlands tilpasningsstrategi: Norsk utenriks- og 
sikkerhetspolitikk i EUs skygge”, in Ny giv for nordisk samarbeid? Norsk, svensk og finsk 
sikkerhetspolitikk før og etter EUs nordlige utvidelse, ed. Iver B. Neumann (Oslo: Tano, 
1995), 196–200.
532 Espen Barth Eide, “Norsk multilateralt militærsamarbeid i en ny epoke”, in Sikkerhets-
politikk: Norge i makttriangelet mellom EU, Russland og USA, ed. Iver B. Neumann and 
Ståle Ulriksen (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1996), 310.
533 The Norwegian medal for bravery, Krigskorset, has so far only been awarded to veterans 
of the Second World War. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Norske soldater i krig”, Aftenpos-
ten, 14 November 2007, morning edition.
534 Jacob Børresen, “Norge – en småstat med stormaktsinteresser”, Norsk Militært Tids-
skrift 174, no. 4 (2004): 12–21; –––, “En forsvarsstrategi som ikke passer for Norge”, 
Aftenposten, 10 February 2005, morning edition.
535 See e.g. Torkel Hovland, “Forsvaret på villspor”, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 174, no. 6/7 
(2004): 12–15.
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that the Armed Forces had lost all legitimacy now that its raison d’être 
was no longer defence of the nation’s territory.536
However, these rearguard actions against the reforms were inevita-
bly doomed due to the average age of the protesters. As the polemical 
journalist Aslak Nore puts it, this was a generational cleavage. The de-
bate was resolved as the older Cold War generation naturally declined, 
and new officers realized the necessity of success in international mili-
tary operations to advance their careers.537 These younger officers felt 
being obliged to serve abroad constituted a natural part of their chosen 
profession.538 The remaining proponents of territorial rather than an 
Alliance-integrated defence were successfully branded as dinosaurs by 
the reformists, by which time they lost much of their influence.539 A 
series of interviews with members of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in 2006 show majority support for the new long-term plan. The new 
mobile, Alliance-integrated force structure was more suitable, felt the 
respondents, to this day and age than the old mobilisation-based ter-
ritorial defence force.540
Consequently, it seems that attitudes towards international mili-
tary operations were in fact changing around the end of the 1990s. 
Members of the Armed Forces were less likely to sense an inherent 
conflict between defending Norwegian territory and participating 
in military operations abroad. This was particularly the case in the 
Army, traditionally the most sceptical service of the Armed Forces. 
Participation NATO-led rather than UN operations also helped, be-
cause the Armed Forces were generally much more positive to NATO 
missions.541
In her study of role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
after the Cold War, Torunn Laugen Haaland found that Norwegian 
soldiers had primarily considered themselves “homeland defenders” 
and “state employees” at the end of the Cold War. A decade later, in-
volvement in challenging military operations overseas had revitalised 
a certain “warrior role” in the institution, making the Armed Forces 
536 Sverre Diesen, “Offiseren som etisk aktør: Etikken i Forsvarsstudie 2000”, PACEM 4, 
no. 1 (2001): 5–10. 
537 Nore, Gud er norsk, 212–216.
538 Interview with Major General Kjell Grandhagen in Åsmund Lang, “Stillstand ville 
vært det verste”, Befalsbladet 110, no. 4 (October 2004): 22–23.
539 Ulriksen, “Brydningstid”, 147.
540 Brachel, Botheim, and Bakkeland, Omstillingen av Forsvaret 2002–2005, 30–33.
541 Sigve Brekke and Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Politiske rammebetingelser for norsk deltagelse i 
internasjonale militære operasjoner, FFI/Rapport -96/04088 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment, 1997), 30–31.
	 Norwegian	and	Danish	defence	policy		117
both more able and willing to participate in dangerous military op-
erations abroad.542 By the time the second Norwegian battalion was 
rotated into Kosovo, warfighting skills and robustness had become the 
focus of the units deployed in theatre. Less emphasis was now put on 
special peacekeeping training, equipment and organisation.543
The “new model army” deployed to Afghanistan in the new cen-
tury was even more different from the army of the early 1990s. This 
“new army” considered the Cold War era conscript army as its antith-
esis.544 Cold War era officers had an understanding of duty and honour 
tied to fighting and possibly dying in direct defence of the nation.545 
The post-Cold War generation had developed pride in their profes-
sionalism and a kind of warrior ethos unknown in the old army.546 Its 
members viewed the Cold War force as a “rigid, passive, slow organisa-
tion with desk officers without combat experience”.547
The Armed Forces sought to strengthen this new expeditionary 
ethos. In 2004 the Army published a new historical work emphasising 
the long history of engagement in missions overseas, with the explicit 
aim to foster an expeditionary culture.548 Operations abroad strength-
ened rather than weakened the defence of Norway, and officers who did 
well abroad were now being hand-picked for the top jobs at home.549
The effect of military culture
Like many other Western military forces, both the Danish and the 
Norwegian armed forces had been mostly homebound “unblooded” 
armies after the Second World War.550 This changed with the end of 
the Cold War, as both countries became involved in a new type of 
PSOs around the world. Both the Norwegian and the Danish mili-
tary gradually came to rediscover some of their warrior roots after the 
542 Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach”, 244–257.
543 Rolf-Petter Larsen, Norske soldater i Kosovo – erfaringer “rett fra levra” (Oslo: Sypress 
forlag, 2006), 247–261.
544 Friis, “The Power of the Draft”, 112.
545 Karl Hellemsvik, “Refleksjoner rundt militær kultur”, in Kryssild: Militært lederskap i 
en ny tid, ed. Karl Hellemsvik and Johan Haarberg Kristian Firing (Trondheim: Tapir 
Akademisk Forlag, 2007), 143–150.
546 Friis, “The Power of the Draft”, 113–114.
547 Ibid., 112.
548 Lars J. Sølvberg, “Forord”, in Hær i verden: Oppdagelser – Operasjoner, ed. Jens A. Riisnæs 
(Oslo: Hærstaben, 2004), 6–7.
549 Dag Leraand, “Operasjonens art”, in Hær i verden: Oppdagelser – Operasjoner, ed. Jens A. 
Riisnæs (Oslo: Hærstaben, 2004), 24.
550 Lars Nyholm, “On the social organisation of western armed forces after the Cold War: 
a return to warrior ethics?”, Militært Tidsskrift 126, no. 4 (October 1997): 396.
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Cold War, embracing more of what Christopher Coker has called the 
warrior ethos.551 The Danish experience in the Gulf and especially in 
the Balkans however gave this transition in the Danish Armed Forces 
greater pace and breadth, leading to radical changes at tactical and op-
erational level in the employment of Danish forces abroad. Norwegian 
reluctance to commit combat forces to the two theatres slowed the 
progression of the new post-Cold War mentality in the military ranks 
in Norway.
An important reason for this is that the Danish military culture 
was more positive towards professionalisation and internationalisa-
tion in the first place. Hence, the Danish military culture facilitated 
a rapid transition to expeditionary operations, whereas the culture of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces served to slow the process and keep the 
organisation focused on its old Cold War tasks of territorial defence 
and traditional, non-robust UN peacekeeping.
551 Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2007).
Conclusion
Denmark was quicker to embrace operations going beyond traditional 
peacekeeping, it was quicker to give priority to peace operations in its defence 
planning, and it was the only one to give its military forces pride of place 
in its foreign policy.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen552
When studying the post-Cold War security and defence policies of 
Norway and Denmark, one is struck by the degree to which the pat-
terns established during more than four decades of Cold War were 
inverted. Following the Second World War, Denmark became a reluc-
tant ally within the Western camp,553 and throughout the Cold War 
it retained an image as that of the weakest link in the Alliance.554 
Norway, on the other hand, was not held to be a so reluctant an ally;555 
indeed, the Americans considered Norway to be one of the most coop-
erative countries within the Alliance .556
A little over a decade after the end of the Cold War, opinions had 
reversed. Given its almost pacifist Cold War policy, Denmark had 
made significant adjustments,557 and was now described as the impec-
cable ally.558 Meanwhile, by the end of the 1990s Norway had become 
a special case in NATO, and was in danger of becoming “the last cold 
552 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 93.
553 Eric S. Einhorn, “The Reluctant Ally: Danish Security Policy 1945–49”, Journal of 
Contemporary History 10, no. 3 (July 1975): 493–512.
554 Agger and Michelsen, “How strong was the ‘weakest link’?”.
555 Sverre Lodgaard and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Norway – the Not So Reluctant Ally”, 
Cooperation and Conflict 12, no. 4 (1977).
556 US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in conversation with Norwegian Prime Minis-
ter Odvar Nordli, 1978. Quoted in Tamnes, Oljealder, 61.
557 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 185.
558 Ringsmose and Rynning, “The Impeccable Ally?”
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warrior” in the Alliance.559 The reason for this inversion of perceptions 
was the new philosophy within the Alliance: to foster the capacity and 
willingness to participate in expeditionary military operations, prefer-
ably with combat troops in high-risk areas.
With the 2001 reform Norway did temporarily come to resem-
ble Denmark in terms of expeditionary capabilities, and Norway and 
Denmark made nearly identical contributions to the 2001–02 inva-
sion of Afghanistan. However, this alignment was short-lived. The 
2004 Danish Defence Agreement again gave expeditionary capacity in 
the Danish Armed Forces precedence, and the 2003 Danish participa-
tion in the Iraq War, followed by the 2006 decision to send regular 
ground forces into southern Afghanistan, again served to accentuate 
the differences between Norwegian and Danish defence policy.
This chapter draws the discussion of the preceding seven chapters 
together, and especially seeks to relate the different factors handled 
in chapter 4−7 to one another. It then attempts to present a few hy-
potheses about the future, drawing on recent developments in Danish 
and Norwegian defence policy. Finally, it offers a few reflections on 
viable future research topics, and how this study fits into a new form 
of history-writing relatively unknown in Scandinavia, which builds 
bridges between, on the one hand, a technical military literature, and 
on the other, a more accessible foreign policy history.
Geopolitics, leadership, strategic and military 
culture
As we have seen, the reasons Norway and Denmark parted ways in the 
extent of their willingness and ability to pursue a policy of expedition-
ary warfighting in the post-Cold War era can be divided into four main 
categories:
559 Tamnes, “The Strategic Importance of the High North”, 274; Mevik, Det nye NATO: 
en personlig beretning, 101.
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Table 3: Overview of factors determining change or continuity in Norwegian 
and Danish defence policy after the Cold War
Norway Denmark
Geopolitics • Lingering threat from 
Russia and need to exercise 
sovereignty/authority in 
maritime areas. Therefore 
territorially focused
• No military threat to Danish 
territory after the Cold War 
Could therefore refocus 
the Armed Forces on 
combating distant/diffuse 
risks
Leadership • Political and bureaucratic 
desire for continuity
• Successful example of 
political and bureaucratic 
inertia
• Ambivalent leaders 
unwilling to identify clear 
priorities
• Political and bureaucratic 
desire for change
• Successful case of 
political and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship
• Willingness to make tough 
choices and prioritise
Strategic 
Culture
• Political consensus 
persisted which 
emphasised traditional role 
of the Norwegian armed 
forces
• Use of the Armed Forces 
abroad seen as much as 
humanitarian as national 
security issue
• Old Cold War functions to 
defend the state and build 
the nations still relevant
• New political consensus 
emerged which viewed the 
Armed Forces as useful and 
employable foreign policy 
tool
• Use of armed force against 
distant new threats seen 
as necessary and vital for 
national security
• Cold War symbolic defence 
functions of the military 
obsolete in the new era
Military 
Culture
• Strong national service 
traditions. Top heavy force
• Lacked professional 
soldiers and NCOs
• Opposition to operations 
outside of Norwegian 
territory
• Weaker national service 
tradition. Balanced force.
• Tradition for employing 
professional soldiers/NCOs
• Stronger support for 
expeditionary operations
These factors played out differently at different periods.
Marked differences in geopolitical environment remained the prom-
inent factor throughout the period covered. Denmark’s geopolitical 
concerns decreased more in these years than Norway’s. Denmark’s sense 
of security was strengthen by Poland’s NATO membership in 1999. 
Thus Danish freedom to combat distant and diffuse threats grew over 
the years. For Norway, perceptions of the geopolitical environment 
changed to a lesser extent. The decline of the Russian military, new 
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advances in military technology, and the drastically reduced probabil-
ity of a Russian desire to occupy Norwegian territory, combined to 
make the invasion defence forces obsolete by the turn of the century. 
However, the Norwegian government remained concerned about the 
possible application of limited force in the High North. In addition, 
the economic importance of the High North was growing, increasing 
the need to maintain a presence in the region, to exercise sovereignty 
and authority, and to have the necessary capacity for managing a lim-
ited crisis.
The appearance of decisive leadership was a striking phenomenon 
in Denmark in the 1990s. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup, 
working closely with military counterparts such as Hans Garde, man-
aged to overcome entrenched domestic constraints on overseas deploy-
ment of military force. Their success, part skill and part luck, created 
a new domestic consensus: it was now viewed as normal and even desi-
rable for Danish soldiers to be located on the frontlines in distant wars. 
Bjørn Tore Godal and Kristin Krohn Devold, acting as the political 
agents of military reformers such as Sverre Diesen, played a somewhat 
less prominent role in Norway in the beginning of the new millenni-
um. They managed to overcome domestic opposition to scrapping the 
Cold War era invasion defence force and to introducing a more modern 
and employable structure. They did not, however, manage to do more 
than soften domestic constraints on engaging in combat operations 
abroad, which still remained controversial. Nor did they manage to 
set political priorities for the Armed Forces by closing redundant bases 
and cutting excess capacity.
The advent of successful political leadership in Denmark on the 
cusp of the post-Cold War period resulted in the emergence of differ-
ent strategic cultures in Norway and Denmark. During the Cold War 
Denmark and Norway had shared a common Nordic outlook towards 
the use of force, on sovereignty and international institutions. In the 
post-Cold War world, Norway retained much more of these classical 
Nordic positions than Denmark. The latter now reinvented itself as 
a strategic actor feeling it occasionally necessary to employ military 
means against the dangers of this world, whether condoned by inter-
national institutions or not. Denmark thus reinvented a new strategic 
role for its Armed Forces, as expeditionary warriors first and homeland 
security providers second. In Norway, however, the Armed Forces’ 
strategic tasks remained tied to the more classic role of defending state 
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and territory, while conscription as a nation-building instrument con-
tinued to inform the popular image of the military.
Differences in military culture became appearant in the 1990s, as 
conservative older officers in Norway fought against Armed Forces 
cuts, the re-introduction of an NCO corps and the obligation of 
Norwegian officers to serve overseas in international military opera-
tions. In Denmark these issues were not only uncontroversial, they 
were actively advocated by the Armed Forces. With the post-2001 
military reforms, the deployment in combat operations in Yugoslavia 
in 1999 and Afghanistan since 2002, the Norwegian Armed Forces 
began slowly to break with the past’s absolute attachment to a large 
conscripted force and territorial defence. Thus the sharp differences in 
military culture were a transitory phenomenon, although the Danish 
Armed Forces still had a higher contingent of professional soldiers and 
remained more focused on high-intensity, expeditionary warfighting.
The present and the future
Both Norway and Denmark are committed to currents levels of inter-
national deployment, though the latter is showing the strain. Denmark 
maintains its focus on deploying combat forces under the NATO or 
US/UK umbrella; Norway will continue its balancing of national and 
Alliance-integrated tasks.
The 2008 Danish Defence Commission, chaired by Hans 
Hækkerup, presented its findings in March 2009. Current Danish de-
fence policy should continue in broad measure.560 The June 2009 Danish 
Defence Agreement 2010–2014 largely adopted the Commission’s 
recommendations.561 While there is dissent, criticism has mostly been 
limited to questioning whether the report was innovative enough.562 
Danish defence policy is therefore unlikely to change in the short 
term. The recent appointment of the Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s General Secretary also seems to confirm 
560 Danish Defence Commission of 2008, Dansk forsvar – Globalt engagement (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 2009).
561 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2010–2014 (Copenhagen: 
Danish MoD, 24 June 2009).
562 Poul Aarøe Pedersen, “Forsvarskommissionen turde ikke udfordre vanetænkningen”, 
Politiken, 31 March 2009.
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Denmark’s excellent standing in NATO circles, giving Denmark some 
cause to congratulate itself.563
Denmark has remained relatively unconstrained by its Arctic 
possession Greenland, or indeed by the Faeroe Islands. The 2009 
Defence Agreement gives more attention to these areas. A joint Arctic 
Command will be created, along with a force catalogue, known as the 
Arctic Response Force, composed of units capable of operating in the 
Arctic. Aware of the opportunity created by the melting of the polar 
ice cap to exploit the natural resources and establish new sea routes in 
the Arctic, Denmark is considering following Norway’s lead and allo-
cating more resources to increasing its military footprint in the area.564
At the moment, however, were Denmark to reduce its internation-
al military commitment the reason would be either the great strain 
on personnel and equipment, and/or a popular backlash in light of the 
mounting casualties. Retention of personnel is perhaps the most seri-
ous problem, seeing as how the Danish Armed Forces are now short of 
2,300 soldiers at the start of 2009.565 The strain on equipment has also 
been substantial, as the increasing Danish deployment tempo has not 
resulted in any comparable increase in defence spending. Though dif-
ferences have narrowed somewhat, Norway spent more than Denmark 
on defence in the entire 1990–2007 period, and also invested a much 
higher percentage of its defence budgets in new equipment. While 
Denmark is increasing its defence expenditure somewhat, it is nev-
ertheless forced to cut capacities even more in order to focus on the 
remaining. The 2009 Defence Agreement scrapped the M109 self-
propelled artillery system, as well as the Army’s ground-based, short-
range air-defence systems.566
The recent Norwegian Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 
2009–2012, presented in March 2008, contained no shocks. The cur-
rent force structure of the Norwegian military will continue, albeit 
with some rationalisation. Overall the Norwegian Armed Forces re-
main occupied with their dual mission, a national, territorial one and 
an alliance integrated one abroad.567 The High North receives wider 
attention, and the budget for 2009 allocated more funds to increase 
563 The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was, however, also mentioned as a 
possible candidate if Rasmussen was rejected. Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Backs Dane for 
NATO Post Amid Turkey’s Objections”, New York Times, 23 March 2009.
564 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om … 2010–2014, 10–11.
565 Danish Defence Commission of 2008, Dansk forsvar – Globalt engagement, 1.
566 Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om … 2010–2014, 22–27.
567 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Et forsvar til vern.
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slightly the Navy’s and Air Force’s presence in the region, and in-
crease the Army’s readiness.568 Linked to Norway’s growing concerns 
about a resurgent Russia and the growing importance of the High 
North is the Government’s attempt to bring NATO “back into area”. 
This is necessary, the Government argues, to strengthen the organisa-
tion’s legitimacy, which in turn will strengthen support for out-of-area 
missions.569
There seems to be little prospect of the present centre-left 
Government changing the established policy of providing combat 
troops only to relatively safe locations. In Afghanistan the Government 
wants less emphasis on the military.570 Norway seems therefore for the 
moment to continue rotating troops for stability operations, rather 
than participating in high-intensity combat as initial entry forces.
Final remarks
This study has attempted a detailed comparative analysis of Norwegian 
and Danish defence policy after the Cold War, a field in which the dif-
ferences between these very similar countries have been so remarkable 
as to inspire frequent comments in the media, popular culture, as well 
as academic and military studies. It is, however, by no means a com-
prehensive study, dealing as it does with nearly 20 years of history and 
several different aspects of security and defence policy. Firstly, perhaps 
one of the most unexpected findings I made, about which nothing has 
appeared in the scholarly literature to my knowledge, is the substan-
tial differences between the personnel structure and traditions of the 
armed forces of Norway and Denmark. There is certainly a compara-
tive article waiting to be written on this subject alone, if only military 
researchers could turn their attention away from their own particu-
lar country of study. Secondly, little has been done comparatively on 
Scandinavia by contributors to the strategic culture literature. Given 
the many similarities between Norway and Denmark, their defence 
sector differences would surely make an excellent subject for a his-
torical study. It would explore precisely the “same-but-different” for-
eign policy cultures and draw on recent developments in the field of 
568 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, For budsjettåret 2009, Proposition to the Storting, no. 
1 (2008–2009), 26–28.
569 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interesser, ansvar og muligheter: Hovedlinjer i norsk 
utenrikspolitikk, Report to the Storting, no. 15 (2008–2009), 95–96.
570 Ibid., 92.
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strategic culture to bring it up to date. Finally, and most importantly, 
relatively little has been written in the cross-sectional field of military 
and foreign policy history in Scandinavia. Military history tends to be 
narrow and specialised, and general political and foreign policy his-
tory tends to ignore military issues. While this may have a natural 
explanation in the long peace of the Cold War, the “militarisation” of 
Scandinavian foreign policy over the last two decades has surely cre-
ated room for this type of history.571 Hopefully, this study is but one of 
many new contributions to this genre.
571 Note that the word militarisation is used here in a neutral, analytical, not a derogatory 
sense.
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